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“Italian food internationalisation process: the case of Beretta and Senfter in China” aims to 
understand how to be successful in China with Made in Italy and Italian traditional food. The 
main goal of the dissertation is to analyse the internationalisation process of Italian food 
companies and to identify the best practices needed to plan a direct presence in Mainland China. 
The value of this research is on the usage of the Uppsala model – an “old” theory made in 1997 
– which makes the analysis replicable and comparable to other industries, but also points out 
criticism on the usage of other models and theories. Moreover in the literature there is a lack of 
case studies related to internationalisation process of multidomestic industries, like food 
industry. Neither country far from host country have been deeply analysed both by theoretical 
and empirical literature available now.  
Before starting this case study analysis, an investigation of the Chinese market and of the 
opportunities within it has been developed. The main trends are social, economic, technological, 
political, and regulatory changes.  
Later internationalisation strategies and structure will be taken into consideration, trying to 
discover which is the most suitable FDI structure in China for a food company and then Uppsala 
model for the internationalisation process will be studied.  
With all the theoretical framework designed the case study analysis can be done.  Why choosing 
a case study and case study structure will be explained and with all data on hands they will be 












































“Italian food internationalisation process: the case of Beretta and Senfter in China” aims 
to understand how to be in China with Made in Italy and Italian traditional food.  
The national agri-food is worth 205 billion and represents 12% of Italian GDP, but it is above 
all the driving force for the entire economy abroad, where it is the true symbol of Made in Italy 
(Brizzo, 2019).  
In 2019 there was a record jump in Made in Italy food in China that marked a 20% increase in 
exports. This is what emerges from an analysis by Coldiretti on the basis of ISTAT data relating 
to the month of January, disclosed during the visit of Chinese President Xi Jinping in Italy. This 
trend has been growing for years, with exports of Made in Italy agri-food products to China that 
reached the historical record of 439 million euros in 2018. This value has more than tripled in 
the last 10 years (+254%) with the progressive opening of the Asian giant to Western lifestyles 
(Coldiretti, 2019). It is therefore interesting to know about Italian stories overseas.  
The thesis will focus on understanding why an Italian food company should invest in Mainland 
China, how to invest in that country and which are the drivers of the internationalisation process.  
 
Having this mission in mind, it has been decided to develop a multiple case study by 
interviewing companies that have already invested in the country, i.e. Fratelli Beretta and ISU 
(Independent Salumi Union), also considering recent changes and developments.  
 
For this reason at the beginning it has been done Chinese market analysis, studying social 
trends; cultural trends and Hofstede cultural dimension; economic trends and political changes, 
among which reasons for investing in one country rather than another one and what does it 
mean investing in a developing country; technological trends, studying online channels like 
Alibaba, WeChat, Baidu, Tencent and Jingdong (JD).  
Later internationalisation strategies and structure have been taken into consideration, trying to 
discover which is the most suitable FDI (Foreign direct investment) in China with a food 
company. Data have been studied through the Uppsala Model, in order to be able to analyse the 
whole internationalisation process and not one step only. 
 
The value of this research is on the usage of the Uppsala model – an “old” theory made in 1997 
– which makes the analysis replicable and comparable to other industries, but also points out 
criticism on the usage of other models and theories. Moreover in the literature there is a lack of 
case studies related to internationalisation process of multidomestic industries, like food 
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industry. Neither country far from host country have been deeply analysed both by theoretical 
and empirical literature available now.  
 
In the first chapter opportunities have been analysed by observing trends and studying how 
they create favourable circumstances for entrepreneurs to pursue (Barringer, 2012, p. 44), an 
analysis of the Chinese market and of the opportunities within it has been developed. The main 
trends are social, economic, technological, political, and regulatory changes. 
Social trends might be predicted but macroeconomic shocks might happen and change them 
consequently. In 2020, the appreciation of safe and healthy food has increased, and the value 
of Made in Italy remains way higher, in particular PDO and CDO products are a good weapon 
in the internationalisation strategy. However, teaching the value of an Italian product is not that 
easy in China, and, apart from expatriates, the market has all to be built. 
Macroeconomic factors have been studied: trade costs are lowering thanks to considerable 
economic policies and alliances among governments that are in place, in particular Belt and 
Road initiative related agreements. Moreover, Chinese giants, in collaboration with the 
government, are fighting counterfeit, increasing Italian products value, knowing that Chinese 
customers are willing to pay when quality is well communicated and ensured.  
Speaking of technological trends, it might be said that online channels can overcome 
commercial and financial barriers when going abroad, avoiding settling in the Chinese mainland 
from the beginning, besides saving money through customers optimisation and supply chain 
adaptation.  
For now, the best platform to approach the new market without having a presence in mainland 
China is T-mall global (Alibaba.com), although in this case an overseas entity can sell products 
on T-mall only through a cooperation with a Chinese entity/partner (Third-party). Unfortunately 
given fees and barriers on cured meats and Italian meat, even using international platforms 
would not help entrance into China.  
 
The second chapter is about internationalisation strategies, for what concern the governance 
first and then the process itself by using the Uppsala Model.  
It has been studied which might be the most suitable FDI structure in China for a food company 
and it turned out to be International Joint Venture (JV), considering that the Chinese 
government forces multinational companies to use independent JV firms for entering China and 
to enhance the development of Chinese infrastructure. JV makes it easier to enter the market, 
considering that shares risk, knowledge, distribution network and expertise, making it easier to 
overcome the liability of foreignness. Both Senfter and Beretta have used this structure to gain 
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market knowledge and exploit distribution channels of the partner. However, JV is not a once-
for-all relation; it is a dynamic relationship which evolves over time, as it does the 
internationalisation process. 
 
On the other hand, to study the internationalisation process Uppsala theoretical model has been 
used. This is based on two main criteria, the network view of the business context and the 
establishment chain.   
According to the network view of the business context, firms expand predominantly in markets 
similar to or adjacent to their home market. However, we will see how relationships have an 
impact on foreign market selection as well as on the mode of entry in the context of ongoing 
network processes (Coviello and Munro 1997; see Johanson & Vahlne, 2009, p.1413).  
Moreover, the evolution of the company’s foreign presence is progressive (establishment 
chain), but when assuming this, institutional reasons, for instance commercial barriers, were 
not considered by the model. Reading Bråmå, Andersson and Solid (2006, p. 10), it seems clear 
that contextual differences between different countries and institutions make it difficult to use 
international studies to generalize the Swedish conditions to other countries in the Uppsala 
model. The theory also ignores company strategy and the local adaptation of companies, which 
is very important in a multidomestic industry. We will see how Chinese customers need to be 
educated to increase sales of Italian food in the mainland.  
 
In the third chapter, with all the theoretical framework done, Fratelli Beretta and ISU 
(Independent Salumi Union) have been interviewed considering recent changes and 
developments, and their data analysed through the Uppsala Model. 
The core of doing a case study is to investigate a contemporary phenomenon in depth and within 
its real-world context, especially when the boundaries between phenomenon and context may 
not be evident enough to find out which elements have influenced company success and which 
not.  Doing a questionnaire would have not been significative, given the small number of 
companies with a direct FDI in Mainland China, while sample size in a case study is irrelevant 
(Lipsey, 1990) and it gives the possibility to understand each case more in-depth.  
Having even more complete information than you need, you always give rise to further 
reflections, and go beyond the starting model from which the analysis begins, is both the 
richness, and the difficulties of the case study.  
After the interview similarities and differences between the two cases with respect to the 
following topics have been analysed: entrance mode, human resources management, financial 
and economic data and plants location.   
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ISU Shanghai Yi Hua Food has never done export, it entered in China through a JV with 
completely different product compared to the domestic one and then, when it gained enough 
market knowledge, it decided to go alone, building a wholly owned subsidiary focused on 
traditional Italian food. 
Differently Beretta, which tried to enter in China for the first time in 2007, approached the 
market at first by exporting PDO products, the only approved by Chines government, which 
have been admitted in that year. Then Beretta opened a JV, at the beginning in a brownfield 
investment and consequently building up a new plant, making a greenfield investment.  
The different plants are located all around China, actually all their factories are or were 
distributed in the richest cities in the mainland. 
For what concern company strategy, from the analysis it can be deducted that the two strategies 
are similar both in terms of channels and in terms of products, with the only difference that a 
company, the Senfter’ s one, started with cost focus before arriving at the differentiation, also 
because it entered the country in a different historical period than its competitor, Beretta. 
The last part of the analysis is focused on the Uppsala model, which is made of four variables, 
state and change ones. All the four state and change variables have been taken into 
consideration, giving the forecasted effect, generating gradually commitment - the two 
companies build gradually their position in the market -, trust relationship - it is a long process 
of customers education-  and good performances – capabilities.  
 
Entering China is about relationships and opportunities. Uppsala Model has been little used 
today for multi-household industries, which for definition require adaptation, in developing 
countries or in any case in countries distant from home, probably because the gradual 
internationalization in such cases is not the rule. It is difficult to generalize from one country to 
all the others, given cultural, social and macroeconomic differences among them all. 
The kind of relationship seems actually relevant in discriminating successful companies from 
not or less successful ones. When the relationship is driven by trust and collaboration it may 
also help in accelerating the learning process and knowledge development. It is not given that 
a company’s knowledge must be built on its own, this may be taken from outside partners or 
competitors. On the other hand if the relationship is pure network and not based on previous 
collaboration and trust, this may not give any additional value rather than the possibility to enter 
in the country. 
Senfter Family (ISU Shanghai Yi Hua Food) approached China without having any other 
presence in the international market, and without being China a country neighbouring Italy, 
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since it is 7,562 km distant. Besides Beretta had previous investments across Europe and in 
USA (network view of the business context).  
Beretta entered in the country with export but has still not completed the internationalisation 
process of the Uppsala Model, while Senfter is building his second plant on his own, showing, 
according to Uppsala and his model , higher commitment, which should be related and 
proportional to higher success (establishment chain).  
However Beretta, has seen a growth of 20% in the last 5 years, compared to Senfter 5%, not 
precisely what one should expect if basing forecasts on the Uppsala Model. 
According to the literature joint venture structure is not a once for all relationship, it is a 
dynamic relationship as internationalisation process is. Once the partner has gained enough 
market knowledge, he will be able to have a business alone. The issue here is whether Senfter 
in 2001 had enough knowledge to do a company on his own without any Chinese partner.  
Actually, although Senfter is in China from more time, and although this has been helpful for 
learning Chinese culture, he has changed company strategy once, in 2001 when it was taken the 
decision of producing Italian sounding products and no more Chinese cured meats. This change 
in the products selections completely changed the distribution channels, targeted customers and 
need for marketing activities, meaning that previous knowledge were useful as foreseen. 
Moreover changing trademark in 2018, after 17 years of sales, contributed to creating more 
confusion to the management and to customers, requiring still more effort for creating trust and 
reputation in the market.  
On the other hand Beretta has always been linear in the strategy, promoting standardised Italian 
sounding cured meats, besides being in a multidomestic industry which for definition requires 
adaptation, building knowledge of the market and an excellent reputation in it.  
Changing strategy may have decreased Senfter knowledge advantage compared to Beretta. It 
does not matter from how long a company is investing in a country, if it changes its strategy it 
will be almost like starting again from the beginning in building knowledge and experience, but 

























Ch.1 Why should an Italian food company be interested in the Chinese 
market? Chinese market analysis 
The thesis will focus on understanding why an Italian food company should invest in Mainland 
China, how to invest in that country and which are the drivers of the internationalisation process. 
However, before doing that, it is crucial to understand why China can be an interesting country 
for Italian food companies in particular, highlighting trends and changes of the last periods in 
this market, which is so far from Italy. These insights should give a clue to companies whether 
they are or they are not able to satisfy customers’ needs and whether their product might be 
suitable for that country or needs some changes and development, or even whether there is 
enough space to build an entirely new market.  
An investigation of the Chinese market and of the opportunities within it has been developed. 
Actually, according to Barringer (2012, p. 44), opportunities may be identified by observing 
trends and studying how they create favourable circumstances for entrepreneurs. The main 
trends are social, economic, technological, political, and regulatory changes. 
1.1. Social and cultural trends  
In the following chapter both Chinese social and cultural trends will be taken into consideration. 
Social trends are relevant to understand which directions are taking Chinese customers’ tastes 
and preferences. On the other hand cultural trends are important to understand because having 
a deep knowledge of the host country culture will surely help in doing conscious business. This 
assumption gains far more relevance linked to the fact that food is a multidomestic industry and  
most of the strategy of food companies is based on geographical decentralisation, with different 
commercial subsidiaries in different countries, with their own marketing strategy and product 
development, according to different market tastes.  
1.1.1. Social trends 
2020 has been the year of the biggest pandemic ever due to the virus Covid-19. The huge 
impact has been caused by globalisation, although it started in China.  
A part from the economic impact of the pandemic, the virus Covid-19 has had also an impact 
on consumers preferences, which is clearly the main social trend for the year 2020 and, surprise, 




Starting from March 2020, while the whole world was dealing with the virus, with Italy as the 
most affected, China was going out of the crisis. McKinsey & Company (2020) has done a 
webinar about how the behaviour of Chinese consumers has changed after the virus. 
From these data emerged that  the penetration of ecommerce has soared. Despite a general fall 
in discretionary consumption, during the pandemic the tendency to buy mainly online has been 
consolidated, both in already strong categories such as skincare and make-up and in categories 
that previously were purchased little online. In alcohol, for example, the propensity to purchase 
online has grown from 39% to 63%. If it is in some sense assumed that those who cannot go 
out purchases more online, it is interesting to understand what happens next. The analysis 
estimates that in the post-crisis period a part of this growth will be consolidated and that online 
will increase its penetration by an average of 3-6 percentage points. This is a huge jump in just 
few weeks.   
The growth of e-commerce is driven by the approach to this distribution channel by those who 
previously did not buy online, and the profile of the online shopper has therefore drastically 
changed: if before 51% of buyers  were less than 30 years old, now the impact on the total under 
30 has fallen to 41%, with the over forty passed from a weight of 19% to 25%. Online shopping 
has become an adult game. 
Although the data related to online purchases are compelling, it is not necessary that the demand 
will restart. In many categories’ consumers show a propensity to buy less in the future than 
before. Both online and offline, 21% of consumers will buy less snacks (against 8% who will 
buy a little more or much more), 17% will buy less make-up (10% will buy more) and 16% will 
drink less alcohol (9% will buy more). The implications of these trends for companies are clear: 
the pandemic is a point of no return for ecommerce and it is needed a jump on the omnichannel 
strategy, also the companies that had moved more timidly in this direction. This is also true for 
those who thought they had more time available because they turned to a more mature customer 
who until yesterday was less interested in online purchases. 
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Romano Cappellari in his article "E dopo? Spunti dalla Cina per il marketing" of 20th March 
2020, suggests not to panic and resist the temptation to make the most classic of the mistakes 
of the recession periods, the one of cutting investments in communication. Without the 
stimulation of communication there is the risk that the consumer will maintain the "bad habits" 
acquired during the pandemic. Of course, here too the communication mix must be in line with 
a digitalized consumer.   
Graph. 1 – China growth rates of sales of consumer goods by type between January-March 
2019-2020 (National Bureau of Statistics – NBS) 
In Graph. 1 there are represented China growth rates of sales of consumer goods by type 
between January-March 2019-2020, highlighting that people started to purchase mainly 
essential goods rather than furniture, clothing, cars and more.   
Consistently with this trend, at the beginning of April, when the first reopening in China began, 
Mintel carried out an analysis of the reaction of Chinese consumers to the various phases of the 
Covid-19 pandemic. From this analysis three main trends emerged, continuing even in the post-
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emergency, such as the preference for fresh food and the tendency to cook at home; exponential 
increase in online spending in China, even by the most reluctant consumers to use new 
technologies, starting with the older ones, especially for the grocery; the renewed interest in 
local products and nearby shops. The latest trends can certainly be disadvantageous to exports 
and, in this sense, the advice of Mintel to companies and retailers is to consider long-term 
policies: those who succeed in ensuring more adequate and rapid responses to the needs of 
communities will emerge reinforced by the crisis (Foodweb, 2020).  
Coherently with the suggestion of Mintel, an article from Food.net in May, written in 
collaboration with ICE, highlights that food consumption in China has remained resilient and a 
promotional plan adapted to the new scenario will also support import products in the medium 
term. Last year, imports of agri-food products into China reached USD 570 million. Particularly 
popular are the basic products of the Mediterranean diet such as wine, pasta, and extra virgin 
olive oil, but also chocolate, coffee, mineral water and cheese. As regards the final demand for 
both packaged and frozen products and fresh products, a positive dynamic has been observed, 
in particular for fruit and vegetables, dairy products, meat and fish, while for sauces, seasonings 
and vegetable oils a decrease in volumes consumed has been seen, due to the strong contraction 
recorded by the channel HO.RE.CA. (Food.Net – Maggio 2020).  
This statements have been confirmed by Filippo Fasulo during the Webinar “La Cina post 
Covid: scenari e prospettive per affrontare la ripresa economica”. There has been a turnaround 
of the trends in the change of the “basket of goods” of Chinese customers (Tab.1) which was 
seeing a decrease in the food and beverage expenses among 2002 and 2017. This trend is strictly 
connected with the attention to the quality of product, giving high potentiality and margin to 
our agri-food sector (Filippo Fasulo). 
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Tab. 1 – Total retail sales of consumer goods in April 2020 (Fasulo, 2020)  
Which were the trends before coronavirus?   
According to Peter Pivelli of Justfood.com, yet in 2019 the trends forecasted for 2020 in the 
food market where:  do it yourself food, heating products on-the-go, goody boxes, light eating, 
singles people.  Also Tmall has revealed seven trends in China F&B consumer market, which 
are small packaging, diet replacement meals, low sugar, international brands, internet 
sensations, inter-industry cooperation and revival of cultural elements, which might seem 
contradictory to the increasing interest in international brands. The truth is that what matters 
most is the path in which consumers preferences are going, and the fil rouge of that path is 
healthy lifestyle and sustainability, matched with increased curiosity for cultures.  
However, it remains true that going abroad requires an understanding of local tastes. Chinese 
consumers are changing their preferences, there is a strong demand for simple and healthy food, 
whichever must be convenient.  
Rosie Lintott (2019), basing on Global Data’s report, found that Chinese consumers are being 
influenced by the global trend towards healthy eating; consumers are becoming more conscious 
about their overall health and pay more attention to the nutritional value of dishes and food. Be 
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careful that Organic restaurants are growing in popularity and Veganism has also become more 
popular among the Chinese food industry. According to statistics from the South China 
Morning post the vegan market is expected to rise by more than 17% from 2015 to 2020. 
 
Chinese consumers, especially those in the growing middle class, are very concerned about 
food safety, and safe supply chain.  
“If you don’t have safety, it is going to backlash on every other trend that we talk about, be it 
health or sustainability”, Stephane Alpern, managing partner of Kantar Consulting for 
Southeast Asia, told to the recent Food Industry Asia (FIA) Food for Future Summit in 
Singapore (WARC, 2019). 
According to Luisa Burwood-Taylor (2019) in any country, a fragmented, opaque, and 
inefficient supply chain is at the heart of the problem, particularly when it comes to perishables 
like meat and vegetables. In early-stage deals, several companies raised funding for blockchain-
enabled traceability technologies. PDO (Protected Designation of Origin), COD (Controlled 
Designation of Origin) and PGI (Protected geographical indication) are clear signals of a safe 
supply chain and there are actually relevant data reflecting the preferences of middle-class 
Chinese customers for these kinds of products. Ecommerce giants and Chinese government are 
making several deals with Italy in order to protect them. 
 
Food safety is the assurance that food will not cause harm to the consumer when it is prepared 
and consumed according to its intended use (World Health Organization, 2017). It  is a global 
issue that affects the health of populations in both industrialised and developing countries 
(DeWaal & Robert, 2005) and is day after day gathering more relevance for Chinese customers, 
mainly in the emerging middle class.  
 
Recent progress on food safety legislation and regulation, however, has been limited by the 
huge scale of China’s food industry, which makes it difficult to uphold high safety standards 
across the vast diversity of food products. As it is the case with other large developing countries 
such as India (Umali-Deininger & Sur, 2007), China’s regulatory approaches are complicated 
by the sheer size of the food sector: more than 450 000 food production and processing 
companies are active in China, 350 000 of which are small enterprises with fewer than ten 
employees. For these small food companies, the wide array of required safety tests can be a 
significant burden, particularly in the absence of cheap and standardised testing protocols. One 
important way forward is to aid and training to these small enterprises, particularly by teaming 
them with private sector developers of standardised food safety tests. With support from 
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regulators, these developers might play a part in training food industry personnel to comply 
with government standards, while providing safety tests and certifications for the wide range of 
food products covered (Lam, Remais, Fung, Xu, & Sun, 2013). Knowing that health and safety 
is one of the main trends in the food industry it is relevant to communicate values and quality 
of Made in Italy products, highly above of Chinese ones in terms of safety, also according to 
what was reported right before.  
 
What about Made in Italy products? Italian cuisine is very popular in the Asia-Pacific region; 
products, such as Prosciutto di Parma (Parma ham) and Parmigiano Reggiano are already very 
well known. It is a simple cuisine, made with healthy ingredients that Millennials appreciate.  
On ItalianFood.net (2018b) it is claimed that Chinese consumers, especially those who have 
travelled beyond the Great Wall, are increasingly aware of Western food, which they have come 
to appreciate and, in some cases, know very well. Some have become true ambassadors of 
Italian dinner table lifestyle. 
To confirm this assumption, on the same online journal ItalianFood.net (2019d) it is declared 
that  “This year, for the first time, the Mediterranean Diet ranked as first in the Best Diet Overall. 
The world renown Italian typical diet got the first place by decision of a panel of health experts 
at the U.S. News and World Report. Every year, journalists and editors research 41 different 
eating programs, consulting medical journal entries and government reports, before assembling 
the list and writing a brief profile of each one. Among the panel of experts are nutritionists, 
doctors, researchers, and professors from some of the country’s top universities”. 
 
Social trends might be forecasted but macroeconomic shocks might happen and change them 
consequently. In this case what might not be true anymore are the do it yourself food, heating 
products on-the-go, goody boxes, light eating, singles people, but on the other hand safety and 
healthy food has increased its appreciation and the value of Made in Italy remains way higher, 
in particular PDO and CDO products, and are a good weapon in the internationalisation 
strategy. What can be interesting is to understand how Italian companies have thought the value 
of their product to Chinese customers and how they have created their own market, to keep 
them as example. The case study will help in doing such analysis.  
 
1.1.2. Cultural trends and Hofstede cultural dimension 
All the previous social trends underline a changing culture. Culture is the acquired knowledge 
that people use to interpret experience and generate social behaviour. Every culture has its own 
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values that may influence international management (Luthans & Doh, 2012) and should be 
analysed and then taken into consideration when deciding which product to offer and how to 
do it. 
When entering China, keep in mind that it is significantly different from home country. It may 
happen that geographic differences make the product useless. Similarly, while a company has 
been successful in the home market, it might be too early or too late for China. The secret to 
success is to test early, test cheap, be open and adapt to culture (Luzikova & Krivoshey, 2020).   
 
Of all the ideologies that influenced the thinking and life of traditional and agricultural China, 
Confucianism should account for the most (Fu, Wu, Yang & Ye, 2008, p.878). Smith (1894, p. 
295; see Fu, Wu, Yang & Ye, 2008, p.878) stated that “Confucianism is the base, and all 
Chinese are Confucianists, as all English are Saxons”.  
According to Confucius (1992, 2:3): “Lead the people with governmental measures and 
regulate them with laws and punishment, and they will avoid wrongdoing but will have no sense 
of honor and shame. Lead them with virtue and regulate them by the rules of propriety, and 
they will have a sense of shame and, moreover, set themselves right”. 
  
Chinese economic system had the following main characteristics. All major industrial 
enterprises were owned by the state, as required by state socialism (state ownership). There 
were many privately owned small businesses, but they were all eliminated during the 3-year 
“Socialist Transformation'' movement launched in 1956. The economic system was highly 
centralized and planned (central planning); and there was the dominance of the Chinese 
Communist Party (Fu, Wu, Yang & Ye, 2008, p.881). It will be clear, when analysing culture, 
how these three variables directly affected people's mindset and point of view.  
 
With the goal of analysing Chinese culture completely, without losing any detail, it has been 
used Hofstede’s model of cultural dimensions, which explains how culture can be affected. 
Many variables have to be taken into consideration when approaching HRM in a new market, 
and culture affects them all (Hofstede, 2003). 
It will also be taken into consideration GLOBE project, which is the acronym for “Global 
Leadership and Organizational Behaviour Effectiveness”, a 62-nation, 11-year study involving 
170 researchers worldwide, which has many parallelism with Hofstede model and might be 
jointly analysed.  
Hofstede’s cultural dimensions are power distance, uncertainty avoidance, individualism vs 
collectivism, masculinity vs femininity, time orientation and indulgence versus restraint. All 
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these variables will be analysed and in the following case study only the relevant ones will be 
taken in consideration.  
 
Power distance is the extent to which less powerful members accept that power is distributed 
unequally (Hofstede, 2003).  
According to Chinese culture a person’s social status, no matter how high or low, is given at 
birth (Yang, 1993; see Farh & Cheng, 1999, p. 99). Moreover the virtue of obedience is the 
cultural root of paternalistic leadership and can be found in many overseas Chinese enterprises 
(Farh & Cheng, 2000; see Fu, Wu, Yang & Ye, 2008, p. 879). 
The analysis of the actual Chinese culture underlined how people have a common desire for 
more equality than they currently have, while Chinese managers demonstrate a higher level of 
tolerance for inequality of power in society. This is the result of two opposing forces: while the 
internal forces from the still highly-respected traditional values are pulling the Chinese business 
leaders away from becoming competitive, the external pressures form an opposite force, is 
pushing these leaders toward becoming increasingly competitive (Fu, Wu, Yang & Ye, 2008, 
p. 891). Young people now can quit their jobs for better opportunities, they can look for jobs 
themselves instead of having to be assigned by the government, they no longer have to work in 
places where they were born, but can work thousands of miles away from home without being 
punished. They are becoming more independent.  
 
Uncertainty avoidance indicates the extent to which people seek order, consistency and 
structure to cover situations in their daily lives; try to avoid uncertain and ambiguous situations 
by reliance on social norms and procedures; and belief in absolute truths and the attainment of 
expertise (House, 2002).  
In China, when conflicts occur, doctrine of the mean (avoiding extremes, also translated as 
moderation) is the principle to handle them. Confucius believed that any extreme ideas would 
lead people astray and create disorder in society, and therefore urged people to control their 
emotions and refrain from desires in order not to lose insightfulness and the ability to remain 
obedient to one’s superiors under all circumstances ( Fu, Wu, Yang & Ye, 2008, p. 879). This 
can be seen looking at 60s and 70s business practices. During those years people wanted “unity 
and order” to such a degree that they would run their businesses the same way year after year 
without change, maintaining the same structure, the same products, the same everything (Fu, 
Wu, Yang & Ye, 2008, p. 891). Now that unprecedented changes are going on in China, 
although people enjoy a better living, many of them are worried about the loss of “order”, 




Individualism is the tendency of people to look after themselves and immediate family only, 
while collectivism is the tendency of people to belong to groups and to look after each other in 
exchange for loyalty (Hofstede, 2003). 
In the GLOBE project collectivism has been divided into institutional and in-group 
collectivism. Institutional collectivism measures the degree to which individuals are 
encouraged by societal institutions to be integrated into broader entities, such as the extended 
family, the firm, or the village (Fu, Wu, Yang & Ye, 2008, p.889). “Chinese think of themselves 
using more group-related concepts and they see their ideal ‘self’ as being closer to their social 
self” as shown by Michael Bond (1991, p. 34; see Fu, Wu, Yang & Ye, 2008, p. 889). This 
happened 20 years ago, but now the changes taking place in China, especially within the 
business context, are challenging the collectivistic orientation and individual contributions are 
now being acknowledged and rewarded (Fu, Wu, Yang & Ye, 2008, p.889).  
In-group collectivism is the degree to which members of a society take pride in membership in 
small groups such as their family and circle of close friends, and the organizations and units in 
which they are employed (Fu, Wu, Yang & Ye, 2008, p.890). In China, the pursuit of individual 
interests at the sacrifice of families has always been discouraged; altruism and loyalty, to 
parents at home and to bosses at work, are values that the society tries very hard to instil in 
children. However young people are becoming increasingly independent, they move away from 
their parents as soon as they can and at work they are no longer constrained to the organization 
(Fu, Wu, Yang & Ye, 2008, p.890).  
Anyway young people are becoming more and more competitive, consequence also of the 
school teaching methods for which only the best may graduate and go to the best colleges. This 
trend is also confirmed by what is said about the power distance issue, young people may 
independently choose their preferred job and can constantly look for the best option. 
Competition and proactiveness however are not at all a synonym of collectivism but of 
individualism.  
 
Masculinity societies give great importance on earnings, recognition, advancement, and 
challenge. Individuals are encouraged to be independent decision makers, and achievement is 
defined in terms of recognition and wealth. The workplace is often characterized by high job 
stress, and many managers believe that their employees dislike work and must be kept under 
some degree of control. On the other hand femininity is characterised by cooperation, a friendly 
atmosphere, and employment security. Individuals are encouraged to be group decision makers, 
and achievement is defined in terms of contacts and living environment. The workplace tends 
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to be characterized by low stress, managers give their employees more credit for being 
responsible and allow them more freedom (Hofstede, 2003). 
In China there was a strong belief that the eldest male possessed absolute authority, and all 
others were expected to be absolutely obedient and loyal to the family head (Fu, Wu, Yang & 
Ye, 2008). 
Traditional masculinity ideology is still endorsed highly as shown in Levant et al. (1996; see 
Fu, Wu, Yang & Ye, 2008, p. 889) study. Masculine behaviours such as assertiveness, 
dominance, and aggression are therefore be highly acceptable in China.  
In GLOBE assertiveness was seen as a measure of the degree to which individuals in a society 
are dominant and aggressive in social relationships and Chinese managers have a much stronger 
desire for the society to value assertive behaviour in comparison to others. This fact may be due 
to rapid changes in society, which consequence is an extremely high level of uncertainty, urging 
Chinese people to become increasingly aggressive to protect themselves.  
On the other hand unique Chinese cultural concepts such as mianzi, renqing (which refers to 
being kind, benevolent, righteous, or respecting the feelings of other people (Fu, Wu, Yang & 
Ye, 2008)) and guanxi strongly indicate otherwise, coherently with a femininity society.  
 
Long term oriented societies focus on the future and on achieving long term results, are able 
to adapt traditions when conditions change, and tend to save and invest, while short term 
oriented societies focus on quick results, do not tend to save, and value stability and leisure 
(Hofstede, 2003). Hofstede (1993) pointed out that Chinese culture is long-term oriented. China 
is a farming country, and for farmers, planning long-term meant to save the most possible and 
thriftiness was a virtue cherished in the traditional agricultural society that now forms the 
backbone of China (Cheung et al., 1996; see Fu, Wu, Yang & Ye, 2008, p. 892). But the 
GLOBE items on this dimension, which actually have the same meaning as in Hofstede (1993), 
do not capture thrift or saving. One possible reason according to Fu, Wu, Yang & Ye (2008) is 
that nowadays there are high levels of uncertainties caused by the too many changes happening 
in China. Once Chinese people used to put into the bank every single penny they could spare, 
but now that the government has dropped the interest rate to such a low level in order to 
stimulate expenditure there is no incentive to save anymore.  
While people may be discouraged to think long-term, the political route is highly characterised 
by a long term orientation, take for instance The Belt and Road Initiative (Wikipedia, 2020), a 
global development strategy adopted by the Chinese government which includes the 
development of infrastructure and investment in 152 countries and international organizations 
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in Asia, Europe, Africa, Middle East, and the Americas, which aspires to be completed by 2049, 
(more than 40 years from the beginning) 100th anniversary of the People’s Republic of China.  
 
These ongoing changes in the Chinese culture allow us to analyse the relationship among 
industry type and culture’s consequences on innovation, using a study done by Allred & Swan 
(2004). Following Ghoshal & Nohria (1993), construction and mining machinery, industrial 
chemicals, nonferrous metals, and scientific instruments are categorized as global industries. 
Beverages, food, household appliances, and rubber are categorized as multidomestic industries.  
 
Focusing on the multidomestic industry, it emerges that high-power distance is more 
negatively related to firm innovation. Multidomestic industries generally have greater 
informality, non-standardization, and environmental complexity (Ghoshal & Nohria, 1993). 
Thus, firms in multidomestic industries are more likely to be negatively affected by high 
uncertainty avoidance in the pursuit of innovation. Multidomestic industries are better suited 
for individualistic cultures, while global industries are better matched with collectivist cultures. 
In a multidomestic industry the approach is to maximize the number and range of options. This 
individualistic behaviour is accomplished through a loose structure in the initiation stage 
(Johne, 1984). Masculinity will be more negatively related to firm innovation in multidomestic 
industries than in global industries but there is no significant moderation effect of industry type 
on the relationship between masculinity/femininity and innovation. Multidomestic industries 
are more likely to be tradition bound and protectionist for short-term gain (Allred, Brent & 
Scott, 2004). 
 
Comparing what has been said about Chinese cultural changes and what are the successful 
cultural aspects when operating in a multidomestic industry, it seems that China and Chinese 
people are day after day more suitable for multidomestic industry internationalisation strategy. 
Power distance is preferred low, in China it is lowering and consequently people can be more 
innovative and autonomous. High uncertainty avoidance is discouraged, but young people's 
proactiveness goes with entrepreneurship and tolerance for ambiguity, although eldest and less 
educated people still highly dislike changes. Multidomestic industries are better suited for 
individualistic cultures and Chinese are detaching from collectivism, becoming more 
independent. Anyway Chinese, young and old, are still strictly loving their culture and that is 




The relevance of this analysis is related to the high influence that the right collaborators and 
employees have on being successful abroad. 
Beyond exporting product, when a corporation wants to settle a permanent establishment in 
Mainland China, it has to keep in mind that it is significantly different from home country. 
Different people in different countries have different culture and conception on organization 
behaviour. The diversity and complexity of cross-nation and cross-culture may result in strategy 
conflicts for multinational companies when they implemented international standardized 
human resource management (Daft, 2007; see Wu, 2008).  
However changes in culture are taking place and the young generation is way more similar to 
western culture than the oldest one. Young people are competitive and high achievers, meaning 
that they can give additional value to the company they work for but still they need relevant 
rewards, extra incentive, and a variety of compensation and benefits to keep working hard (Wu, 
2008). Unfortunately, the Chinese Ministry of Education claimed that the ratio of science 
graduates and arts graduates is unbalanced in the past five years. More and more young people 
major in arts rather than science with certain reasons (Ministry of Education PRC, 2006; see 
Wu, 2008). Despite the change masculine behaviours such as assertiveness, dominance, and 
aggression should therefore be highly acceptable in China. If the company struggle to keep and 
transfer its Italian values the best solutions is to get expatriates, someone who has chosen to 
live in a country other than the one in which he or she legally resides (Noe, Hollenbeck, Gerhart 
and Wright, 2006; see Wu, 2008) at top management, but never as HR Manager.  
Another relevant aspect with Chinese is that they are long term oriented, so when making a deal 
do not give rush, be patient, do not put too much emphasis and stress the dealer. Actually when 
doing business negotiation with Chinese, foreigners may discover Chinese are a group of 
“gentlemen” (Ghauri & Fang, 2001; see Wu, 2008). So if foreign multinationals want to do 
business in Chinese market, they need to take a people-oriented approach and establish a high 









1.2 Economic trends and political changes 
Not only social trends and cultures are relevant when choosing a country where to invest. 
Macroeconomic figures and regulatory changes are crucial when understanding whether the 
country where you may have found an opportunity is suitable to the company and which 
eventual changes might be made. In this chapter it has been analysed whether China is a suitable 
country for Italian food companies and for which reasons.  
1.2.1. Reasons for investing in one country rather than another one 
In choosing FDI it is fundamental to observe country characteristics and economic and political 
trends.   
Trade costs, for instance transport costs, are crucial variables for explaining the pattern of FDI, 
being one of the motivations for establishing new plants in other countries rather than exporting. 
Trade costs and barriers are both industry and country specific and therefore they vary both 
across industries and across country pairs. A study made by  Ekholm (1998) found out that 
foreign affiliates are more likely to be set up if presence in the market through exports has 
already been established. However once this decision has been made, the more costly it is to 
supply a foreign market through exports, the greater the relative importance of affiliate sales. 
Trade costs induce firms to undertake FDI to serve foreign markets through local production 
rather than through exports (Hanson , 2001).  
 
Considerable economic policies and alliances are in place to lower the cost of trade towards 
China. The most relevant project is the Belt and Road initiative (Wikipedia): In March 2019 
China signed an infrastructure plan with Italy, becoming the first European country to join the 
Initiative. In any case, the agreement is not entirely binding and does not prejudice the Western 
political and security alliances of Italy. The project is often described as a 21st century silk road, 
consisting of a "belt" of land corridors and a maritime "road" of sea routes. 
The "Belt" refers to land routes for road and rail transport, called "the Economic Belt of the Silk 
Road"; while the "road" refers to maritime routes, or the Thirst Marine Road of the 21st century, 
which will end in the port of Venice. The Chinese government calls the initiative "an attempt 
to improve regional connectivity and embrace a brighter future". Some observers see it as a 
push for Chinese dominance in global affairs with a China-centred commercial network. The 
objectives of the project are: "building a large unified market and making full use of 
international and national markets, through cultural exchange and integration, to improve the 
mutual understanding and trust of member nations, leading to an innovative model with capital 
inflows, pool of talent, and technology databases." The initial emphasis was on infrastructure 
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investment, education, building materials, railways and motorways, the automobile, real estate, 
electricity and iron and steel. 
As stated by China, “the focus on connectivity within the BRI is both about facilitating trade 
and investment, and thereby development of neighbouring countries, as well as strategically 
shoring up its own security of energy, resources and food by taking a regional leadership role 
with its most important neighbours.” OECD (2018) revealed that huge infrastructure would be 
built to encourage trade and free trade zones along Belt and Road will be established. Pros and 
cons have emerged since the announcement of the BRI project, focusing on political goals and 
equilibrium, further analysis may be required, although not the focus of this thesis.  
On this trend of economic collaboration among Italy and China, yet in 2016 Alibaba, the B2C 
e-commerce website visited by hundreds of millions of buyers every year, introduced 500 
Italian labels on Tmall. In the article  ItalianFood.net (2016) claimed that “Alibaba has also 
committed to fighting counterfeit Italian products within its platforms. This represents a great 
test of faith in the potential for growth of Italian exports through e-commerce, which, in China, 
is very important to prevail over competitors. China has become the largest consumer of red 
wine in the world, and Italian quality has all it takes to close the gap and be up there with these 
countries.” 
In 2018, ItalianFood.net (2018a) disclose the three years renewal of the agreement among 
Alibaba and the Italian Ministry of Agriculture, under the supervision of Italy’s Central 
Inspectorate for Quality Protection and Fraud Prevention of Agri-Food Products (Icqrf). Online 
sales are a great opportunity for Italian products both generally abroad and in China, but 
consumers and businesses still need to be protected from counterfeits.  
Not only Alibaba is playing the game. According to ItalianFood.net (2019b) “At the side-lines 
of the EU-China agreement about Geographical Indications, and during the 2nd China 
International Import Expo (CIIE), Suning International retail chain started a partnership with 
Italian Trade Agency (ITA-ICE) to provide ‘Authentic Italian’ products for Chinese consumers. 
The goal is to raise awareness among Chinese customers about the quality of Italian products 
and to leverage upon the concept of authenticity in order to increase the offering and the sales 
of Made in Italy products, as well as the exports of such products to China. Suning will conduct 
a series of online and offline marketing campaigns to increase the consumption of authentic 
Italian products in China, promoting better understanding of Italian products among Chinese 
consumers. In addition, ITA will support Suning to facilitate the sourcing of Authentic Italian 
products with marketing investment and to establish the Suning-Italy Retail Academy, a 




As concern economic policy, with regard to the protection of Made in Italy, as it is relevant 
under the change in the preferences of Chinese consumers, the 6th November 2019 was signed 
a bilateral agreement by the European Commissioner for Agriculture Phil Hogan and the 
Chinese Minister of Commerce Zhong Shan (ItalianFood.net, 2017). This agreement would 
protect 100 European Protected Geographical Indications in China (26 of which are Italian) and 
as many Chinese PGIs in Europe. Why is that crucial? “Geographical indications, and certified 
productions, therefore, continue to be a key factor in the growth of Italian products in the world. 
Their exports add up to 7.8 billion euros, accounting for 21% of agri-food exports: a positive 
trend that almost reaches double-digits (+9.6). The food sector – consisting of more than 80,000 
operators – is worth 6.35 billion euros (-1.5% per year) in terms of production, and currently 
enjoys a +1.7% consumer growth, which reaches +5% in retail. The wine sector, whose 
production of certified bottles reached 2.84 billion (worth 7.4 billion euros in terms of 
production for a 5.8% growth). In Italy, the PDO, PGI and CDO systems guarantee quality and 
safety.” (ItalianFood.net, 2017) 
These latest policies and agreements are clear evidence of how e-commerce giants and Chinese 
government is paying attention to people's new habits and preferences, in order to make deals 
and create additional commercial value. Different entities and institutions have been 
demonstrating their interests across the last few years, signing agreements, believing in the 
relevance of Made in Italy export in China.  
An indicator of the path is the trend of Italian export to China from January to August 2019 
(James Ferguson, 2020). The volume of sales has been 140 tonnes, + 48,7% than 2018, for a 
value of 1,7 million € (+38%) and the estimated exports of meat and cured meats in 2019 was 
about 50 millions. 2019 has seen an increase in the pork meat price of 40%compared to the 
previous year. Chinese customers are willing to pay when quality is well communicated and 
ensured. Top exported products have been PDO Parma Ham and PDO San Daniele Ham, 
meaning that Protected origin is a clear index of quality and safety.  
Moreover  the size of the market is one of the fundamental factors for attracting FDI; 
increasing market size, measured as the total income (GDP) of the host country increases 
affiliate production: investing in a given foreign country implies large fixed costs, firms are 
willing to afford these costs if prospective sales are large (Navaretti & Venables, 2006). The 
affiliate production for the local market is more sensitive to the size of the local market than 
affiliate production for exports; also, the relative market size of home and host countries matters 
for FDI; theory predicts that when national markets are of similar size this should have a 
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positive effect on HFDI. In 2017 Chinese population was about  1,386 billion people (United 
States Census Bureau, 2017), compared to the European population which was 741,4 million 
people.  
While market size is conducive to economic transactions, geographical distance discourages 
it (Ekholm, 1998). ItalianFood.net (2018b) stated that “The greatest hurdle for Italian 
companies is of a logistical nature. As it takes days to receive shipments from Italy, some 
distributors are turning to Australia (which is much closer), which provides them with cheaper 
non-authentic ‘Italian’ products.” 
 
Production costs play a mixed role in choosing the FDI country because, although labour cost 
differentials should be an incentive in investing abroad, there is the possibility that this 
difference is related with lower productivity, whose consequence is the so called back shoring 
effect: after having brought the production abroad the company takes it back to the home 
country (Navaretti & Venables, 2006).   
 
 
Graph. 2 - Chinese vs Italian labour costs (Trading Economics, 2020) 
 
In Graph. 2 both Chinese and Italian labour cost are counted in points to avoid exchange rate 
and differences in currency turmoil, and it is clear that China labour costs are considerably 
lower than Italian. However in Graph. 3 it is shown how China labour cost is growing and for 
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this reason lots of companies are now moving their production in other developing countries of 
South-East Asia, like Vietnam.  
 
Graph. 3- Manufacturing labor costs per hour for China, Vietnam, Mexico from 2016 to 2020 
(Statista, 2020) 
 
Now China is a leading economy and production costs are no more the main drivers of 
internationalisation and localisation. Moreover, as regards the food industry, what it has been 
tried to show is that the success factor is product quality and safety. To be consistent with this 
message and to properly communicate it, it is relevant to still produce in the home country and 
then be present in the host with a different establishment than pure production.  
 
Tax differentials and policies may attract FDI. A potential benefit from being a multinational 
is the ability to shift profits through transfer pricing strategy from countries where the taxation 
is high to countries with low corporate taxes (Navaretti & Venables, 2006). Therefore countries 
may reduce corporate taxation to attract more FDI and their actions may lead to tax competition 
between countries, thus influencing the tax rates in different countries.  Tax rate may influence 
the location decision by the firm: low corporate tax rates attract investment by foreign firms. 
Anyway, as with transfer costs, differences in taxation mainly influence the choice of where to 




As regards China and Italy relationship, on 23rd March 2019, it has been signed a new Double 
taxation agreement (DTA), giving Chinese and Italian investors more favourable terms when 
doing business with each other. According to Belt & Road News (2019) “The tax breaks and 
incentives introduced in the updated China-Italy DTA are designed to encourage more cross-
border trade and investment between the two countries while making doing business easier”. 
This economic policy can be compared with USA one. While China is opening doors to Made 
in Italy products, the USA is closing them. The United States can impose tariffs on EU goods 
worth a total of 7.5 billion dollars per year (6.8 billion euros), as claimed by ItalianFood.net 
(2019e).   
Despite the threat of additional duties, exports of Italian food in the USA in June 2019 were 
flying, with a jump of +9.4% in the same period of 2018 (ItalianFood.net, 2019a).   
Proximity to other firms and clients may play a role for the location of FDI. According to 
Marshall (1920) industrial clusters and industrial districts have at least three main reasons for 
which firms benefit from locating close to each other: knowledge spillover, labour pooling and 
input-sharing, forward and backward linkages between customer and supplier firms. There is a 
positive relationship among product specialisation and level of inward FDI (Braunerhjeml et 
al., 2000). Technological knowledge externalities/spillover have many channels through which 
they can get diffused: direct personal contact, workers movement among different companies 
or by being predictable consequences of explicit contracts.  
Quality of infrastructure and of institutions and degree of industrialization are also factors 
determining FDI (Wheeler & Mody, 1992), with macroeconomic and political stability, 
corruption, and criminality.  
1.2.2. Investing in a developing country 
A side of the economic trends is the definition of developing vs developed or advanced 
countries. In this chapter it will be understood which kind of country China is and how this 
influences the fact of being in a multidomestic industry.  
The share of developing countries has been rising. In these countries FDI are generally made 
through a greenfield direct investment because host country firms are often not developed 
enough, and it is more profitable for MNE to create new ones. The increase of FDI flows to 
developing countries reflects the growing importance of FDI as a source of financing of these 
economies. It is not surprising that developing countries lack sufficient domestic resources and 
they need foreign capital to finance their investments (Navaretti & Venables, 2006). 
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Some trends about developing countries (China, India, Indonesia) show that they had increased 
their share of outward flows through the 1970s and 1980s to a peak of 15.3% of world flows in 
the mid-1990s, to see it declining again in the late 1990s (Navaretti & Venables, 2006). FDI 
flows into China in 1993–2000 constitute over 30 per cent of total FDI in the developing world. 
By 2000, the total FDI received in China reached $347 billion (Navaretti & Venables, 2006). 
Within the developing world, only the Asian countries (especially China, Hong Kong, Taiwan, 
South Korea and Singapore) supply a significant share of world flows by the mid-1990s; most 
of these investments took place within Asia and therefore declined drastically in the aftermath 
of the Asian crisis in 1997.  
Nowadays it is still not clear whether China, who has exploited a great growth in the last 
decades, is still a developing country or a developed one. Clara Weinhardt (2020) in her article 
“Emerging Powers in the World Trading System: Contestation of the Developing Country 
Status and the Reproduction of Inequalities'' tried to strategically reframe the boundaries of the 
developing country categorisation in the World Trade Organization (WTO). WTO grants 
special and differential treatment (S&D) to its developing country members. S&D comprises 
measures such as exemptions from tariff cuts for developing countries and longer transition 
periods when implementing new liberalisation obligations or financial aid. According to these 
special and differential treatment principles, developing country members are granted certain 
exemptions and flexibilities, while developed country members are asked to improve market 
access conditions for developing countries or to provide financial or technical assistance. 
Although China is not only an emerging country but yet a world power, they still defend their 
self-declared developing country status, given the low levels of per capita income within their 
countries, consequently producing inequalities among groups. Pascal Lamy, former Director 
General of the WTO assessed that the rule of the game for emerging countries is still not clear 
and WTO members have not made up their mind whether China is a rich country with many 
poor people, or a poor country with many rich people. Actually China is not the only country 
whose taking advantage of this informality and lack of clear criteria for defining boundaries, 
also India, Qatar or the United Arab Emirates continue to claim developing country status in 
the WTO. However just because China claims to hold developing country status, this does not 
mean that this framing takes hold in the WTO.  
Although China classification is still uncertain, let us consider it as a developing country. 
Thanks to globalization, developing countries have been able to increase their share of global 
trade, investment and production. A large number of developing countries have also seen the 
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positive effects of the IT revolution in the acceleration of their respective socioeconomic and 
political reforms. However, some developing countries have been incapable of making use of, 
and coping with, the effects of globalization (Hirono, 2001). Mass poverty has not been 
eradicated from many developing countries, and new types of “poverty pockets” have emerged 
according to Louis Emmerji, (1997). Although economic growth in developing countries has 
grown much faster than in industrialized countries, the level of poverty in developing countries 
is still consistently high, because of economic stagnation; high population rates; high 
unemployment; greater income discrepancies; and the rapid destruction of the family (Hirono, 
2001).  
In China, the difference among richer and poorer might be geolocalized in rural and developed 
regions, so called regional inequality. A study of Zhang & Zhang ( 2003) analysed the 
contribution of two major driving forces of globalisation, foreign trade and foreign direct 
investment (FDI), on regional inequality applied to China. Theoretically globalisation would 
make a developing country more egalitarian through raising wages of its abundant low-income 
unskilled labour, because the country has comparative advantage in producing unskilled labour-
intensive goods and services (Deardorff & Stern, 1994; see Zhang & Zhang 2003). Being the 
largest trading nation and the largest recipient of FDI in the developing world, China has 
obviously been a major participant in the process of globalisation for the past two decades. 
Perhaps China’s economic integration with the world has been accompanied with growing 
regional inequality. Especially the income gap between coastal and inland areas has risen 
dramatically since the mid-1980s (Zhang & Kanbur, 2001; see Zhang & Zhang, 2003).  
Also according to Mark Hedley of B2B International the first realisation that foreign companies 
often need to make is that China is in no way a uniform and homogenous market.  Although 
China is unified in the geo-political sense, socially and economically the picture is much more 
disparate and fragmented.  Uneven rates of economic growth in different parts of China over 
recent years have served to exacerbate many of the economic and social differences that already 
existed between different provinces.  For example, there are huge variations between different 
provinces in terms of population levels, per capita GDP, average income levels, consumer 
spending habits, education levels, literacy rates, lifestyles and so on.  As such, it is certainly no 
exaggeration to state that rather than representing a single, unified market, China is actually a 
collection of individual sub-markets defined by vastly differing demographic, economic and 
cultural characteristics. 
The nature and make-up of markets in different parts of China also varies considerably, which 
means that foreign companies should think carefully about which geographical location offers 
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the best vantage point to target the broader China market. It is not only a matter of population 
size, but also a matter of customers potential expenditures. 
 
Fig. 1 - Map of China’s 33 Provinces and Administrative Regions (Mark Hedley, 2019) 
 
According to Forbes one of 4 key trends driving Foodtech Innovation in China is the fragmented 
market. Although regional inequality and poverty, in China it is exploding the middle class, 
which represents an opportunity to develop new products and services that they want and can 
afford. Obvious examples in the food industry are premium branded foods and restaurants, 
including higher-end food products and experiences. Start-ups in this category raised $770 
million in investment in 2018, up 172% on 2017 levels.  
 
However there is a rise of technology targeting China’s lower-income population. Emerging 
innovators are targeting low-income consumers looking for bargain food options and services, 
in areas where data can be leveraged, technology can be scaled and are finding success in lower-
tier cities. An example is given by Pinduoduo, a fast-growing group buy app for discount 
products, is a key example of a successful start-up that went on to list on the NASDAQ stock 
exchange. Another example of a successful company that also completed one of the five IPOs 
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in the sector last year is Six Walnuts, a plant beverage company that has built strong sales in 
lower-tier cities. 
Anyway, Made in Italy products are high quality products and not suitable for the low-price 
market. One possibility could be the extra food market to avoid wastage of products. But that 
could be only after the establishment in China and not a first best strategy (Louisa Burwood-
Taylor, 2019).  In many cases the impetus for entry into a new country is precisely the fact that 
local competitors are weak or non-existent. 
 
Having done this deep analysis on economic trends and market features, lets summarize it in 
few points. Trade costs are lowering thanks to considerable economic policies and alliances 
that are in place, in particular Belt and Road initiative related agreements. Moreover Chinese 
giants, in collaboration with the government, are fighting to counterfeit, increasing Italian 
products value, since Chinese customers are willing to pay when quality is well communicated 
and ensured. Of course the size of the market is favourable, although it is necessary to consider 
that only some regions (Fig. 1) have improved enough their quality of life thanks to a strong 
industrial orientation (regional inequality). However thanks to the digital channels also inland 
regions might be reached, although it should be taken in mind that Italian food are high quality 



















1.3 Technological trends 
Technological innovation is closely linked to socio-cultural changes and it is important to 
understand which tools can be exploited to adapt and emerge, crossing economic barriers. In 
this chapter it will be analysed the development of online tools and the effect on commerce they 
might have.  
 
According to a PWC China Study driven by Brian Marter (2020), innovation is not an option 
in the age of new retail. 59% of Chinese consumers are likely to buy groceries online, compared 
to a global average of 22%.  
When going abroad a company needs to be ready to face technical difficulties. Depending on 
how the product is built, it might already not work in China. Some websites are blocked in 
China and it would be better to switch to local platforms and ecosystems. Whether the product 
is a mobile application or an online store selling a physical product, any company is required 
to adopt the format that people are used to. Indeed many services that enter China, possibly 
being a native mobile application in their home market, will need to create a WeChat application 
as their main engagement channel (Luzikova & Krivoshey, 2020).  
 
According to a recent report by online venture capital firm AgFunder and Chinese food tech 
VC Bits x Bites in 2018 the funding to start-ups operating across the food and agriculture supply 
chain reached $5.8 billion, with an increase of 222% compared to 2017.  
Evidence of agri-food sector growth is clear but Matilda Ho, founder of Bits x Bites suggests 
“My advice for interpreting these developments is that trends in China can rise just as rapidly 
as they fall. Some of the models will be refined and improved, others will disappear within a 
year. China has no shortage of companies that raise eyebrows with their lightning-fast 
expansion and massive funding rounds. In most cases, what ultimately will achieve sustainable 
impact are those companies that are addressing real pain points in the food supply chain and 
are taking a long-term view in creating value.” 
 
Having a long-term view in creating value means looking to market trends and develop a 
business to satisfy them all or at least most of them. All the technological trends arising are 
solutions to needs and new habits of Chinese consumers.  
 
According to Forbes in “4 key trends driving Foodtech Innovation In China”, consumers are 
hyper connected and expect hyper convenience: whether it’s groceries, coffee deliveries, or just 
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waiting in lines for restaurant tables, customers expect everything to come to them quickly and 
cheaply. Moreover 97.5% of its online population uses mobile phones, in addition to the 
penetration of platforms like WeChat. Internet giants like Alibaba, Baidu and Tencent are 
investing billions in e-grocery, restaurant marketplaces, food services, in-store restaurant tech, 
supply chain logistics and more, through organic and inorganic expansions. They have a 
common successful strategy related to the capability to access data about consumer habits, and 
to play a role in every aspect of Chinese lives, plus  promoting more traffic to their sites. 
This is the reason why several of the largest deals in 2018 were concentrated in innovations 
about hyper convenience.  
Tencent’s is an Internet-based platform company using technology to enrich the lives of 
Internet users and assist the digital upgrade of enterprises, whose purpose is to promote 
technology innovation and cultural vitality; to help industries digitally upgrade; and to 
collaborate for the sustainable development of the society. In 2018 Tencent's invested $1.5 
billion in restaurant delivery group Meituan Dianping, indisputable leader in food delivery in 
China serving 310 million people, which got a 60% increase in the number of deals, confirming 
the sector’s growth. It has also invested $450 million in the top  e-grocery Miss Fresh’s.  
On the other hand, as denoted by Louisa Burwood-Taylor (2019), Alibaba, a Chinese 
multinational technology company specializing in e-commerce, retail, Internet and technology, 
has invested $280 million in the alcohol delivery group 1919.cn; for $9.5 billion it has acquired 
ele.me, a restaurant marketplace; and it has purchased Meiweibuyongdeng, a mobile app that 
allows diners to reduce restaurant waiting time and at the same time helps restaurants better 
manage customer traffic. Now the company encompasses e-grocery, restaurant marketplaces, 
food services, in-store restaurant tech, supply chain logistics, to name a few.  
 
New retail puts customers at the centre and their feedback is required in each key value chain 
stage gate. Although manufacturing is continuously trying to optimise costs structure it is also 
focusing on product differentiation and tailor-made solutions. Consequently the supply chain 
adjusts on real-time frontline sales results and on more accurate estimates. This will be possible 
thanks to retailers that collect real-time data for transaction and customer journey, to provide 
feedback not only to the supply chain but also to R&D, that is focusing on optimising design 
and planning based on real time customer behaviour. Brands understand consumers and 
enhance their experience through “co-creation” while maximizing productivity.  
In this direction emerging trends are shop online and pick up in-store, face recognition payment 
and AR Experience (Hawksford, 2019).  
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There are several new internationalisation methods, mainly online, that Italian food companies 
should exploit to be successful in going to China.   
 
Fig. 2 – E-commerce players in China (Hawksford, 2019) 
 
Graph. 4 – E-commerce players in China (Hawksford, 2019) 
1.3.1 Alibaba 
In China, the first B2B e-operator in the market is Alibaba.com, a platform born in 1999 with 
the purpose of connecting the Chinese market offer with the worldwide demand.  
Nowadays, the development of Chinese online sales market has developed into B2C, C2C and 
cross-border e-commerce.  
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Alibaba Group and its competitors have been indeed investing in these sales channels to create 
platforms and become market leaders. Talking about data  in January 2019 Alibaba had a market 
share of 66%, with 601 million Chinese users. It sold over 1 billion products. 
Alibaba now has two different platforms for international retailers and B2C customers. 
Respectively, TMall Global and TMall.com.  
TMall global, the platform for International Retailers, has overseas entities as entity 
jurisdiction, which manages local operations and international orders. To access the platform it 
is not necessary to be present in Mainland China since operations might be done both in China 
or overseas and stock can be kept abroad as the tax residency. Also the bank account might be 
overseas, but it must support Alipay. Italian bank accounts that support Alipay are BNP Paribas 
with the Axepta service, UniCredit and Banca Intesa. 
However an overseas entity can sell products on T-mall only through a cooperation with a 
Chinese entity/partner (Third party) that becomes the authorized seller for such a trademark.  
In TMall.com, the Business to Customer (B2C) platform, there are local entities who manage 
different operations, consequently presence for at least 3+ years in Mainland China is required, 
and the stock capital and assets must be in China as the tax residency and the bank account.  
The presence in the platform is not given for free, there is a sale commission that goes from 2% 
to 7% plus 1% on payments done with Alipay. It is also required a security deposit,  25,000 
USD for T-mall global and from 10,000 RMB to 300,000 RMB for T-mall, which correspond 
to 1,400 USD to 40,000 USD. Of course these fees are for reference only and may be subject 
to changes (Hawksford, 2019).  
Both in Tmall and Tmall Global there are different store types. One is the flagship store in 
which the products shall have the trademark registrations in Hong Kong. If merchant is a brand 
owner, they shall provide the trade mark registration certificate for their products; if merchant 
is an exclusive authorized dealer, he shall provide the trademark registration certificate for the 
products and the letter of authorization for selling those products. 
A second type of store is the authorized store, in which the product shall have its trademark 
registration in Hong Kong. If merchant is not the owner of the trademark of its products, he 
shall also provide evidence of his authorization to operate a store on the Tmall.hk platform. The 
trademark owner is a different entity than the company.  
The last option is the specialty store in which the company sells products of 2 or more 
trademarks under the same product category, and up to 2 product categories; consequently it 
has to give evidence of product source, and invoice of the products purchased. The name of the 
shop shall not infringe the legitimate rights of others. 
In all these cases the platform gives overseas and local logistic support (Alibaba, 2020).  
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On the other hand the trademark registration can be done in any country. Thanks to the 
trademark protection law effective from January 1, 2019 which guarantees verification on 
trademark property by e-commerce platforms.  
Although it is not compulsory to have a Chinese trademark certificate and despite the different 
deals it has done to fight counterfeit Italian products within its platform, trademarks that are not 
effectively registered in China are not protected by Chinese laws according to the principles of 
regional protections of trademarks. Because China’s trademark law applies the principle of 
prior application, and in practice there are many infringement risk cases, it is recommended that 
the sellers who have cooperated with or are about to cooperate with platforms such as Tmall 
International and Tmall for domestic trade transactions to conduct research on brand intellectual 
property risks in advance, and formulate targeted prevention programs to ensure normal 
operation in the Chinese market. In addition, the sellers should apply for Chinese trademarks 
as far in advance as possible. 
1.3.2 WeChat 
WeChat was born as an instant messaging platform, however now thanks to a huge number of 
users, it has become one of the most used channels for marketing by merchants. There are 2 
main types of communication channels: subscription accounts where followers receive a 
marketing message every day, although these are in folder together with all the other; service 
account where followers receive messages directly from the company account but only one 
message a week can be sent.  
If an official account is created outside of China it can be seen only by users who are not in 
China, while accounts created in China are visible worldwide (inside and outside of China).  
WeChat offers different payment methods for both B2B and B2C and between private 
individuals as well. All these payment methods can be simply done with a smartphone. Stores 
can use the POS to scan the barcode generated by the customer’s WeChat account to receive 
the payment. Stores may have QR codes that can be scanned by the customers to make the 
payment. The QR code can also be used to share information about products. Another way is 
that merchants send promotional messages to the users with a direct link to purchase such 
products, integrating WeChat payment also inside their applications. Customers can then pay 
online with WeChat while they are using the merchant’s app. Unlike Alipay, WeChat to date 




Baidu, Inc. operates as an internet search provider, which offers internet search solutions and 
online marketing solutions. The firm operates as an e-commerce platform with an online 
payment tool, develops and markets web application software, and provides human resource 
related services (Forbes, 2020).  
While in the United States there is Google, in China 90% of online search queries are done 
through Baidu. Since Google is banned in Mainland China, most Chinese people use Baidu as 
their chosen search engine. 
By March 2019, Baidu had 1.1 billion mobile users; its DuerOS voice assistant generated 2.37 
billion voice queries per month; Baidu Analytics Is Used by More Than 7 Million Websites. 
Baidu Is the 4th Most Popular Website in the World; it currently ranks at #4 on Alexa, above 
both Facebook and Wikipedia (Julia McCoy, 2019).   
According to GMA Baidu is a successful digital solution for doing SEO campaigns, working 
on content and backlinks. It ranks sites based on their homepage, giving priority to websites 
hosted in China, but if a company wants to get a 100% Chinese website, it first needs to register 
the company in the country.  
Baidu helps in managing lead generation, attracting potential customers through online e self-
promotion to convert them into real customers; PPC & SEM, campaign management & 
reporting; e-PR where building brand image, writing online publications; and e-Reputation, 
controlling the company brand name and discussing the brand (Gentlemen in China, 2019).   
Baidu operates through the following segments: Search Services, Transaction Services and 
iQiyi. The Search Services segment includes the traditional search engine related businesses 
such as auction-based P4P services and display-based online advertising services. The 
Transaction Services segment includes the newly developed internet businesses such as services 
provided by Baidu Nuomi, takeout delivery services and other online-to-offline services. The 
iQiyi segment engages in the online video business. 
Baidu Launched AI-Powered Cameras That Can Spot Ocular Fundus. Baidu is not all about 
giving internet users the best way to find what they are looking for. In fact, the company is 
concerned about the general health and welfare of the Chinese people as well. In 2018, Baidu 
revealed high-tech AI-powered cameras that did the work of ophthalmologists in spotting eye 
conditions that lead to blindness. These include glaucoma, macular degeneration, and diabetic 
retinopathy. In 2019, hospitals began using Baidu’s cameras to run eye screenings on patients. 
Baidu Launched a Chatbot for Doctors and Patients Baidu is a huge player in China’s health 
market. In fact, two years before it launched the AI cameras for spotting ocular fundus, it 
introduced Melody to hospitals.  
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Melody is a chatbot that allows patients to give their health information to doctors. With it, 
doctors and patients can communicate in a faster, simpler way (Julia McCoy, 2019).  
1.3.4 Tencent 
Tencent is a Chinese multinational conglomerate holding company founded in 1998, whose 
subsidiaries specialise in various Internet-related services and products, entertainment, artificial 
intelligence and technology both in China and globally (Wikipedia, 2020).  
Tencent uses technology to enrich the lives of Internet users. Company communications and 
social platforms Weixin and QQ connect users with each other, with digital content and daily 
life services in just a few clicks. 
Tencent manage high performance advertising platform to help brands and marketers reach out 
to hundreds of millions of consumers in China. 
Tencent services are communications and social. Actually connecting people is the core of what 
they do. They develop and provide a wide range of easy to use instant messaging and social 
networks, to make communications and sharing more convenient, lively and personal, enriching 
the lives of users. WeChat is a communication service developed by the company.  
Tencent produces digital content too. They are continually exploring the next generation of 
social and content integration, trying to provide Internet users with diversified and multi-
dimensional content, to satisfy all of users' entertainment needs. They are really concerned with 
copyright. At present their digital content products include: Online Games, Video, Live 
Streaming, News, Music, Literature. 
Another service Tencent provides is FinTech Services, which leverage WeChat Pay and QQ 
Wallet to connect people with financial products and solutions, build an open ecosystem for the 
financial sector, collaborate with partners to provide innovative financial services such as 
mobile payment, wealth management, loans and securities trading to users around the globe. 
Moreover Tencent offers a variety of utility software designed to help users quickly and directly 
address issues such as network security management, fast browsing, navigation, application 
management, email and much more (Tencent corporate website, 2020).  
1.3.5 Jingdong (JD) 
Jingdong (JD), another e-commerce platform allowing customers to buy products online, has 
not been presented because, although it allows both Chinese companies to open e-stores and 
overseas companies to open e-stores, cross border e-commerce, in JD Worldwide (Joybuy), It 
is mainly focused on apparel and textiles, watches, jewelry & accessories and home products, 




In China is clear the increasing trend on online grocery purchase. However a western company 
approaching to this new market might face technical difficulties in entering through online 
channels. What it is crucial for being successful is to understand and address real pain points in 
the food supply chain and creating long term value, looking to social and cultural trends seen 
before.  
Chinese internet giants are investing huge part of their budget in restaurant delivery and grocery 
online, following the market requests.  
For now the best platform to approach the new market without the need of having a presence 
in Mainland China is Tmall global (Alibaba.com), although also in this case an overseas entity 
can sell products on T-mall only through a cooperation with a Chinese entity/partner (Third 
party).  
Online can overcome commercial and financial barriers when going abroad, avoiding 
establishing a presence in Mainland China at the beginning, and saving money through 






































Ch.2 Theories about going international  
2.1 Different internationalisation structures and strategies 
There are different internationalisation strategies a company can undertake. Export (direct or 
indirect), licensing, franchising, contract manufacturing, turnkey operations, management 
contracts, international JV, wholly owned subsidiaries (greenfield or brownfield). In this 
chapter it will be understood which the most suitable legal entity is to make FDI in China 
according to regulations and characteristics of the different forms. All these will be further 
analysed considering the food industry, which is  a multidomestic sector.  
A company has three different choices, it  can be domestic, it can be an exporter and the share 
of the production is sold in a foreign market or it can enter in a foreign country by M&A or 
greenfield investment, becoming a multinational company (Navaretti & Venables, 2006). A 
firm has different reasons to internationalise, which might depend also on the country where 
the company comes from. Market seeking, to identify what are the more relevant markets and 
try to reach customers abroad as a way to enlarge the share and create connection with local 
markets. Resource seeking, like raw material and natural resources.  Efficiency seeking, lower 
labour costs, taxation, lower environmental and social regulations, lower manufacturing costs. 
And finally innovation seeking, to learn and provide key knowledge and inputs for innovation 
activities, that can be done through technology, marketing tools, analysing product insights, 
universities (Di Maria, 2019). Internationalisation is a grey process, both in terms of 
manufacturing but also for commercialisation. The idea is that overtime companies change their 
organisation in the international environment due to development in many fields such as 
technology, market and regulations.  
Going abroad seriously means becoming a Multinational Enterprise (MNE), a firm that owns a 
significant equity share of another company (subsidiary/affiliate) operating in a foreign country 
(Navaretti & Venables, 2006, p.2). FDI (Foreign direct investment) is an investment in a foreign 
company where the foreign investor owns at least 10% of the ordinary shares. The investor can 
be both large corporations and small firms.  The aim is to establish a significant influence on 
the management of the firm and thus to establish a long-lasting interest in the foreign country 
(Navaretti & Venables, 2006, p.2). FDI concept is strictly related with the definition of 
multinational enterprise (MNE); when a multinational decides to open (build or acquire) a new 
productive plant outside the home country and to invest money in the foreign country there is a 
foreign investment.  
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Firm and industry characteristics affect the extent of multinational activities. FDI drivers can 
be identified as primarily plant scale economies, which are related to fixed costs at plant level, 
and then as firm scale economies, associated with fixed costs at firm or firm-specific assets 
level. These last factors are likely to promote FDI thanks to the non-tangible assets that can be 
used also outside the home country, which might be for instance knowledge about product 
design or production processes, trademarks and brand, reputation for high quality products. 
Possible measures of intangible assets are advertising intensity (Brainard, 1997), with which 
there is a positive relation for the share of affiliate sales in total foreign sales and R&D intensity 
(technological knowledge created by R&D activities): several studies find a positive relation 
between R&D intensity and the propensity to carry out FDI.  
Firm heterogeneity in productivity is the most important factor (Helpmann, 2004): more 
productive is a company, higher is the probability that this company becomes a multinational. 
Firms with a low level of productivity will remain domestic; firms with a medium level of 
productivity will become only exporters; firms with high levels of productivity will become 
multinationals. The reason for this relation is related to the fact that when firms decide to go 
abroad, they have to face fixed costs and consequently only if they are productive, they will be 
able to pay them off. Keep in mind that foreign firms have to pay higher wages, on average, 
than privately-owned local firms (Lipsey, 2002, p. 20). This is due to the fact that they employ 
higher skilled labour, but also that they want to minimize labour turnover and by increasing 
wages they hope to retain more workers. Foreign owned companies are perceived as more 
volatile employers and consequently employees demand a risk premium. According to 
Luzikova & Krivoshey (2020) local hiring is crucial for cultural fit. China has its own culture 
and local people are the only experts about that and about the market. However it is also relevant 
to maintain standards and rules that reflect corporate values and mission. It may be difficult, 
but being coherent ensures that people stay committed, which is important in a country where 
there is  an  extensive employee turnover rate.  
The first and most common equity form in an international  environment is the wholly owned 
subsidiary, the most capital-intensive structure, with the highest level of political, 
environmental, legal and financial risks. A company may establish a subsidiary by M&A,  
acquiring an already existing firm in a foreign country, buying existing assets in a foreign 
country, or merging with a foreign firm in a brownfield FDI.  Another way to establish a 
subsidiary is by greenfield FDI, more typical for developing countries, by building a new firm 
(subsidiary) in a foreign country, investing in new physical plants and productive assets, and 
building new facilities. FDI might be horizontal, setting up a foreign plant in addition to a home 
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plant for some part of the production process,  which  replicates the activities of the home plant; 
vertical, setting up a foreign plant for some part of the production process that in the home 
country does not exist, exploiting host country specific knowledge and competences, when 
home and host countries have different relative endowments of skilled labour (Navaretti & 
Venables, 2006). 
A novel form of equity internationalisation is the international joint ventures (Marshall 
Hargrave, 2020), a form of foreign direct investment where two or more companies share 
ownership of a third commercial entity. From a legal point of view a joint venture (JV) is a 
business arrangement in which two or more parties agree to pool their resources for the purpose 
of accomplishing a specific task. These tasks can be a new project or any other business activity. 
In a joint venture (JV), each of the participants is responsible for profits, losses, and costs 
associated with it. However, the venture is its own entity, separate from the participants' other 
business interests. Joint ventures, although they are a partnership in the colloquial sense of the 
word, can take on any legal structure. The objectives of the JV, the initial contributions of the 
partners, the day-to-day operations, and the right to the profits and/or the responsibility for 
losses of the JV are all set out in the JV agreement. It is important to draft it with care, to avoid 
litigation down the road. Studying internationalisation mechanisms it will be understood how 
relevant relationships are in going international.  A study by Moskalev & Swensen (2007, p. 
51) has analysed JV presence in different countries and industries. They found out that the food 
industry participates with the 6,4 % in manufacturing agreement JVs, cluster in the following 
industries outside the “top-ten” which do not experience many other types of JVs.  
For what concerns the Chinese country it accounts for 6,9 % of all JV transactions, 2nd in the 
world after the US. While for independent JV firms, China accounts for 13.7% (Moskalev, S.A. 
& Swensen, 2007, p. 56).  
According to Moskalev & Swensen (2007, p. 56) the difference between the U.S. and China in 
terms of the frequency of strategic alliances and independent JVs can again be attributed to 
differences in economic development. China is foreign production oriented, has substantial 
state involvement, and imposes significant restrictions on foreign investment; it is reasonable 
to conclude that the Chinese government forces MNCs to use independent JV firms for entering 
China in order to enhance development of Chinese infrastructure.  
 
International joint ventures can be regarded as an institution for risk sharing. A properly 
designed joint venture between the foreign firm and a local partner makes foreign investment 
more likely (Broll & Marjit, 2005). For the foreign investor using the JV makes entering the 
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market easier because it may share risk, knowledge, distribution network and expertise with the 
partners and there is a huge potential for synergy and competitive advantage. Companies use 
Joint Venture (JV) to enter foreign markets and to partner up with a local business. On the other 
hand the local firms can get the benefit of up-to-date technologies and global market access 
(Kabiraj, Lee & Marjit, 2005, p.1).  
Moreover joint ventures (JVs) and alliances are vital to multinational corporations (MNCs) 
because these are all very large companies and mergers and acquisitions would be extremely 
expensive (Moskalev & Swensen, 2007, p 29). 
Although there is a growing interest in JVs, these companies have been observed unstable and 
often short-lived. This trend is due to the fact that after forming a JV and operating for a few 
years, partners break up their ties; thereafter either they compete independently in the market, 
or one sells out its shares to the other or to a third party, or they liquidate their assets completely 
(Franko, 1971; see Kabiraj, Lee & Marjit, 2005, p.2).  Reasons for litigation are, among others, 
ownership and control; introduction of new product or technology, extension and 
modernization, advertisement, dividend and investment policy; resource use, source of supply, 
government tax and trade policy (Miller et al.,1996; see Kabiraj, Lee & Marjit, 2005, p.5).  
It is evident that JV is not a once-for-all relation; it is a dynamic relation which evolves over 
time, as it does the internationalisation process (Kabiraj, Lee & Marjit, 2005, p.4).  
Actually renegotiation will definitely occur at the end of the first period because beliefs are 
updated by the outcome and the foreign firm can always do better by offering a new contract 
(Kabiraj, Lee & Marjit, 2005, p 16). 
According to Sinha (2001) the joint venture is formed in response to government restriction on 
foreign equity holdings in the first period. However, the joint venture becomes unstable in the 
second period, when the government removes the foreign equity restriction. Therefore once 
liberalisation period occurs multinationals enter through fully owned subsidiaries that compete 
with their own joint ventures, unless local partners permit them to raise their stakes (Mukherjee, 
& Sengupta, 2001, p.163).  
Another issue that has emerged as a litigation reason is cultural compatibility of partners.  
When foreign firms acquire local knowledge, the probability of JV instability increases 
substantially, because, according to Kabiraj, Lee & Marjit (2005, p. 5) “learning from another 
partner’s knowledge reduces the synergy gain. So sustaining comparative advantages or 
organizational complementarity between the partners is the key factor to keep the relation alive 
for a long time”. 
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Evidence indicates that inter-partner learning of each other’s competencies is an important 
reason of JV instability. Kabiraj & Sengupta (2018) showed that the JV is likely to break up if 
the learning effect is stronger than the synergy effect.  
Although it has been demonstrated that most JVs are characterized by instability, in developing 
countries it is much larger than that in developed ones (Kabiraj, Lee & Marjit, 2005., p. 3). 
Usually, the governments in the developing countries liberalise their economy in stages. Thus, 
in the initial stage, the foreign firms are allowed to hold equity up to a certain limit, and in the 
subsequent stages, this equity restriction is withdrawn to allow for the wholly owned 
subsidiaries of the foreign firms (Sinha, 2008, p. 752). 
Moreover developed and developing countries represent different external environments; 
developing countries are considered a more complex and difficult environment to manage joint 
ventures than in developed countries. Differences among developed and developing countries 
JVs include reasons for creating the venture, autonomy, stability, performance, frequency of 
government partners and ownership (Beamish, 1988).  
 
Non-equity forms are forms of collaboration and it is interesting to understand where the value 
of these activities is and who really gains from the trade process. When choosing an 
internationalisation strategy the company needs to mix and balance control and risk, reason why 
contract-based modes is now the standard internationalisation structure.  
International Licensing is identified as the process of transferring the rights to a firm’s 
products for the purpose of local production and/or sales. The licensor allows the licensee to 
use intellectual property to gain presence in the markets, covered by the licensee in exchange 
of a fee. In this way the licensee deals with small upfront cost and risk, while the licensor gets 
direct profits through royalties. This form of market entry is ideal for countries that impose 
imports and mature products with standardized production. The main challenges of Licensing 
are that licensing firms can find themselves competing against former licensees and firms can 
guard against this risk with strident attention to detailed legal contracts.  
Some other companies might organise themselves in international franchising (Alon et al., 
2016) and the main driver is the willingness to open up a new business with a minimum market 
risk failure. Franchising gives more control to the franchisor company over the franchisee, who 
has licensed the company’s trademarks, products and/or services, production and/or operation 
processes. Control is exerted through the franchise fee which can be expropriated if contracts 
are not adhered to, and elaborate contracts that govern the relationship between the franchisor 
and the franchisees. Franchisee gets proven brand, marketing exposure, established client base 
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and management expertise. When choosing this internationalisation form the entrepreneur has 
to consider the level of country economic development, the economic growth rate and the 
market governance policies.  
Some other companies could also decide to undertake management contracts, by using the 
expertise, technology, or specialized services of a company from another country to run its 
business for a set time and fee or percentage of sales; the management company is responsible 
for day-today operations while other decisions stay with the owner. This form is most widely 
used by the hotels and airline industry.  
Contract manufacturing is the main form for using cheaper overseas labor for the production 
of finished goods or parts by following an established production process, allowing lower 
production costs and to enter a new market with small amounts of capital.  
Finally, strategic alliance is a formal, contractual relationship between two or more firms that 
share resources to pursue a common goal. It is a non-equity agreement, where firms from 
different or from the same industries cooperate.  
Although all the different internationalisation forms have been presented, International JV is 
the most suitable form of FDI in China, considering that the Chinese government forces MNCs 
to use independent JV firms for entering China in order to enhance development of Chinese 
infrastructure. Moreover JV makes it easier to enter in the market, considering that is shares 
risk, knowledge, distribution network and expertise, making it easier to overcome the liability 
of foreignness. As already stated, JV is not a once-for-all relation; it is a dynamic relation which 









2.2. Uppsala model for the internationalisation process 
Not only macroeconomic factors and social trends are relevant when internationalising. The 
dynamic relation established with the JV is strictly connected with the Uppsala model, 
according to which the internationalisation process is an evolving one. The model is analysed 
and discussed in this chapter.  
Internationalising may have some rules, better practices, pros and cons, and also some 
rationalisation behind, but when going abroad it is important to pay attention to the host country 
culture. Further than what it has already explained, one really important Chinese cultural 
characteristic is “Guanxi”, the Chinese term is used instead of the word relationship. “Guanxi 
ties people together according to the specific relationship between these people” (Hui & Green, 
1997, p. 454). Foreign businesspeople who have done some business with China also know that 
companies wanting to get on the ground floor in China need guanxi in addition to planning, 
funding, and a good product (Murphy, 1996). This aspect of Chinese culture is really consistent 
with the Uppsala model and with the relevance given to the network in the internationalisation 
process.  
The evolution of the internationalisation process and which are its main characteristics are 
explained by the Uppsala model.  
Johanson & Vahlne (1977) have observed a database of Swedish-owned subsidiaries abroad 
and have studied a number of industry research of Swedish companies in international markets, 
discovering that Swedish companies frequently began internationalizing with ad hoc exporting 
(Carlson, 1975; see Johanson & Vahlne, 2009, p.1412). Then firms would subsequently 
formalize their entries through deals with intermediaries, often agents who represented the focal 
companies in the foreign market. Usually, as sales grew, they replaced their agents with their 
own sales organization, and as growth continued, they began manufacturing in the foreign 
market to overcome the trade barriers that were still in place in the post- II World War era. The 
researchers labelled this dimension of the internationalization pattern the establishment chain, 
based on the opinion that experience builds a firm’s knowledge of the market. That process is 
consistent with the assumption that going abroad is a grey process and companies change their 
organisation in the international environment due to development in many fields such as 
technology, market and regulations, and now also due to a more sophisticated market 
knowledge.  
The international environment has changed and consequently company behaviours have 
adapted to that. Lately in 2017 Johanson & Vahlne defined key features of a modern 
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international firm as the process, the network, business exchange and being entrepreneurial and 
proactive.  
 
The process of knowledge development and resource commitment is the most distinctive 
feature of the Uppsala model.  
To incorporate the potential for capability building in the model, the process of knowledge 
development has been considered as the basis from which learning, creating, and trust-building 
stem (Johanson & Vahlne, 2017).  
Internationalisation can be seen as a learning process. Knowledge related to the market itself, 
to flows of decisions and foreign activities and to stock of experience on international markets. 
Learning how to manage international markets and to interact requires practice and time to 
learn.  
The knowledge development and the resource commitment processes affect the characteristics 
of the firm and its context, which in turn affect the processes in the next time period. (Giddens, 
1984; see Johanson & Vahlne, 2017, p.1089).  
As states by de Rond & Thietart (2007; see Johanson & Vahlne, 2017, p.1088) “strategy is 
likely to emerge from multiple, complex, interacting processes, only some of which are under 
management control”. It cannot be known what will come out of a process. Firms are 
“continually in a state of becoming” (Langley et al., 2013; see Johanson & Vahlne, 2017, 
p.1088). 
More over the underlying processes are partly deliberate, meaning that they are affected not 
only by environmental change, but also by managerial intent (Augier & Teece, 2008; see 
Johanson & Vahlne, 2017, p.1089), consequently generating tension between intra-firm path 
dependency mechanisms and sometimes revolutionary environmental changes (Johanson & 
Vahlne, 2017). 
However the creative ability of managers more than offsets (Sarasvathy, 2001; see Johanson & 
Vahlne, 2017, p.1089) path-dependence as described by Sydow et al. (2009; see Johanson & 
Vahlne, 2017, p.1089). This argument can be represented by the concept of “history-
dependence” (Cyert & March, 1963; see Johanson & Vahlne, 2017, p.1089), which 
encompasses both the evolutionary nature of the firm and its potential for revolutionary 
adaptation to its changing environment. 
On the other hand path dependence and problemistic search tend to make managers prefer 
certain specific alternatives to other ones, reason why also managerial discretion and strategic 




For what concerns the network view of the business context, the regionalization thesis 
(Verbeke & Asmussen, 2016; see Johanson & Vahlne, 2017, p.1090) suggests that the 
managerial capacity is typically the bottleneck in achieving growth, with that firms expand 
predominantly in markets similar or adjacent to their home market, using technologies close to 
those they already hold in order to save on costs of search and change (Kay, 2005; see Johanson 
& Vahlne, 2017, p.1090). 
Contrary to what has been stated by Teece (2014; see Johanson & Vahlne, 2017, p.1091) the 
business firm is not an island of (non-market) resource allocation and not even the focal point 
in a greater ecosystem, and the process in the Uppsala model involves not only the focal firm 
but also the organisations in the network.  
The dimension of the “organizational advantage” might be extended to a “network advantage.” 
This is because evolution is really co-evolution: to some extent the network, whether internal 
or external, develops as a unit, although its characteristics may vary over time, as does its 
membership (Johanson & Vahlne, 2013; see Johanson & Vahlne, 2017, p.1091).  
Coviello and Munro (1997; see Johanson & Vahlne, 2009, p.1413) found out that relationships 
have an impact on foreign market selection as well as on the mode of entry in the context of 
ongoing network processes. Jan Johanson and Jan-Erik Vahlne yet in 2009 supported this 
theory. Markets are networks of relationships in which firms are linked to each other in various, 
complex and, to a considerable extent, invisible patterns. Hence insidership in relevant 
networks, which is also related with psychic distance, but it does not necessarily refer to a 
specific country, indeed to a network, is necessary for successful internationalization. If a firm 
attempts to enter a foreign market where it has no relevant network position, it will suffer from 
the liability of outsidership and foreignness, and foreignness presumably complicates the 
process of becoming an insider. Cultural trends and the right HRM might decrease this risk, 
which in China is high. Indeed a firm may suffer little or no liability of foreignness when its 
existing operations, either in the home country or in other countries, are in institutional 
environments that are similar to the one in the new host country (Barkema and Vermeulen, 
1998; see Cuervo et al, 2007 ), and that is clearly not the case of China.  
 
Business exchange indeed is not only related with goods and money, since in relationship 
knowledge is exchanged as well: knowledge of opportunities is discovered, or jointly 
constructed, by the parties (Johanson & Vahlne, 1977). Knowledge about entrepreneurial 
opportunities is by no means a public good but is private and shared between the parties 
involved. Thus, relationships give partners access to an extended knowledge base (Hohenthal, 
Johanson & Johanson, 2014; see Johanson & Vahlne, 2017, p.1091), that can also be related 
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with technological development (Ha°kansson, 1989; see Johanson & Vahlne, 2017, p.1090). In 
the meanwhile Coviello (2006; see Johanson & Vahlne, 2017, p.1090), among others, found 
that relationships are crucial for internationalizing firms. The borders between firms involved 
in relationships are therefore fuzzy rather than clearly delineated. External actors may therefore 
behave as they would if they were located inside the firm’s formal borders (Johanson & Vahlne, 
2011; see Johanson & Vahlne, 2017, p.1090), if they are in the same network. General market 
knowledge may be transferred between organizational units and more general 
internationalization knowledge, that is knowledge that reflects a firm’s resources and its 
capabilities for engaging in international business, is also important (Ericksson et al., 1997; see 
Johanson & Vahlne, 2009, p.1416).  
 
Entrepreneurship is strictly related with risk and uncertainty. Entrepreneurs are willing to take 
risks; they actually measure it and minimize it through the start-up process. There might be 
some cognitive bias in the risk evaluation, like over optimism, self-efficacy, which is the 
capability of self-empowerment when higher or different skills and competences are required 
to meet the final outcome, failure to know your own limits, illusion of control over the final 
outcome, while not everything can be managed by entrepreneur personal actions and behaviour, 
and the fact of taking decisions basing on small number of information. Anyway there is a u-
shaped relation among risk level and performance, and what is successful is a moderate risk, 
nor too high or too low. Risk cannot be reduced to zero – if decisions are not made, opportunities 
may be missed. 
Moreover entrepreneurs, as well as an entrepreneurial firm, like uncertainty more than certainty 
and have a high tolerance for ambiguity (Barringer, 2012, p. 16).  
A successful firm does not just passively adjust to a changing environment and so risk and 
uncertainty, it reacts to it and actively attempts to transform it with entrepreneurial action, be it 
with technological innovations, efforts to increase the effectiveness of the value chain, or 
changes in relationships with partners (Nightingale, 2008; see Johanson & Vahlne, 2017, 
p.1091).  
 
Yet these four key variables are still not enough to explain how a company develops its FDI 
and its international status, through the establishment chain. In doing so the Uppsala model 
could be used. There are two types of variables: state and change. As it is a model of 
dynamic processes, the change variables are the crucial ones. The change variables are the 
crucial elements of the model: they are where the action takes place. These processes change 
the characteristics of the focal firm and its environment, and then trigger further changes 
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(Johanson & Vahlne, 2017). The decision of taking in consideration the 2017 Uppsala model is 
related to the higher contemporaneity it has, but still all the relevant variables and assumptions 
of the previous ones have been considered and studied in this analysis. 
 
STATE VARIABLES       CHANGE VARIABLES 
 
 
Fig. 3 - Uppsala Model (Johanson & Vahlne, 2017) 
 
Developing knowledge is fundamental to a firm’s internationalization, and in particular that 
knowledge that grows out of experience in current activities is crucial to the learning process. 
An increased level of knowledge may thus have a positive or a negative impact on building 
trust and commitment (Johanson & Vahlne, 2009).  
The entrepreneurial knowledge development process includes at least three subprocesses, 
relationship-building, flexibility in strategy implementation, and adaptation to the 
organization’s task environment.  
Relationship building involves learning about each other and building trust by committing to 
the relationship. Trust-building on the other hand is not only a prerequisite to learning and 
creating, but to business exchanges in general (Johanson & Vahlne, 2009). Trust can also 
substitute for knowledge, for instance when a firm lacks the necessary market knowledge and 
so lets a trusted middleman run its foreign business (Arenius, 2005; see Johanson & Vahlne, 
2009, p.1417). Trust may develop into commitment if there is willingness and positive 
intentions. The speed, intensity, and efficiency of the processes of learning, creating knowledge, 
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and building trust depend on the extent to which the partners find given opportunities appealing. 
Furthermore, high levels of knowledge, trust, and commitment in a relationship result in a more 
efficient creative process (Johanson & Vahlne, 2009).  
Moreover knowledge does not accrue only from the firm’s own activities, but also from the 
activities of its partners (Kogut, 2000; see Johanson & Vahlne, 2009, p.1415) and exchange 
within a network allows a firm to acquire knowledge about its relationship partners, including 
their resources, needs, capabilities, strategies, and other relationships. Relationship partners are 
therefore indirectly a source of relevant business information about their own partners and more 
distant actors in the network (Barney, 1986; see Johanson & Vahlne, 2009, p.1419).  
Flexibility in strategy implementation is an incremental process for which only selected parts 
of the “intended strategy” will be translated into “realized strategy” (Mintzberg & Waters, 1985; 
see Johanson & Vahlne, 2017, p.1093). 
What matters most in organizational adaptation for the Uppsala model approach is how 
adaptation affects entrepreneurial attitudes, since these will directly affect the resource 
commitment process previously discussed (Van de Ven & Hargrave, 2004; see Johanson & 
Vahlne, 2017, p.1095).  
However, dynamic capabilities approach for a successful knowledge development process 
learning plays a crucial role because the success comes from continuous reconfiguration and 
development of company resources (Teece, 2014; see Johanson & Vahlne, 2017, p.1095). What 
managers learn and their interpretations depends heavily on previously acquired knowledge, 
that is, learning is affected by prior experiences (Cohen & Levinthal, 1990; see Johanson & 
Vahlne, 2017, p.1094). Market-specific knowledge is the critical kind of knowledge.  
Experiential learning is a central factor in firm’s internationalisation, it is a process that unfolds 
over time, because learning not only has to be consolidated in the minds of individuals, but also 
in organizational routines, structural arrangements, and ultimately in capabilities, via the 
resource commitment process (Johanson & Vahlne, 2017).  
In truth learning can also be not experiential, this non experiential learning is related to the 
acquisition of other firms, imitation, and search and it may also speed up the internationalization 
process (Forsgren, 2002; see Johanson & Vahlne, 2017, p.1095). This is one of the critiques of 
the model: it is not given that the internationalisation process will be gradual and linear.  
 
Knowledge development process is the input to commitment process, a continually flowing 
process, whose main mechanism is built upon reconfiguring resources and coordinating assets.  
The novelty in the 2017 Uppsala Model is the inclusion of opportunity development in the 
commitment process, which refers both to opportunity identification and opportunity 
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exploitation (Foss & Klein, 2012; see Johanson & Vahlne, 2017, p.1093). Implementing 
decisions involves an additional bundle of risks and uncertainties. (Mintzberg & Waters, 1985; 
see Johanson & Vahlne, 2017, p.1093). According to the effectuation model of Sarasvathy 
(2001; see Johanson & Vahlne, 2017, p.1093), expert entrepreneurs keep risks, uncertainty, and 
partial ignorance at bay by working with available means, accepting the possibility of affordable 
loss, building partnerships, and leveraging contingency (Sarasvathy, Kumar, York, & 
Bhagavatula, 2013; see Johanson & Vahlne, 2017, p.1093). Market commitment and market 
knowledge affect ‘‘perceived opportunities and risks which in turn influence commitment 
decisions and current activities’’ (Johanson & Vahlne, 1977).  
Opportunities are a favourable set of circumstances that generates the need for a product, 
service, or process (Barringer, 2012, p. 43). The reported circumstances arise from the fact that 
the markets are never in equilibrium (Kirzner, 1973; see Johanson & Vahlne, 2009, p.1421). 
This view implies that opportunity recognition is associated with ongoing business activities 
rather than with specific opportunity-seeking activities. Actually opportunities may be 
discovered by observing trends, economic, social, technological, political and regulation ones; 
but also by solving problems of finding gaps in the marketplace. (Barringer, 2012, p. 53) 
Opportunity findings are anyway strictly related with entrepreneur characteristics because 
personal market knowledge may help in finding growing niches that others might not see. 
Denrell, Fang, and Winter (2003; see Johanson & Vahlne, 2009, p.1419) conclude, as Barney 
(1986; see Johanson & Vahlne, 2009, p.1419) argued, that the firm, or entrepreneur, does not 
have any privileged knowledge about external resources required for identifying an opportunity. 
Therefore, as Shane (2000;see Johanson & Vahlne, 2009, p.1419) suggests, the firm should 
focus its opportunity analysis on its own internal resources, where it presumably has privileged 
knowledge rather than external resources.  
Also cognitive characteristics like entrepreneurial alertness let the entrepreneur discover 
opportunities, indeed without engaging in a deliberate research, the entrepreneurial discovery 
can be both an outcome of intuition and serendipity. Kirzner (1997; see Johanson & Vahlne, 
2009, p.1419) concluded that identifying opportunities is likely to be the result of a 
serendipitous strategy characterized by effort and luck, combined with alertness and flexibility.  
Connecting to what has already been said about network relations, this can be also related with 
opportunity discovery because the interaction between partners who build knowledge together 
and come to trust each other as they commit themselves further to the relationship is the source 
of opportunities as the consequence of the privileged knowledge that the two partners develop 
during their interaction. Summing up opportunity can constitute a subset of knowledge, as the 
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most important element of the body of knowledge that drives the process.  (Johanson & Vahlne, 
2009).  
Commitment matches with the resource allocation process and it is made when there is a 
“reasonably positive” trade-off between expected benefits and downside outcomes (Johanson 
& Vahlne, 1977). Expectations and future perception are made on past experiences, together 
with network members. Also potential risk and value of the resources that could potentially be 
lost if expectations would not be met,  which depends on  the ease with which the focal resources 
could be redeployed for an alternative purpose (Hill, Hwang, & Kim, 1990; see Johanson & 
Vahlne, 2017, p.1093), contribute to the downside outcomes forecast.  
 
In the dynamic capabilities approach, the successful development of firms is the result of 
continuous reconfiguration and development of resource bundles (Teece, 2014; see Johanson 
& Vahlne, 2017, p.1095). In general, a capability, whether dynamic or operational, reflects the 
ability to use resources for a particular purpose. 
Firm’s portfolio of core competences and capabilities reflects the high order FSA (Firm specific 
advantage), discussed in the mainstream international business literature (Verbeke, 2013; see 
Johanson & Vahlne, 2017, p.1096). High-order FSAs are identified with the firm's routines and 
recombination capabilities, company shared knowledge and ability to generate new knowledge, 
and company capability of integrating multiple technologies. Actually the “advantage package” 
makes sense as a means of augmenting the value of individual capabilities through interaction. 
(Johanson & Vahlne, 2017). Originally FSA (Dunning & Lundan, 2008; see Johanson & 
Vahlne, 2017, p.1096) included asset-based elements, such as privileged access to raw 
materials, capital, technology, brands, and distribution channels; while transactional advantages 
include superior governance systems and the management skills to operate an internal, 
multinational network, relationships and organizational culture. 
Indeed internationalisation requires sufficiently strong FSAs to establish a sustainable business 
in foreign markets and to overcome liabilities of foreignness and outsidership (Hymer, 1976; 
see Johanson & Vahlne, 2017, p.1095).  
While operational capabilities exploit extant FSAs, dynamic capabilities allow further 
development of those operational capabilities with the intent of adding to their strength (Teece, 
2014; see Johanson & Vahlne, 2017, p.1097), integrating, building and reconfiguring internal 
and external competences to address rapidly changing environments, therefore suitable in an 




Commitment describes the distribution of resources over the company’s functions but has also 
a forward-looking connotation: positions reflect commitments to particular courses of action. 
Performance on the other hand refers to what has been achieved already  (Johanson & Vahlne, 
2017). 
Commitment and performances are reflected in the company status within its network. The 
network structure outside the firm’s own business network and the specific business 
relationship are crucial in a firm’s internationalisation (Johanson and Mattsson, 1988; see 
Johanson & Vahlne, 2009, p.1415). On the other hand the internationalization process has a 
positive impact on performances (Delios & Beamish, 2001; see Johanson & Vahlne, 2017, 
p.1413). 
Axelsson and Johanson (1992; see Johanson & Vahlne, 2009, p.1415) showed that foreign 
market entry should not be studied as a decision about modes of entry, but should instead be 
studied as a position-building process in a foreign market network, also with the firm's partner. 
Indeed the focal firm is likely to follow a partner abroad if that partner firm has a valuable 
network position in one or more foreign countries. By following the partner abroad, the firm 
demonstrates its commitment to the relationship (Johanson & Vahlne, 2009). Morgan and Hunt 
(1994; see Johanson & Vahlne, 2009, p.1418) stated that ‘‘when both commitment and trust are 
present, they produce outcomes that promote efficiency, productivity and effectiveness.’’  
It will be interesting to analyse real cases and see whether relationships and network or 
economics evaluation mostly affect FDI.  
 
The internationalisation process according to the Upsala model is a learning process and firms 
are continually in a state of becoming. In truth learning can also be not experiential, it is not 
given that the internationalisation process will be gradual and linear.  
Knowledge about entrepreneurial international opportunities may be transferred between 
organizational units. Indeed when going abroad firms expand predominantly in markets similar 
to their home market and relationships have an impact on foreign market selection as on the 
mode of entry. Market entry should not be studied as a decision about modes of entry but should 
instead be studied as a position-building process in a foreign market network, also with the 
firm's partner, which is crucial particularly in China Mainland. Opportunity findings is the result 
of a serendipitous strategy characterized by effort and luck, combined with alertness and 
flexibility. However internationalisation requires sufficiently strong ability to generate new 
knowledge and routines management to establish a sustainable business in foreign markets and 
to overcome liabilities of foreignness and outsidership. 
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2.3. Food as multidomestic industry 
Most FDI is concentrated in skill and technology-intensive industries, in manufacturing and in 
services. Within manufacturing, the largest shares are in chemicals, electrical and electronic 
equipment, transport equipment, generally knowledge intensive companies (KIBs).  Sectors in 
which the presence of MNEs is greatest are characterized by large investments in R&D and by 
a large share of professional and technical workers specialised in  the production of technically 
complex or differentiated goods. However it is easy to find a quite relevant FDI in luxury and 
fashion because of the importance of the brand name (Navaretti & Venables, 2006), and food, 
high quality Made in Italy food, is part of the luxury sector, as reported by 2020 Social Luxury 
Index by Altagamma and Accenture.  
Companies, when going abroad, may approach different strategies, depending on configuration 
and level of coordination of activities (Allred & Swan, 2004). According to these variables a 
company might engage in a global strategy with a high coordination of distributed activities, 
without looking for exploiting different countries characteristics. This could be pursued through 
geographical decentralization, a transnational corporation strategy, in which different countries' 
marketing strategy and product development are managed together,  or geographical 
centralization,  in a homogeneous global strategy. The second approach is engaging in a 
multinational strategy, where different countries cultural differences are exploited and 
companies in different countries are managed separately. In case the strategy is based on export  
different channels and sales method are pursued for different countries, with a low level of 
coordination since there are no office abroad; while if the strategy is based on geographical 
decentralisation, there are different commercial subsidiaries in many different countries, with 
their own marketing strategy and product development, according to different market tastes 
(multidomestic approach). 
According to Ghoshal & Nohria (1993) food is categorized as multidomestic industry. For 
instance some big names such as Ferrero, Budweiserr, Hoegaarden, Heineken, Coca-Cola, 
Pepsi, Nestle, are making huge changes in Asian plants and products, to be suitable to each 
country's needs and preferences (Guan Yu Lim, 2019).  
Let us better understand what undertaking a multidomestic strategy implies. Firms within 
multidomestic industries are relatively autonomous across countries and focus on the needs of 
the local market (Porter, 1986). A multidomestic company adapts to each market based on 
differences in resource availability, cultural values, product usage and marketing opportunities. 
Primary strengths of a multidomestic approach include customized offerings since the company 
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can tailor its activities and products to the interests and needs of each market. For instance, a 
business may offer high-end goods in a more affluent market but scaled-down and lower-priced 
goods in a market with lower per-capita income. Another advantage the multidomestic 
approach can give is concentrated effort because business activities are concentrated on success 
in a single market, allowing optimized production, marketing and services. Last but not least, a 
multidomestic company can give quick response to the changing needs of the marketplace, each 
local headquarters or business unit is close to the action and to customers and can identify 
evolving trends sooner than a distant central headquarters (Makhija et al, 1997). Firms in 
multidomestic industries allow their foreign subsidiaries to be relatively autonomous in order 
to better respond to local markets.  
 
According to Park, Jong-Hun, & Kwangsoo Kim (1999) in a multidomestic industry as a 
nationwide geographic scope of competition, competitive forces are mostly constrained by 
national boundaries, due to the differences in customer needs and industry structures across 
nations. It has relatively low number of competitors and rivalry, due to the fact that competitors 
compete against each other on a country-by-country basis, it has low dynamism, complexity, 
and uncertainty. Across nations industry structure, customer needs and tastes and rules of 
competition are relatively different. On the other hand barriers to entry into foreign national 
markets are relatively high, because of the significant difference in markets and industries 
across nations (Porter, 1986), and because of the need for learning about foreign national 
markets and foreign business operations for newcomers. Consequently establishing favourable 
partnerships and engaging in the knowledge development and learning process explained in the 
Uppsala model is crucial to be successful when investing in foreign markets in multidomestic 
industry. 
 
In support of what said above, the degree of industry globalization, measured as trade levels, 
plays an important role in explaining which type of international alliance is likely to be chosen 
by partner firms. Park, Jong-Hun, and Kwangsoo Kim yet in 1999 stated that joint venture 
alliances take place relatively more frequently in multidomestic  industries.  
The host country focus is an appropriate strategic choice for a multidomestic industry, the need 
to respond quickly to local standards and changes necessitates the responsiveness, peculiar of a 
host country focus strategy (Fatehi, 2008).  
Being in a multidomestic industry also means adapting the way in which the company 
communicates to customers. Nowadays in China the key is to adapt the social media strategy 
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to the local channels and to the different ways in which they are used, as explained in 
technological trends for instance, Incorporating WeChat into playbook is a must, given that the 
consumer-facing service is also widely used as a platform for corporate marketing. Before 
deciding on a marketing strategy it is also worth observing how other companies use the local 
social media platforms for marketing, another reason why having a local partner might 
accelerate foreign company presence in the market (Luzikova & Krivoshey, 2020).  
 
When in a multidomestic industry subsidiaries in different countries are managed separately. 
Each one has its own marketing strategy and product development, according to different 
market tastes. Multidomestic industries are relatively autonomous across countries and focus 




























CH. 3 – The case study analysis of Beretta and Senfter  
The aim of this dissertation is to understand why an Italian food company should invest in China 
Mainland, how to invest in that country and which are the drivers of the internationalisation 
process. Having this mission in mind it has been developed a multiple case study interviewing 
companies that have already invested in the country, also considering recent changes and 
developments, and analysing data through the Uppsala Model.  
3.1 The case study  
3.1.1. Why choosing a case study?  
The case study’s unique strength is its ability to deal with a full variety of evidence and allows 
to understand why a set of decisions were taken, how they were implemented and with what 
results (Shramm, 1971), core of our case study.  
To settle and manage this case study it has been followed Yin (2017) publication, “Case study 
research and applications: Design and methods”. According to him the scope of a case study is 
to investigate a contemporary phenomenon in depth and within its real-word context, especially 
when the boundaries between phenomenon and context may not be clearly evident, to find out 
which elements have influenced company process and which not.  
A case study benefits from the prior development of the theoretical propositions to guide design, 
data collection and analysis. It relies on multiple source of evidence. 
 
Case study may require unmanageable level of effort, however engaging in a survey would 
have required higher effort, since there were only 23 Italian food company with at least a 
subsidiary in China and the sample would have not been meaningful. It should be interviewed 
all the companies in the food & beverage industry, trying to find out whether there was some 
exporting in China and the differences among exporters, real presence and no deals with China. 
Moreover trying to engage with a summary would have meant look for 25.571 companies’ 
email, with the risk of not finding them and of not having a meaningful number of respondents. 
On the other hand with the case study it is possible to choose few companies, since  
 sample size in case study is irrelevant (Lipsey, 1990),  that had already done direct investments 
in the country, trying to give useful answers to our research questions.  
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3.1.2 Case study structure  
When choosing multiple case study, which is therefore seen as more robust, each case must be 
carefully selected so that the individual case studies either predict similar results or contrasting 
results but for anticipatable reasons (replication logic).  
The reason why it has been decided to develop a multiple case study is to analyse companies 
which produce cured meats, typical Italians and not integrated within the Chinese culture. 
Companies with that kind of product had to create and establish a new market and their own 
space in the foreign culture.  
 
Although this case study will be mainly developed around an interview, there still is the need 
to follow systematic procedures.  
Literature review has been crucial in designing and define the case study’s research questions. 
Defining the research question(s) is the most important step to be taken in a research study. 
They need to have both substance and form. Literature has also given substance to the mission 
and goals of both the whole dissertation and study. Each proposition directs attention to 
something that should be examined within the scope of the study. (Attachment 1 – Interview 
questions)  
Not all the 23 Italian food companies that have a subsidiary in China could have been 
interviewed and analysed. Reason why cases and definition of who is inside the group 
(phenomenon) and who is outside (context) has been integrated with data collection procedure 
to make a better screening of the candidate cases for the case study.  
Data collection procedures started for Aida data base, where 23 companies resulted in the food 
and beverage sector with at least one subsidiary in China. From this data base different kind of 
data could be found, doing a preliminary analysis of all the companies:  
a. Legal and administrative data 
b. Financial data like income statement and balance sheet indicators 
c. Main business field and principal product and services  
d. Subsidiaries location, participation % and number of employees there 
Looking at this number and according to what previously said about product characteristics it 
has been decided to analyse two companies, in the meat field, Shanghai Yihua Food Co., Ltd. 
and Fratelli Beretta Spa. These companies consequently have been analysed before the 
interview and the contact (Attachment 2 – Company profiles).   
Case study protocol is essential because research design and topics help to remind you the data 
to be collected and why. The protocol is intended to data collection of a single case and not to 
serve the entire project. A tentative outline can appear in the case study protocol.  
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There are different ways of collecting case study evidence, however the main focus has been 
put on: 
o Documentation, which is stable and can be reviewed separately, is not created 
as the result of a case study, it is specific and can contain the exact names, 
references and details of an event, being also able to cover a long time span, 
many events and many settings. However it may be difficult to find and suffer 
from selection bias if collection of document is incomplete and reporting bias of 
the document’s author. Moreover Chinese documents, mainly the administrative 
and financial ones, are completely different from the Italian structure and have 
not an accessible database.  
o Interviews on the other hand are targeted, focusing directly on case study topics 
and are insightful, providing explanation as well as personal views. They 
however might be biased due to poorly articulated questions and to response 
bias, moreover interview might say what interviewer wants to hear. To avoid 
this bias it has been followed the rule of “Interviewer desired skills and values”:  
▪ be a good listener, being able to assimilate large amount of new 
information without bias 
▪ stay adaptive, remember the original purpose of the study but then must 
be willing to adapt procedures or plans if unanticipated events occur  
▪ have a firm grasp of the issues being studied.  
▪ Asking good questions is related with checking the ideas in the light of 
new information, dealing with inevitable discrepancies between what 
was expected and what was found by rethinking the possibilities of 
getting more data (Becker, 1998, p. 66)  
Interviews can help by suggesting explanations of key events and insights. 
Audio recording provide a more accurate rendition of any interview than taking 
your own notes. The interviews have been then transcript, summarised and 
codified according to different topics, to help understanding the company and 
giving clearer conclusions to our study (Attachment 3_Senfter interview and 
coding; Attachment 4_Beretta interview and coding). 
 
Summing up what is relevant when managing a case study is to have a thoughtful, balanced, 
and transparent tone; methodical but also attractively written. The research question should suit 
the case study research, being dominated by “how” and “why” questions. The design of the 
interview is crucial: cases definitions and selection, logical connection between the research 
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question and the data to be collected, rival’s consideration. Data must then be scientifically 
collected, using at least a protocol which has to be presented, in our case the transcription and 
codification method. Moreover sources and interviewed people must be always cited.  
3.2 Case study analysis 
After telling the history of internationalization of the two companies analysed, we will try to 
better frame them in the competitive scenario and contextualize them over time. 
Competitive scenario and strategic choices are the result of an internationalization process, 
which will be analysed through the Uppsala model according to which the evolution of the 
company foreign presence is progressive and based on the establishment chain (Johanson & 
Vahlne, 2009). Firms should expand predominantly in markets similar or adjacent to their home 
market, using technologies close to those they already hold in order to save on costs of search 
and change (Kay, 2005; see Johanson & Vahlne, 2017, p.1090). 
On the other hand Coviello and Munro (1997; see Johanson & Vahlne, 2009, p.1413) found out 
that relationships have an impact on foreign market selection as well as on the mode of entry in 
the context of ongoing network processes. Markets are networks of relationships in which firms 
are linked to each other in various, complex and, to a considerable extent, invisible patterns. 
The inconsistencies and differences will then be evaluated through additional parameters, such 
as social and cultural trends, which can undermine the progressive process of entry into a 
country, generating significant changes of direction. Finally, there may also be macroeconomic 
variables to influence FDI and corporate governance. 
 
ISU Independent Salumi Union 
Interview 04/08/2020 
Length 52 Min 
Participants 
Name Role 
Helmuth Senfter (HS) Company CEO 









Fratelli Beretta Spa 
Interview 21/08/2020 
Length 80 Min 
Participants 
Name Role 
Simone Donadoni (SD) Production manager 
Francesca Brusa  (FB) Marketing member 
Andrea Beretta (AB)  Family member 
Tab. 3 – Beretta Interview 
3.2.1 Senfter family case study 
More than the history of ISU, Independent Salumi Union, brand of Italian cured meats in China, 
this is the history of the internationalisation process of Senfter family. Indeed ISU is the last-
born brand of Shanghai Yi Hua Food, 100% controlled by Senfter family.    
The Senfter SPA yet in 1994 was a cured meats producer located in San Candido, with its main 
products as Speck, Wurstel and Praga Ham.  The need of growth met the risk of falling in the 
price war and the Senfter family was looking at a way to overcome it. According to Helmuth 
Senfter, the actual Vice Chairman of The Board of Senfter Holding Spa  and Chairman of The 
Board and Founder of Shanghai Yi Hua Food Co. Ltd: 
“For my father as a classic entrepreneur, born entrepreneur (he studied neither university 
nor higher), expanding the company was not a variable, the only variable was the how. 
Staying in Italy would have been a bit too risky”. 
In ’94 the company met an Italian journalist correspondent for Asia with a huge love for the 
Chinese country and with a great business network there. The journalist offered to Senfter Spa 
to make a partnership with an already build cured meats plant in Xianyang, north-east China.  
This plant was on sale because of the country project of privatization of all the state-owned 
companies. This historical period can be seen as the symbol of the loss of power of the 
socialism, with a highly centralized and planned economic system (Fu, Wu, Yang & Ye, 2008, 
p.881). The plant was in awful conditions, but the deal was interesting for the lack of offer in 
the market of Chinese cured meats, despite the constant demand from the customers. This, for 
the supply and demand rule, would have allowed the imposition of high prices in the market. 
However in 1994 the Chinese law required at least 25% of Chinese shares  for opening a 
company. The question Senfter Senior asked himself was not whether to invest, but with whom 
to do it, because the previous owner was not efficient enough to make a deal with. Moreover 
the old company plant and land evaluation would not have been fair enough. The Senfter family 
70 
 
asked for some help to ICE office to find out other potential partners. Out of 25 candidates only 
one was good enough to make a deal with. Henan Shuanghui Group had a general manager 
with a military background. In 1994 people of age 40/50 would have had an education only if 
they were military, otherwise for them schools and university would have been closed. In 1995 
the Senfter family made the first JV with a state-owned company. Helmuth Senfter told us that:  
“We departed in the '95 with a first plant in JV with the state. The state, however, had no 
interest in making traditional Italian sausages, but obviously had more of a vocation as a 
state company whose goal was to feed a population of 1.2 billion people. So they wanted to 
make cheap products, mix vegetable and animal proteins, which were basically half-vegetable 
and half-animal emulsifiers that were cheap and could be transported by train all over China. 
Anyway, the population was still not prepared for raw products like prosciutto crudo or 
salami. For about 10 years we have therefore only made emulsified, always with the same 
partner, arriving to have more than 2000 employees, 4 factories and to produce more in 
China than in Italy.”  
Helmuth Senfter contributed as General Manager to the building of 4 Joint Venture meat 
processing companies with Henan Shuanghui Group. The first Equity Joint Venture was a 
brown field manufacturing plant in Luohe city, Henan Province, and launched the Marco Polo 
brand in the Chinese cooked ham market using the JV platform. Marco Polo brand in China 
became a famous and notorious brand, an Italian sounding reference adjusted to typical Chinese 
preferences. In 1999 they established the second Equity Joint Venture manufacturing green 
field plant in Luohe city, Henan Province, China, for meat processing operations. In 2001 they 
established the third Equity Joint Venture green field manufacturing plant in Fuxin city, 
Liaoning Province, China with Chinese partners company Henan Shuanghui  and a local 
partners company Fuxin Food for meat processing operations. In 2003 established the fourth 
Equity Joint Venture partly green field manufacturing plant in Jinhua city, Zhejiang Province, 
China with Chinese partners company Henan Shuanghui and a local Mingzhu Food company 
for meat processing operations especially in the traditional Chinese raw ham segment (Helmuth 
Senfter LinkedIn Profile).  
After 10 years the partnership with  Henan Shuanghui Group was over, and the Senfter Spa 
decided to go on with its own resources without a Chinese partner anymore.  In 2005 they 
opened the first wholly owned green field manufacturing plant in Shanghai Minhang District, 
China, Shanghai Yi Hua Food, 100% controlled, 100% owned and part of the Italian Senfter 
Holding Spa/AG company, for the specific purpose of a local production and domestic 
distribution of traditional Italian style cured meats in Chinese market, with the vision of locally 
producing and locally distributing traditional Italian style cured meat products in a sustainable 
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way. They focus on sustainability: fresh meat cuts, natural ingredients, and animal welfare. In 
2008 they successful disinvest and sell all of their four China Joint Venture equity participations 
to WH Group, also listed in HK stock exchange.  
The choice of opening up a plant for the production of Italian cured meats came from the market 
knowledge. Helmuth said:  
“I started with this project in '95 and I stayed all the time. I lived in China as a child, I could 
speak and read Chinese, I could afford to make an Italian sausage factory without partners.”  
Being in China as an insider helped the Senfter Spa in understanding the market needs. 5-star 
hotels, western restaurants and specialty markets needed these products, mainly because their 
import is forbidden. This is because in foreign policy and in the management of duties there is 
a kind of mutuality. If Italy or the EU does not accept Chinese products, then China opposes 
the importation of European cold cuts/products into China. Chinese cured meats are still banned 
in Europe. There are the contraband products (via HK), but the 5-star hotels and high-quality 
restaurants did not want to risk high fines. Moreover, it has now become a criminal offence 
punishable not only on a civil level but also as a criminal offence. There is therefore an even 
greater incentive not to buy contraband products. For what concern the PDO products, in 
particular Prosciutto di Parma and Prosciutto San Daniele, in 2007 there has been an opening 
because the contraband was not manageable anymore. There was the new possibility of 
importing these products but with a fee of 25%, way too high according to Helmuth Senfter.  
The size of the newest plant in 2005 (10 mln potential turnover), was the minimum possible, 
according to Helmuth Senfter: 
“ It was then a question of expanding and going beyond the demand of Western expatriates. 
China’s consumer demand grew more slowly than hoped, as it was a hope, there was no 
market survey that could predict future demand for cold cuts. We had not done any research 
through questionnaires to consumers. If we went back, we would not do it anyway. It was a 
manageable dimension even in case of lack of demand, even if it had gone completely 
wrong.”  
The demand used to come only from western customers expatriate in China, while for the 
remaining population there was a huge work to be made in order to generate the needed market 
demand. To reach the target turnover they needed 15 years despite 5 years planned, 3 times 
slower. 
In 2018, after almost two decades of collaboration, Senfter sold its GSI shares to Unibon, who 
become its sole owner, (Foodweb, 2018).  
With these shares sales revenues the Senfter Spa has decided to build within 24 months a new 
manufacturing plant of 15 thousand square meters, located in China Mainland, next to the first 
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plant, with a potential turnover of 40 mln, planned to be reach in 15 years.  The main hurdle for 
this project is, as with the previous built plant, customers’ education, which has to be done 
almost individually, tasting, and teaching the different products.  
With the sale of GSI shares,  the Senfter family needed also to change the brand with which 
products were sold and in 2018 ISU, Independent Salumi Union, was created. On January 2019 
Shanghai Yi Hua Food started to exclusively manufacture ISU branded cured meat products, 
credibility and reputation needed to be reached and gained in the market. 
The company has developed over the years and is currently selling approximately 100 different 
SKUs in the Chinese market. Main product categories include Prosciutto ham, Salami, Cotto 
ham, Pancetta bacon and Sausages, all Italian sounding products but adapted to Chinese tastes. 
Major sales channels in China are Food Service, Retail and E-commerce (Helmuth Senfter 
LinkedIn Profile).  
According to Helmuth Senfter their success factors are:  
“Knowledge of culture and market: having learned not only to speak Chinese but also to 
write and read it I managed to run a Chinese company from insider, not like the 
multinationals which have all the first line of Western managers, who can’t even understand 
the news in local newspapers (language barrier) and want to impose their taste/ style. In 
small companies like ours if we had only western managers, we would have been short-
sighted in management. All this would make an investment even more risky than it is. 
Moreover, in my company all managers are Chinese and know where to go, know and live the 
Chinese market.” 
3.2.2 Beretta family case study 
Beretta has a great story of merges and acquisitions since 1987, when it began its expansion 
focused on companies specializing in PDO and PGI (Protected geographical indication) 
productions. Then in 1997 he landed in the United States, acquiring a production business in 
New Jersey, in South Hackensack: because of American laws, cured meats and cups could not 
be exported from Italy.  
Between 2005 and 2007 a joint venture with the Chinese giant Yurun for the production of 
Italian cured meats near Nanjing was also carried out (Fratelli Beretta Website).  
 
It all started in 2004, when a Beretta plant supplier put them in contact with the Chinese 
company that is still their partner (Yurun). The founder and chairman of China Yurun Food 
Group Limited ("Yurun Food") Zhu Yicai believed that "With their income rising and Western 
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culture getting popular here, Chinese people would love these high-end processed meat 
products" (Lu Haoting, 2007). Andrea Beretta told us that:  
"It was all born in 2004, when one of our plant suppliers put us in contact with a Chinese 
company, which is still our partner (Yuber food). They had started independently to produce 
Western cured meats, but they realized that there was a lack of know-how and asked for 
support to find a partner to their plant supplier. We have started progressively. We sent them 
an industrial/food technician to implement a small production and show them how to make 
Italian cured meats". 
In 2006 they made the first real agreement, a trade agreement, on the distribution of Prosciutto 
di Parma in China, constituting a JV only for exporting. But immediately in the following 
months, between 2006 and 2007, Yurun asked for more support, giving Beretta space, facilities 
and more. As a result, the first transfer of an Italian commercial/finance employee to China took 
place, plus a production technician, and the following year in 2008 this small Beretta company 
was born in China, a commercial reality which dealt with the sale of both imported and directly 
produced products. 
Yurun still controls 70 percent of the venture, with Beretta holding the rest of the shares (30%). 
The positive feedback from the Chinese market motivated them to turn the partnership into a 
formal joint venture and expand into more product lines. "Beretta has the technology. We know 
the market and have the sales channels. It is a perfect match," says Zhu, who supplies sausages 
and hams to nearly 70 percent of China's four- and five-star hotels (Lu Haoting, 2007).  
Zhu is the emblem of the Chinese changing society, where individual contributions are now 
being acknowledged and rewarded (Fu, Wu, Yang & Ye, 2008, p. 889). However it also 
represents the masculine society, where assertiveness, dominance and aggression are highly 
acceptable in China.  
Consequently in February 2012, thus celebrating the bicentenary of society, there have been the 
inauguration of a second factory, in Ma'anshan, 300 km from Shanghai and 60 km from 
Nanjing.  
The new production centre has replaced the historical one of Nanjing, that Beretta Group had 
opened in 2007, and has strengthen the joint venture with the Chinese food group Yurun. 
With an area of 9 thousand square meters, a production capacity of over 3 thousand tons per 
year and a workforce of 150 employees, the new plant is focused on the production of all the 
main cured meats allowing an increase in production volumes. With the investment in even 
more efficient machinery and equipment and in larger areas to be used for maturing, the aim 
has been to further improve the quality of the products and to diversify the offer with the 
production of raw bone hams and cooked cured meats. 
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The works for the construction of the new plant in Ma'anshan, between design and construction, 
lasted little more than a year and employed materials and manpower both Chinese and from 
Italy, under the direction of Andrea Beretta, one of the representatives of the new generation of 
the Beretta family. The new factory also represents the best of Italian and European production 
technology and is able to combine the tradition of Italian salumeria with the increasingly 
stringent Chinese food safety parameters (Lu Haoting, 2007). 
The intention was to produce products for the Chinese market, made with native meat that will 
be as similar as possible, for taste, to the Italian ones thanks to the use of spices and recipes 
from our country. As Chinese people's incomes rise with the nation's economy growing at more 
than 9 percent a year, consumer awareness of food safety is growing fast. Especially in large 
cities, many consumers have gradually abandoned the old way of buying fresh meat from 
butcher's booths in wet markets and now prefer shopping in better-regulated supermarkets. The 
top three meat producers, including Yurun Group, slaughter less than 5 percent of the total, 
while in the United States the three largest companies butcher more than 50 percent of the pigs. 
Initially it was used Chinese raw material, but then there have been two pivotal moments that 
changed the purchasing policy. Four years ago, Chinese commodity prices skyrocketed, then 
there was a further spike with swine fever. As a result, mainly for the quality and price mix of 
meat they decided to import from outside frozen meat. So today they buy 100% of the meat 
they use in the factory, from Germany, Holland, Spain, or South America (Foodweb, 2012).  
According to Francesca Brusa, marketing team member in Fratelli Beretta: 
“If you want to offer a complete basket of products to the Chinese customer the only solution 
is to produce directly there. It must be considered that the plant in China produces only for 
the Chinese market. What is found in the rest of Asia are products Made in Italy and 
exported”. 
Only San Daniele and Parma ham have the authorisation to be exported in China from Italy, the 
remaining products are banned. Only with a plant in the mainland you would be able to sell in 
China. Now Beretta, after 10 years of work, has obtained the permission for a little range of 
Wuber products, cooked products. What is made in China is sold in China only, while in  the 
other Asian countries where Beretta sells its products, these arrive directly from Italy.  
According to Francesca Brusa, marketing team member in Fratelli Beretta, when speaking 
about China:  
“ We have been there for many years, so we have a background and a knowledge of the 
market that is remarkable. A potential new cured meats actor entering China would have 
many difficulties as it is not easy.  The years of the past are precious years for the knowledge 
and experience we have gathered.” 
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3.2.3 Data analysis  
We are now proceeding the two companies’ analysis starting from their descriptive data, going 
then through the strategic indicators.  
In this section we will examine the similarities and differences between the two cases with 
respect to the following topics: entrance mode, human resources management, financial and 
economic data, and plants location.   
 
Industry Meat processing Meat processing 
Name ISU Shanghai Yi Hua Food – Senfter Holding  Yuber food – Fratelli Beretta 
 







1 Italian: R&D - Master Chef 
1 Italian: Founder 
150  
1 Italian: R&D 
1 Italian: Production Manager 
1 Italian: Marketing 
1 Italian: Sales and financial 
Revenues (in 
millions Euro)  
2019: 7.914.621 € 
2020 (2 quarters): 3.543.100 € 
2019: 15.635.693 € 
2020 (2 quarters): 14.500.331 € 
Agreements 
and Structure 
1995: Brownfield Equity Joint Venture with 
Henan Shuanghui Group: manufacturing plant in 
Luohe city 
1999: Greenfield Equity Joint Venture with 
Henan Shuanghui Group: meat processing 
operations in Luohe city 
2001: Greenfield Equity Joint Venture with 
Henan Shuanghui Group: manufacturing plant in 
Fuxin city 
2003: Greenfield Equity Joint Venture with 
Henan Shuanghui and a local Mingzhu Food: 
manufacturing plant in Jinhua city 
2005: Greenfield wholly owned manufacturing 
plant in Shanghai Minhang District 100% 
controlled 
2008: Disinvestment and sale all of their four 
China Joint Venture equity participations to WH 
Group 
2020: Greenfield wholly owned manufacturing 
plant work in progress  
2007: Brownfield Equity Joint Venture 
with China Yurun Food Group Limited 
("Yurun Food"): manufacturing plant in 
Nanjing 
2012: Greenfield Equity Joint Venture 
with China Yurun Food Group Limited 
("Yurun Food"): manufacturing plant in 
Ma'anshan replacing the old plant 
Tab. 4 – Descriptive information of the cases in China 
3.2.3.1. Entrance mode 
ISU Shanghai Yi Hua Food has never done export, it entered in China through a JV with a 
completely different production compared to the domestic one and then, when it gained enough 
market knowledge, it decided to go alone, building a wholly owned subsidiary. The main reason 
that did not allowed Senfter to enter in the market by exporting the product is that in 1994 when 
they first approached China Italian product import was not permitted.  
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Differently Beretta, which tried to enter in China for the first time in 2007, approached the 
market at first by exporting PDO products, the only approved by Chines government, which 
have been admitted in that year. Then Beretta opened a JV, at the beginning in a brownfield 
investment and consequently building up a new plant, making a greenfield investment.  
Both the companies entered the country with a brown field Joint Venture, unpredictable if 
basing the analysis on the belief that China is a developing country, in which FDI are generally 
made through greenfield direct investments because host country firms are often not developed 
enough. Of course the two purchased manufacturing plants were not as technological as Italian 
ones, but enough to start the business in the country. It might be underlined that China as a 
matter of fact is not a developing country anymore, but in 1994 and 2005 its conditions where 
different from now and was hundred percent a developing country.  
3.2.3.2. Human resource management 
People management of the two companies is pretty similar: hundreds of Chinese employees for 
the production,  with Italian people for the staff functions.   
We were able to gain some more information from Beretta. Each of the Italian people in Yurun 
has a different background, it depends also on the position they have in the company. This 
choice is consistent with what Noe, et al. (2006; see Wu, 2008) stated: “if the company struggle 
to keep and transfer its Italian values the best solutions is to get expatriates, someone who has 
chosen to live in a country other than the one in which he or she legally resides  at top 
management, but never as HR Manager.” For sure marketing and salespeople have studied 
language and knew Chinese culture before. While production people were keener on company 
values and products characteristics. According to them the main difficulty is to have stable 
operations staff to teach over time. Especially men in the 20/30/35 range change job very 
frequently, looking for a salary even slightly higher, coherently with the society switching to 
an individualist one, with competition and proactiveness (Fu, Wu, Yang & Ye, 2008). They 
absolutely do not want to increase their salary, unless in the case of a key person. Although 
people culture is changing, since Beretta is in China the dynamics have always been the same, 
by the way as Simone Donadoni, production manager in Fratelli Beretta, said  
“The only thing is that we have understood what is the type of worker that remains more in 
time, that is the local woman, between 25/40 years, with  already one or two children and 
therefore has no particular ambitions.”  
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3.2.3.3. Financial and economic data 
The two companies gave us two slightly different sources to make a brief financial analysis 
about their performances in China. We got Shanghai Yi Hua Food Quarterly Income Statement, 
with net income and gross margin indicated (Graph. 5).  
 
Graph. 5 - Shanghai Yi Hua Food Quarterly Income Statement (2020, ISU - Shanghai Yi Hua 
Food) 
From Beretta came only some numbers related with revenues and volumes sold in the last 5 
years, reported below:  





























In these last five years no new plant or joint ventures have been made in China. The trend is 
increasing for both the company, with percentage of growth up to 20% for Beretta and only 5% 
for ISU Shanghai Yi Hua Food. While Beretta trend in in line with Italian food export growth 
of 20% from 2018 to 2019, ISU Shanghai Yi Hua Food is way below the average.  Indeed 
Senfter have never ended the year with a positive net profit, which in the last year have 
negatively increase of 100%, while Beretta sales volume is now almost 10% higher than five 
years ago. 
Graph 7 – Case studies revenues  
 
Despite we do not have ISU Shanghai Yi Hua Food sales volume we can use the one of Beretta 
(Info Dati, 2020) to evaluate their average price positioning (Revenues / Sales volume) and 
compare it with the one given us by ISU Shanghai Yi Hua Food Income Statement 2016 to Q2 
2020 (Graph. 5). It is possible to compare this two companies in their avarage price given the 
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Graph 8 – Price positioning 
 
Beretta has a slightly lower price positioning compared with ISU Shanghai Yi Hua Food, and 
given the higher revenues Beretta has we can deduct that Beretta selling volumes are way higher 
than ISU Shanghai Yi Hua Food. However we might be careful when doing this evaluation 
because the evaluated price is an average of all the products sold.  
The most expensive product when we talk about Italian cured meats is Prosciutto Crudo, and 
that one is directly sold from Italy in the case of Beretta and these revenues goes in the Italian 
balance sheets, differently from ISU Shanghai Yi Hua Food which sells only Made in China 
Prosciutto Crudo. Therefore the lower price positioning might depend also on this fact.  
3.2.3.4. Plant location 
After the financial analysis it has been examined where the different companies have been 
located across Mainland China from the establishment in the country.  
The different plants are located all around China, but, if we make a comparison with Mark 
Hedley of B2B International Map of China’s 33 Provinces and Administrative Regions, from 
which it emerges that there are huge variations between different provinces in terms of 
population levels, per capita GDP, average income levels, consumer spending habits, education 
levels, literacy rates, lifestyles and so on, we can see that all their factories are or were 
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Fig. 4 – Factories location 
 
 
After having done a general data analysis of the two Chinese-Italian companies we now need 
to analyse their strategy. Basing on what Porter says we can analyse each company strategic 
positioning. Porter called the generic strategies "Cost Leadership" (no frills), "Differentiation" 
(creating uniquely desirable products and services) and "Focus" (offering a specialized service 
in a niche market). He then subdivided the Focus strategy into two parts: "Cost Focus" and 
"Differentiation Focus." The terms "Cost Focus" and "Differentiation Focus" can be a little 
confusing, as they could be interpreted as meaning "a focus on cost" or "a focus on 
differentiation." Remember that Cost Focus means emphasizing cost-minimization within a 
focused market, and Differentiation Focus means pursuing strategic differentiation within a 
focused market. 
Luohe city, Henan 
Province 
1st and 2nd Henan 




Shuanghui Group – 
Senfter JV 
Nanjing, Jiangsu 1st  
and 2nd Beretta-
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Fig. 5 – Porter’s competitive strategies 
 
 ISU Shanghai Yi Hua Food BERETTA 
PRODUCTS 1995: Emulsion and Chinese cooked products. 
Birth of Marco Polo Cooked Ham 
1999: Emulsion and Chinese cooked products  
2001: Emulsion and Chinese cooked products  
2003: Emulsion and Chinese cooked products 
2005: Italian sounding products, cured meats 
assortment 
2007: Italian sounding products, cured 
meats assortment 




• 40% Food Service 
• 40% Retail  
• 10% E-commerce 
• 30% High-end Food Service 
• 45% Italian and western high-end Retail 
• 15% E-commerce (shop both in JD and 
Tmall)1 
STRATEGY 1995 to 2005: Cost leadership  
From 2005: Differentiation 
• Local production 
• Standard Italian products 
• Slight adaptation to Chinese tastes (more strong 
and intense tastes)  
 
From 2007: Differentiation  
• Local production 
• Standard Italian products 
• Slight adaptation to Chinese tastes (more 
strong and intense tastes)  
Tab. 5  – Companies strategic positioning 
 
Looking at Tab. 5 we can say that the two strategies are similar both in terms of channels and 
in terms of products, with the only difference that a company, the Senfter’ s one, started with 
cost focus before arriving at the differentiation, also because it entered the country in a different 
historical period than its competitor, Beretta. According to what Porter says and to the data we 
were able to get it can be concluded that both the productions are based on the differentiation, 
creating uniquely desirable products and services, using the Made in Italy power. The main 
difference among them is that Beretta has a wider range of products, without the fear of falling 
 
1 these percentages were deduced from what the respondents said, but are not revealed data 
82 
 
into a niche market, too small to get profit, since it tries to standardise the product in each 
market, being loyal to the Italian tradition. As Francesca Brusa (Fratelli Beretta) stated,  
“It’s just a corporate philosophy, to be an ambassador of the world of Italian food in 
particular in the world of cured meats.” 
Simone Donadoni (Fratelli Beretta) told us that: 
“We did not voluntarily want to differentiate or adapt the Italian product to the Chinese 
market. On some products, such as cooked products, we have chosen to adapt something to 
less traditional products, such as smoked ham. Tendentially they are accustomed to strong 
flavours, so in the market they go for the greatest cooked products with an intense taste”. 
On the other hand ISU Shanghai Yi Hua Food, although in the field since years, is a new brand 
and needs time and it sells a short range of products to gain reputation from the customers.  
3.2.4. Companies analysis through the Uppsala Model 
Now that we have analysed the overall strategy of the two companies, let us go and analyse in 
depth the variables that most affected the internationalisation process using the Uppsala model, 
which have been explained in the previous chapter.   
 




Variety of modes: 
1995 - 2005: JV with private Chinese 
company, from the purchase of a state-
owned company, for the production of 
Chinese cured meats 
2005: Wholly owned manufacturing plant 
with a different product focus  
2020: Wholly owned manufacturing plant 




Variety of modes: 
2005: Export through Yurun 
2007: JV with Chinese company in a 
brownfield investment  
2012: Second greenfield investment with 
the same partner merging in a JV 
 




Entry order in foreign markets:  
• no gradual psychic sequence  
• foreign markets selection based on 
network and opportunities actualized 
in a journalist knowledge 
• The expansion abroad takes place in a 
market before having acquired the 
leadership in Italy and before being in 
neighbouring markets. 
Entry order in foreign markets:  
• gradual psychic sequence 
• foreign markets selection based on 
network and opportunities actualized in 
a supplier 
• although they had huge experience in 
the internationalization the relevant 
differences with the already known 
countries did not allow to use the 
experience already gained 
 
Sequence modes of operation: 
• equity JV without any prior export 
experience in Chinese market 
• wholly owned manufacturing plants 
in China after having gain a deep 
knowledge of the market 
Sequence modes of operation:  
• initial export of only PDO products 
• equity JV with the same export partner, 
with an increasing trust building   
83 
 




Learning and creating:  
• Experiential learning in foreign 
markets through the JV allowed 
developing the capabilities needed to 
set up a wholly owned manufacturing 
plant 
• Experiential learning through wholly 
owned subsidiaries highlighted the 
importance of being a market insider  
Learning and creating: 
• Experiential learning in foreign 
markets through the JV for the 
market knowledge  
• The Chinese partner itself was able 
to get Italian know how, both for 
the production and for the 
technology  
 
Trust-building relationships:  
• Unknown brand needs time to gain 
credibility 
• Trust-building relationships with 
customers through in store 
promotion 
• Trust-building relationships with 
customers seen as a long process of 
customers education. New approach 
of digital to accelerate the process 
 
Trust-building relationships:   
• Historical brand with a consolidate 
reputation and credibility 
• Trust-building relationships with 
customers by participating to local 
exhibitions  
•  Trust-building relationships with 
customers by training activities mainly 
for supermarket employees, who 
should translate their knowledge to the 
customers. 
• Trust-building relationships with 
customers through in store promotion 
and cooking classes with retail loyal 
customers  
Capabilities  Operational capabilities:  
• Chinese HRM 
• Italian R&D 
 
Operational capabilities:  
• Manufacturing excellence for highly 
technological machinery and Italian raw 
materials (curing) 
• Marketing 
• JV partner distribution chain 
Dynamic capabilities of sensing: 
• Owner-CEO, senior and junior, 
detected opportunities and threats of 
foreign market expansion  
• Entrepreneurial attitude  
Dynamic capabilities of sensing: 
•  Owner-CEO, senior and junior, 
detected opportunities and threats of 
foreign market expansion 
• Cautious process for the lack of trust in 
the different market  
Dynamic capabilities of seizing:  
• JV agreement with Chinese 
partner to overcome liability of 
foreignness  
  
Dynamic capabilities of seizing:  
• JV agreement with Chinese partner 
to overcome liability of foreignness 
and exploit partner distribution 
channel 
 Dynamic capabilities of transforming: 
• When the company changed 
product offering and customer 
target used the acquired 




Tab. 6 – Uppsala model for the analysed case studies   
 
According to the Uppsala model the evolution of the internationalisation process is progressive 
and based on the establishment chain (Johanson & Vahlne, 2009), which ranges from no regular 
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export activities to offshore manufacturing, bringing a gradual increase in market experience at 
each step (Depelteau 1985 see Steen and Liesch, 2007.). 
In reality, according to the companies stories, we have elaborated a time-commitment graph 
were to highlight companies’ main differences and similarities in the process, and the result is 
that although the evolution is progressive for both, not all previewed steps have been followed 
(Graph. 9).  
 
 
Graph. 9 – Time commitment process 
 
Both the companies started with international joint ventures, only Beretta did export for few 
months before opening up the new company. In a country like China JV can be regarded as 
an institution for risk sharing and a faster way to understand and know the market. Although 
there is a growing interest in JVs, these companies have been observed unstable and often short-
lived. This trend is due to the fact that after forming a JV and operating for a few years, partners 
break up their ties; thereafter they compete independently in the market (Franko, 1971; see 
Kabiraj, Lee & Marjit, 2005, p.2).  Beretta is still in the JV phases, but Andrea Beretta asserts 
that: 
“If they had not been there, we probably wouldn’t be in China today. In the same way, however, 
if we were in China alone today, it would be a little easier. Anyway, when you’re the one being 
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who welcomes you to put the stakes between your wheels and tell you how to do things. When 
a partner looks for you to do pure business as in the case of the Chinese, they rely entirely on 
you. We started with the JV that we had to do only the production, the reality of the facts is that, 
even if it is not contractualized, we deal with production, commercial, financial and brand.”  
 
The process of knowledge development and resource commitment is the most distinctive 
feature of the Uppsala model because they affect the characteristics of the firm and its context, 
which in turn affect the processes in the next time period. (Giddens, 1984; see Johanson & 
Vahlne, 2017, p.1089). The possibility to explore and exploit the market itself gave to Helmuth 
Senfter  the possibility to gradually learn Chinese culture, both from commercial and personal 
point of view and with higher knowledge the resource commitment increased simultaneously.  
Entrepreneurial attitude is however one of the common characteristics of the two companies.  
As Helmuth Senfter said:  
“We had an opportunity in '94. For my father as a classic entrepreneur, born entrepreneur 
(he studied neither university nor higher), expanding the company was not a variable, the 
only variable was the how. Staying in Italy would have been a bit too risky”. 
In both Owner-CEO, senior and junior, detected opportunities and threats of foreign market 
expansion. It has been evident the characteristics of entrepreneurs, willingness to take risks and 
cognitive bias like over optimist and illusion of control, without whom all this would not have 
been done.  
As already known the Uppsala model is made of four variable, state and change ones. Let us 
sum them up briefly to make a better company analysis.  
Among the STATE VARIABLES we find:  
- Commitment and performances are reflected in the company status within its 
network. Axelsson and Johanson (1992; see Johanson & Vahlne, 2009, p.1415) showed 
that foreign market entry should not be studied as a decision about modes of entry, but 
should instead be studied as a position-building process in a foreign market network, 
also with the firm's partner. Actually the two companies build gradually their position 
in the market. As we know Senfter made a JV with private Chinese company, from the 
purchase of a state-owned company, for the production of Chinese cured meats. 
Consequently, having gained enough knowledge and credibility in the market, it 
invested in a wholly owned manufacturing plant with a different product focus, and now 
that the old plant is saturated, he is building a new manufacturing plant in the same 
region to increase the production.  
86 
 
On the other hand Beretta first exported through Yurun, then made a JV with the 
Chinese company in a brownfield investment and finally he made a second greenfield 
investment with the same partner merging in a JV.  
- Commitment processes matches with the resource allocation process and it is made 
when there is a “reasonably positive” trade-off between expected benefits and downside 
outcomes (Johanson & Vahlne, 1977). Both companies’ investments have been made 
with a network partner. None of them could forecast the expected benefits being in a 
new country where the market was pretty unknown. Senfter did not have any previous 
international experience, for Beretta any knowledge was useless, but being in 
partnership with a local company halved the risk and the experience began. Senfter 
entered without any gradual psychic sequence. It selected the foreign markets based on 
network and opportunities actualized in a journalist knowledge, with the expansion 
abroad taking place in a market before having acquired the leadership in Italy and before 
being in neighbouring markets. Differently Beretta had previous experience in foreign 
market and started with a gradual psychic sequence, but this experience was not useful 
given the completely different culture and characteristics China has.  
According to Andrea Beretta the reason why American experience was not useful in 
China were three:  
“ The identity of the market: despite being a nation of 1 billion people, the culture of 
delicatessen is not very mature. While in America this is much more intrinsic and has 
allowed us to make investments very different from those made in China. Both as type 
of products and as plants. The volumes of each reference were much larger in 
America, so the investment assessment was to say we make new technologies to 
produce large quantities of volumes in a short time. In America we are alone and not 
in JV.” 
Therefore among the CHANGE VARIABLES we have:  
- Knowledge development process is fundamental to a firm’s internationalization, and 
in particular knowledge that grows out of experience in current activities is crucial to 
the learning process. The entrepreneurial knowledge development process includes at 
least three subprocesses, relationship-building, flexibility in strategy implementation, 
and adaptation to the organization’s task environment. Relationship building involves 
learning about each other and building trust by committing to the relationship. Actually 
none of the interviewed enjoyed talking about the relationship with the JV partner. What 
we understood from both is that doing business with another partner is always difficult 
and most of the time goals are different. When doing business abroad with a partner the 
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risk is lower, but the attention is really high, and the strategy is most of the time more 
cautious than at home or in similar market when the company is alone.  
- Capabilities might be both dynamic and operational. Operational capabilities exploit 
extant FSAs (Firms specific assets), identified with the firm's routines and 
recombination capabilities, company shared knowledge and ability to generate new 
knowledge, and company capability of integrating multiple technologies. Indeed 
internationalisation requires sufficiently strong FSAs to establish a sustainable business 
in foreign markets and to overcome liabilities of foreignness and outsidership (Hymer, 
1976; see Johanson & Vahlne, 2017, p.1095).  
For Senfter the main FSA are having all Chinese employee, insiders in the market, with 
the only exception of the R&D manager who is 100% Italian, and this allowed ISU 
Shanghai Yi Hua Food to establish a sustainable business in foreign markets and to 
overcome liabilities of foreignness.   
Dynamic capabilities approach plays a crucial role for a successful knowledge 
development process learning because the success comes from continuous 
reconfiguration and development of company resources (Teece, 2014; see Johanson & 
Vahlne, 2017, p.1095).  
Dynamic capabilities might be analytically disaggregated into sensing opportunities (or 
threats), seizing (or neutralizing) them via expedient investments, and transforming the 
firm and its resources and capabilities accordingly. (Matysiak et al., 2018).  
In the Senfter case the owner-CEO, senior and junior, detected opportunities and threats 
of foreign market expansion, everything with an entrepreneurial attitude, taking 
decisions basing on small number of information. Indeed they did everything without 
any feasibility study, both in 1994 and 2001, in a completely structureless approach 
falling in a no replication capability (dynamic capabilities of sensing).  
When in 1994 they entered in the market they made it through a JV agreement with 
Chinese partner to overcome liability of foreignness (dynamic capabilities of seizing) 
and then in 2001 when the company changed product offering and customer target used 
the acquired knowledge to build its own Chinese company (dynamic capabilities of 
transforming).  
For what concern the Beretta case, the company was and still is considered a 
manufacturing excellence for highly technological machinery and Italian raw materials 
(curing), and this immediately put them in a position of insidership. 
Also Beretta had the owner-CEO, senior and junior, who detected opportunities and 
threats of foreign market expansion, but it engaged in a cautious process for the lack of 
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trust in a market, China, completely different from the home country and from countries 
where the company had previously invested. Although they had huge experience in the 
internationalization the huge differences with the already known countries did not allow 
to use the experience already gained (dynamic capabilities of sensing). To overcome 
this barrier they made a JV agreement with Chinese partner and consequently they were 
able to exploit partner distribution channel (dynamic capabilities of seizing).  
All the four state and change variables have given the forecasted effect, generating gradually 
commitment, trust relationship and good performances.  
3.2.5  Theoretical implications 
 
From the theoretical analysis of the two companies, made through the Uppsala Model, some 
differences emerged.  
First, according to the literature, for what concerns the network view of the business context, 
firms expand predominantly in markets similar or adjacent to their home market, using 
technologies close to those they already hold in order to save on costs of search and change 
(Kay, 2005; see Johanson & Vahlne, 2017, p.1090).  
 
 
Fig. 6 – Beretta in the world 
 

















The Senfter Family (ISU Shanghai Yi Hua Food) approached China without having any other 
presence and experience in the international market, and without being China a country 
neighbouring Italy. Besides Beretta had previous investments across Europe and in USA (Fig. 
6 – Fig. 7) and consequently accumulated experience.  
However Andrea Beretta stated that all the knowledge and the skills they previously developed 
were not useful, being China a country completely different compared to the Western one, even 
if they are evolving. Chinese culture is highly complicated, as we have analysed before, and it 
brings everything in specific directions. 
 
Proposition 1 follows:  
Proposition 1: In the food industry, the value of past internationalization 
experience is limited when companies enter China. 
 
Second, once entered in the country the Uppsala model expects a process named establishment 
chain, which ranges from no regular export activities to offshore manufacturing, bringing a 
gradual increase in market experience at each step (Denis 1985 see Steen and Liesch, 2007).  
Beretta entered in the country with export but has still not completed the process, while Senfter 
is building his second plant on his own, showing, according to Uppsala and his model, higher 
commitment, which should be related and proportional to higher success. 
However Beretta has seen a growth of 20% in the last 5 years, compared to Senfter 5%, not 
precisely what one should expect if basing his forecasts on the Uppsala Model. 
For what concerns the entrance mode, differences among the two cases in the establishment 
process are mainly given by institutional reasons, not considered by the Uppsala model used.  
Reading Bråmå, Andersson and Solid (2006, p. 10) it seems clear that contextual differences 
between different countries and institutions make it difficult to use international studies to 
generalize to Swedish conditions to other countries in the Uppsala model. Structure and 
institutions both constrain and enable change that might be undertaken by individuals and 










THEORY ISU Shanghai Yi Hua Food BERETTA 
ECONOMIC TRENDS 
Trade cost and 
duties:  
 
• China does not allow import of Italian 
cured meats 
• High-end retail and food services do 
not use contraband product (via HK) 
 
• Only with a plant in the mainland it is 
possible to sell in China.  
• New permission of Wuber products 
import  
PDO export  
 
• Opening in 2007 for Prosciutto Parma 
PDO and Prosciutto San Daniele PDO 
but with a fee of 25% 
• They started through Parma export in 
2007 
• Parma has invested more than San 
Daniele in marketing activities in China 
mainland 
• San Daniele has a higher price and a 
lower number of hams (2 mln vs 10 
mln) 
Production cost  
 
• Raw materials are purchased directly 
from China 
 
• Initially it was used Chinese raw 
material 
• today they buy 100% of the meat we 
use in the factory, from Germany, 
Holland, Spain or South America  
Tab. 7 – Companies economic trends comparison 
 
When in 1994 Senfter entered in China the market was completely different from 2007 when 
Beretta started and from now. It did not start from export since it was not allowed yet, indeed 
it was authorised for the first time only for Prosciutto di Parma and San Daniele at the end of 
2006. Chinese people, both customers and business, had still the communist mindset, no frills 
and high volume to feed the population. Globalisation had not started yet and there was not any 
mixture with the western culture; for sure people were not ready for Italian taste products. 
Beretta entered in 2007 when Chinese country was forced to allowed San Daniele and Parma 
PDO import to stem the black-market trend. The import authorization for Senfter was still not 
enough since the new possibility of importing these products but with a fee of 25%, which for 
them wat too high. Duties and fees have a strong influence in international strategy choices. 
Interesting is that now Beretta, after 10 years of work, has obtained the permission for a little 
range of Wuber products, cooked products.   
 
Proposition 2 follows: 
Proposition 2: The establishment chain of a firm’s internationalization process is 




Third, Coviello and Munro (1997; see Johanson & Vahlne, 2009, p.1413) found out that 
relationships have an impact on foreign market selection as well as on the mode of entry in the 
context of ongoing network processes. This theory explains the importance of relationships and 
networks without specifying which kind of partner it might be.  
Beretta entered in the Chinese market thanks to one of its machinery suppliers, using 
technology, and once they made the newest plant in 2012 they decided to use all the product 
they already have in Italy, which by the way are mainly Italian equipment and few Europeans. 
Senfter was contacted by an Italian journalist who had the honor of finding an Italian investor 
in a Chinese meat processing industry, not in use since years. Beretta was called because one 
of their supplier used to work also with who is their partner now in China, who had the need of 
having Italian knowledge of making cured meats transferred.  
Relationships have also an influence on the internationalisation starting time, which is 
missing in the Uppsala Model. When in 2009 Johanson and Vahlne revisited their model 
assessed that “ there are two possible reasons for such foreign expansion. One is the likelihood 
of finding interesting business opportunities. Relying on a related knowledge base, the focal 
firm may thus enter networks abroad, where it may be able to identify and exploit opportunities. 
A second reason to go abroad occurs when a relationship partner who is going abroad, or already 
is abroad, wants the focal firm to follow. By following the partner abroad, the firm demonstrates 
its commitment to the relationship.”  
Moreover, according to the literature joint venture structure is not a once for all relationship, it 
is a dynamic relationship as internationalisation process is. Once the partner has gained enough 
market knowledge, he will be able to have a business alone. The issue here is whether Senfter 
in 2001 had enough knowledge to do a company on his own without any Chinese partner. 
The kind of relationship seems actually relevant in discriminating successful companies from 
not or less successful ones. When the relationship is driven by trust and collaboration it may 
also help in accelerating the learning process and knowledge development. It is not given that 
a company’s knowledge must be built on its own, this may be taken from outside partners or 
competitors. On the other hand if the relationship is pure network and not based on previous 
collaboration and trust, this may not give any additional value rather than the possibility to enter 
in the country. 
 
Proposition 3 follows:  
Proposition 3: Trust and previous commitment in network relationships positively 




Before analysing the two companies using the Uppsala theoretical model, it has been briefly 
described each of them strategy. This aspect and the local adaptation are actually ignored by 
the model.  
However company strategy may be helpful in founding the reasons of different growth rates, 
higher for the Beretta, the company which actually has less commitment in the country 
according to Uppsala.  
Although Senfter is in China from more time, and although this has been helpful for learning 
Chinese culture, he has changed company strategy once, in 2001 when it was taken the decision 
of producing Italian sounding products and no more Chinese cured meats. This change in the 
products selections completely changed the distribution channels, targeted customers and need 
for marketing activities, meaning that previous knowledge were useful as foreseen. Moreover 
changing trademark in 2018, after 17 years of sales, contributed to creating more confusion to 
the management and to customers, requiring still more effort for creating trust and reputation 
in the market.  
On the other hand Beretta has always been linear in the strategy, promoting standardised Italian 
sounding cured meats, besides being in a multidomestic industry which for definition requires 
adaptation, building knowledge of the market and an excellent reputation in it. Changing 
strategy decreased Senfter knowledge advantage compared to Beretta. 
It does not matter from how long a company is investing in a country, if it changes its strategy 
it will be almost like starting again from the beginning in building knowledge and experience, 
but internationalisation should be a continuous process of learning and knowledge 
development.   
 
Proposition 4 follows: 
Proposition 4: In a firm’s internationalization process, the value of accumulated 
experience in a foreign market is contingent to a firm’s strategy. 
 
3.2.6. – Managerial implications  
 
Theoretical implications might be translated into managerial ones, adding some practical 
information and suggestions, also by looking at the actual market trends. 
The following suggestions are also linked to institutional aspects enumerated before. Given the 
fact that to sell cured meats in China a company must produce in the country, there is not the 
possibility of a softer entry and the internationalisation should be a continuous process of 
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learning and knowledge development.  It does not matter from how long a company is 
investing in a country, if it changes its strategy it will be almost like starting again from the 
beginning in building knowledge and experience. 
Moreover if in a country which is completely different from the home country the company can 
benefit of a trusted partner it may help in avoiding some beginner mistakes, exploiting partner 
previous knowledge by collaborating with him. Choosing the right partner, who may give his 
knowledge to you, makes the difference when investing in a developing country. 
 
THEORY ISU Shanghai Yi Hua Food BERETTA 
MARKET – SOCIAL TRENDS 
Social trends: • attention to quality and food safety 
increased after Covid19 
• attention to quality and food safety 
increased after Covid19 
Cultural trends: 
 
• Long process of product knowledge 
and liking 
• Instore promotion 
• Long process of product knowledge 
and liking 
• customers educational program 
• instore promotion 
• cooking classes 
Swine fever: 
 
• fresh meat could not be used 
anymore: no supply plus too high 
prices 
• look for foreign frozen meat suppliers 
• 150% growth in raw materials prices 
BUT only 20% final customers prices 
increase 
• Company recapitalisation 
• Already use foreign suppliers for 
frozen meat  
• 30% final customers prices increase 
• Stop the production of some 




• Loss of 10%  
• Increase retail sales, stop Horeca sales 
• No payment of taxes on salaries 
allowed by the government 
• Increase retail sales, stop Horeca sales 





• With the online sales they can reach 
many more cities, also the second-
class ones, where there are not high-
end retails 
• With the online sales they can reach 
many more cities, also the second-
class ones, where there are not high-
end retails. 
• They can do that by using the 
distribution chain of Yurun, with 






• Online platforms are managed by an 
external agency 
 
• Online manage in outsourcing 
• Tmall, more prestige, and JD shops 
• Need to have a local presence  
• Local people do not use international 
brand platforms as the national one 
Tab. 8 – Companies market and social trends comparison 
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Entering a new market is not only a matter of relationships. Another issue linked to the network 
view of the internationalisation process is local knowledge and adaptation. When going far 
away from the home country, foreign culture changes completely. Host country culture and 
trends must be known, some are listed in Tab. 8. 
 
Chinese customers need to be educated, Beretta is trying to teach them the story of each single 
product and what is behind  it. Beretta has been in China from 2007 but marketing activities are 
being pursued since few years. Beretta is doing so with training activities mainly for 
supermarket employees, who should translate their knowledge to the customers. The company 
participates to international fairs too, to get in touch with Horeca sector customers. In store 
promotion and cooking classes with retail loyal customers are other activities fostered by the 
company. Chinese customers are now willing to pay when quality is well communicated and 
ensured. PDO and CDO products are clear signals of a safe supply chain and there are actually 
relevant data reflecting the preferences of middle-class Chinese customers (Lisa Burwood-
Taylor, 2019).  
Actually all these educational projects are similar to the activities promoted in the rest of Asia 
for export and fully different from marketing activities Made in Italy.   
 
Relevant for completely understanding performances of the two analysed companies is 
explaining what happened this year with the two main market events.  
At the beginning of the year there has been the swine fever. With the swine fever the prices 
had a huge increase also in the forex market and it was difficult to find enough raw material at 
an acceptable price. The prices to market had an increase of 30% at the end and now is still not 
normalised. This statements are sustained also from Graph. 8, Price positioning.  
Senfter used to have fresh Chinese meat for their products, consequently they needed to start 
purchasing frozen meat coming from Brazil, USA, Spain, and Germany, but it was not possible 
to immediately start doing that. They are now looking for a partnership with German producers 
for directly purchasing meat. Meat price growth of 150% but they were able to transfer to the 
customer only 20%. Consequently they needed to recapitalize the company with the help of the 
Italian State. 
Also for beretta it has been a loss and it was forced to stop producing some references but thanks 
to the fact that they were already using frozen meat they just had an impact on prices but not on 
the supply chain. 
Online sales increase after Covid19 lockdown, by the way still consistent with the previous 




For both Beretta and Senfter online channels are managed outside the company, an external 
agency is more capable of managing efficiently these platforms, since all the bureaucratic thing 
are highly complicated and requires too much time. They use platforms as Alibaba and Tencent, 
given that private platforms are not used by consumers. The main difference among these two 
online channels is that Tmall gives more prestige to the brand. Having a certified shop in Tmall 
increases the brand value.  
Although there are the international brands platforms in both Alibaba and JD having an online 
shop without being in China, would have been almost impossible for the logistic and 
bureaucratic point of view. By the way there are no import authorisations besides Parma and 
San Daniele ham so it would have been equally impossible.  
While Covid19 brought a loss of 10% given an increase in GDO sales and a complete loss from 
Horeca channel. Companies suffered for two months but then everything opened, and the 
Chinese government has rebated all payments of contributions and taxes on salaries recovering 
huge part of losses. Although Horeca has not bought for two months, retail sales have increased, 









































Conclusions: limitations and further research 
 
From the analysis above it emerges that entering China is about relationships and 
opportunities. Uppsala Model has been little used today for multidomestic industries, which 
for definition require adaptation, in developing countries or in any case in countries distant from 
the home one probably because the gradual internationalization in such cases is not the rule. It 
is difficult to generalize from one country to all the others, given cultural, social and 
macroeconomic differences among them all.  
For the World Trade Organisation, China is still considered a developing country despite being 
one of the world’s economic powers; moreover, at the beginning of the internationalization 
process of the two analysed companies, in 1994 and 2001, it could still be called such. In most 
cases, developing countries force foreign companies to enter into partnerships with local 
companies in order to gain their knowledge. Similarly, these institutional constraints, which are 
not mentioned in Uppsala, lead to jump some steps in the establishment chain. 
Proposition 3 suggests that the kind of relationship seems actually relevant in discriminating 
successful companies from not or less successful ones. When the relationship is driven by trust 
and collaboration it may also help in accelerating the learning process and knowledge 
development. It is not given that a company’s knowledge must be built on its own, this may be 
taken from outside partners or competitors. On the other hand if the relationship is pure network 
and not based on previous collaboration and trust, this may not give any additional value rather 
than the possibility to enter in the country. An entrepreneurial and family spirit is needed to 
carry out long-term projects such as these. Long-term because educating a consumer to a 
product far from his culture requires time and commitment. See for example ISU (Independent 
Salumi Union), that took three times more time to reach the expected turnover in the factory 
built in 2001. 
The Uppsala model also ignores company strategy and the local adaptation of companies, 
which Proposition 4 suggest is very important. To sell cured meats in China a company must 
produce in the country, there is not the possibility of a softer entry and the internationalisation 
should be a continuous process of learning and knowledge development.  It does not matter 
from how long a company is investing in a country, if it changes its strategy it will be almost 
like starting again from the beginning in building knowledge and experience.  
Customers tastes and preferences must be learned.  Despite the fact that today the marketing 
and communication activities towards the final consumer are more and more numerous, these 
have only started in the last two years and the main market is still that of expatriates and of the 
local population that travels abroad. Change of tastes and education of the population will 
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take many more years and only then, if the two companies are still present in the country, we 
could say that they were successful cases.  
These propositions might be tested by pursuing specific analysis on those and future studies 
should aim at expanding our comprehension of propositions above, as business relationship and 
incremental learning, company strategy and reasons and modes for market entry.  
 
This study has also limitations that can provide clues for future research. The analysis is only 
made on two companies doing business in a specific product category of the food industry, 
which for definition is a multidomestic industry, in a specific country, China. Such analysis has 
shed light on the establishment chain and on the network view of the Uppsala Model, but also 
on the business relationships and on company strategy and acquired knowledge. The main limit 
is the specificity level of the two cases taken into considerations and deeply analysed. Further 
research starting from this analysis should focus on these main topics and propositions by doing 
a cross country analysis, considering different country cases (eg. developed vs developing) but 
also different industries (eg. multidomestic vs geo-centralised). However also further analysis 
on other kind of foods, completely different for consumptions, knowledge and reputation, might 
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Attachment 1 – Interview questions  
PRESENTAZIONE 
A partire dall'interesse verso il mercato cinese e dai trend positivi che lo caratterizzano, 
l'obiettivo principale della tesi è quello di analizzare il processo di internazionalizzazione delle 
aziende alimentari italiane e di individuare le best practices necessarie per pianificare una 
presenza diretta nella Cina continentale, valutando anche l’adattabilità della specifica azienda 
nel mercato.  
Per studiare l’internazionalizzazione al meglio, oltre ad aver effettuato un’acuta ricerca in 
letteratura, è stato deciso di fare un'analisi di caso sulle aziende alimentari italiane di maggior 
successo già presenti in Cina. Dopo un'analisi preliminare di tutte le aziende rientranti nella 
categoria, sono state scelte quattro aziende, associate perché produttrici di prodotti tipici 
italiani, originariamente non integrati nella cultura cinese. Quello che può essere interessante 
capire è come le aziende italiane abbiano insegnato il valore dei loro prodotti per i clienti cinesi 
e come abbiano creato il proprio mercato, a partire dalle ragioni per cui l'azienda è entrata in 
Cina e dai cambiamenti organizzativi nel corso degli anni.  
La Cina può essere un mercato interessante e prezioso per un'azienda alimentare italiana visti 
gli ultimi trend in continua evoluzione. La sicurezza alimentare e il cibo sano erano apprezzati 
prima del coronavirus e lo sono ora ancora di più. Di conseguenza il made in Italy, e in 
particolare dei prodotti DOP e DOC, ha acquisito un valore molto più alto, e di conseguenza 
risulta essere un ottimo strumento nella strategia di internazionalizzazione (Louisa Burwood-
Taylor, 2019). 
I dati macroeconomici attuali incentivano gli investimenti in Cina. I costi commerciali stanno 
diminuendo grazie alle considerevoli politiche economiche e alleanze che sono in atto tra stati, 
in l'iniziativa Belt and Road. Inoltre, i giganti cinesi in collaborazione con il governo, secondo 
quanto detto da Louisa Burwood-Taylor su Forbes, stanno lottando contro la contraffazione, 
aumentando così il valore dei prodotti italiani, consapevoli che i clienti cinesi sono disposti a 
pagare quando la qualità è ben comunicata e garantita (James Ferguson, 2020). 
Uno sguardo verrà dato anche ai canali digitali. In Cina è evidente la propensione crescente 
verso l’acquisto di generi alimentari online. I giganti del web cinesi vi stanno investendo una 
parte sostanziosa del loro budget, assecondando le richieste del mercato. Nel 2018 Tencent ha 
investito 1,5 miliardi di dollari nel gruppo di delivery Meituan Dianping, indiscutibile leader 
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nella consegna di cibo in Cina al servizio di 310 milioni di persone, che ha ottenuto un aumento 
del 60% del numero di offerte, confermando la crescita del settore. Lo stesso Tencent ha anche 
investito 450 milioni di dollari nell'e-grocery top Miss Fresh’s (Luisa Burwood-Taylor, 2019). 
L’online può superare le barriere commerciali e finanziarie quando si va all'estero, evitando di 
instaurare una presenza fisica inizialmente, risparmiando denaro attraverso l'ottimizzazione dei 
clienti e l'adattamento della supply chain. 
DOMANDE  
1. Quando l’azienda è entrata nel mercato cinese? Quali sono stati i fattori che hanno 
contribuito a scegliere tale investimento? Che processo è stato seguito 
nell’internazionalizzazione?  
2. Dai primi investimenti in Cina ad oggi cos’è cambiato? Avete riscontrato particolari 
ostacoli nell’entrare nel mercato? Questi ostacoli sono tutt’oggi presenti o sono 
cambiati?  
3. Prima di scegliere di investire direttamente in Cina è stata fatta un’analisi 
macroeconomica di costi e benefici? Quali sono stati i fattori analizzati e i risultati 
relativi? (Es. Costi commerciali, tassazione e dazi, dimensioni del mercato, costi di 
produzione, distanza geografica, vicinanza ad altre aziende)  
4. La prima volta in Cina come hanno impattato I diversi gusti e le diverse preferenze dei 
consumatori nella strategia di vendita? La cultura cinese ha avuto un impatto anche nel 
management, avendo assunto personale del luogo?  
5. In un’industria multi-domestica l’azienda si deve adattare al singolo mercato. Quali 
difficoltà avete trovato nell’adattarsi al nuovo paese durante il processo di 
internazionalizzazione?  
6. Quanto è stato cruciale avere prodotti made in Italy per avere successo in Cina? Avete 
dovuto creare un nuovo mercato o avete trovato un pubblico già pronto? Il target 
prescelto è stato difficile da trovare e raggiungere?  
7. Avete riscontrato difficoltà per integrarvi con il mercato e l’ambiente esterno? Quali 
strategie avete utilizzato per oltrepassarle? (Scelta della ragione sociale come JV o 
assumendo personale locale).  
8. Potete definire la vostra azienda imprenditoriale o manageriale? Il  processo di 
internazionalizzazione è stato supportato da imprenditorialità o ha principalmente 
seguito modalità operative già ben definite?  
9. Avete usato o state usando canali online come Alibaba o WeChat? Se sì, come li avete 
o li state gestendo?  
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10. Il nuovo virus Sars Covid-19, partito dalla Cina continentale, ha avuto un impatto 
enorme nell’economia mondiale, causato principalmente dalla globalizzazione. Le 
preferenze dei consumatori sono state influenzate fortemente, ma tuttavia rimangono 
in linea con le tendenze osservate negli anni precedenti, anche se in modalità più 
marcata. Il coronavirus ha avuto qualche impatto sulle vendite della vostra azienda? 
Quali sono stati i cambiamenti nel primo trimestre del 2020 in termini di qualità e tipo 
di prodotti e canale di vendita utilizzato? Com'è stata gestita la ripartenza? 
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Attachment 3 – Senfter Interview and coding 
 
COMPANY: ISU Independent Salumi Union 
INTERVIEW 04/08/2020 
LENGTH: 52 MIN 
With the participation: 
HS  Helmuth Senfter-Company CEO 
EM Eleonora Milesi 
 
 
Speaker Content Summary Key words 
HS La nostra storia in Cina è iniziata nel 1994 
quando la Senfter SPA si chiamava ancora 
Senfter SPA con sede a San Candido dove 
mi trovo adesso e produceva soprattutto 
Speck e Wurstel e un po’ di Prosciutto 
Cotto Praga. Era in una situazione dove 
ampliarsi in Italia sarebbe stato difficile 
perché avrebbe avuto i tipici rischi di una 
posizione di sandwich dove il piccolo che 
vuole diventare grande deve passare dei 
momenti in cui viene Sandwicchato 
perché è troppo grande per essere 
piccolo ma troppo piccolo per essere 
grande. Questi sono momenti molto 
difficili per le aziende dove queste 
muoiono anche. Per i clienti stessi (GDO) 
non  sei più piccolino, perciò, ti devono in 
qualche maniera coccolare, ma non sei 
nemmeno grande abbastanza per 
competere con i grandi e la loro struttura 
dei costi. Perciò il prezzo basso te lo 
chiedono lo stesso, addirittura tu sei 
l’ultimo arrivato e di conseguenza devi 
fare anche il prezzo più  basso e li muori.  
The Senfter SPA yet in 1994 
was a salumi producer located 
in San Candido, with its main 
products as Speck, Wurstel 
and Praga Ham.  
The need of growth met the 
risk of falling in the price war 
and the Senfter family was 





HS Per noi si è aperta un’opportunità nel ’94. 
Per mio padre da classico imprenditore, 
nato imprenditore (non ha studiato né 
università né superiori), espandere 
l’azienda non era una variabile, l’unica 
variabile era il come. Stare in Italia 
sarebbe stato un po’ troppo rischioso.  
For Senfter senior was not 
about whether to expand the 
company but how to do it, as a 
born entrepreneur.  
Entrepreneurship 
Opportunity 
HS Negli anni ’80 l’azienda aveva visto 
un’espansione proficua in Germania con 
lo speck, che ha avuto molto successo.  
  
HS Nel ’94 c’è stato un contatto di un 
giornalista freelance veneziano 
(Mangano?), del Gazzettino di Venezia, 
corrispondente per l’Asia. Era anche un 
professore ed era innamorato della Cina. 
Ci sono molti italiani che nutrono questo 
amore per la Cina, più di una semplice 
In ’94 the company met an 
Italian journalist 
correspondent for Asia with a 
huge love for the Chinese 
country, with a great business 
network there. The journalist 







curiosità, voglia di conoscere il paese e i 
di vivere li. Accettando di essere in un 
paese povero, ma molto colorato, con 
questa grande cultura del cibo, i colori, gli 
abiti.   
La sua presenza in Cina ha generato un 
network di persone che gli proponevano 
affari e lui ricevette la proposta di trovare 
un partner per fare un salumificio in Cina 
e veniva da Xianyang una zona a nord est 
della Cina dove c’era un salumificio 
statale che era già fermo. Negli anni ’90 
c’era il passaggio dall’economia di piano 
all’economia privata e l’80% delle 
aziende statali si sono fermate e non 
hanno fatto questo salto di qualità.  
“Despite the success and growth of the 
Chinese economy in the twenty years of 
the period, many issues remained such as 
the modernisation of the financial sector 
and the state sector. More than half of 
the state-owned companies in the 
country were inefficient and suffered 
losses. During the 15th National Congress 
of the Communist Party of China in 1997, 
President Jiang Zemin announced plans 
to sell, merge, or close a large portion of 
state-owned enterprises, to foster the 
development of a more productive and 
profitable private sector. The plan was 
accepted by the ninth National People’s 
Assembly in 1998. (Wikipedia)” 
a partnership with an already 
build Salumificio in Xianyang, 
north-east China.  
This Salumificio was on sale 
because of the project of 
privatization of all the state-
owned companies.  
HS Noi poi nel ’94 siamo andati a vedere 
questo salumificio, primo viaggio in  Cina. 
Era totalmente fermo, macchinari fermi 
da anni ed arrugginito. L’azienda 
proprietaria non aveva capitale da 
investire e per sistemarlo, poteva solo 
conferire lo stabilimento. Per legge 
un’azienda doveva però avere il 25% di 
quote cinese, nel ’94 il socio cinese non 
poteva scendere sotto il 25% a 
prescindere. Doveva essere valutato lo 
stabilimento e per Senfter il deal 
sembrava poco interessante, in quanto 
erano consapevoli che i vecchi proprietari 
avrebbero sopravalutato il valore del 
terreno e dello stabilimento. Però suo 
padre era interessato perché il cambio tra 
economia di piano e di stato stava 
portando ad un calo dell’offerta di salumi 
(NON COME LI INTENDIAMO NOI) nel 
mercato, mentre la domanda rimaneva 
costante per prodotti semplici, di stampo 
cinese. Di conseguenza i prezzi dei 
prodotti erano alti.  
The salumificio was in awful 
condition but the deal was 
interesting for the lack of offer 
in the market of Chinese 
salumi, despite the constant 
demand from the customers 
(high prices).  
However in 1994 the Chinese 
law required at least 25% of 
Chinese shares  for opening a 
company. The only issue was 
with who making the 
partnership because the 
previous owner was not 
efficient enough to make a 
deal with.  
Moreover the old company 
plant and lend evaluation 
would not have been fair 
enough.  






HS Abbiamo chiesto al ministero degli Esteri 
in Italia, che ha varie Camere di 
Commercio estere che chiama ICE, di 
aiutare a trovare un altro partner cinese 
che avesse competenze e capitale 
adeguato a formare una società insieme, 
in quanto espandersi in Cina sembrava 
più sicuro che non in Italia, dove i costi di 
investimento sarebbero stati molto più 
alti. In Cina, infatti, al tempo i costi erano 
davvero miseri. ICE in collaborazione con 
il Ministero dell’Interno Cinese ha trovato 
25 potenziali investitori statali, in quanto 
il ministero poteva decidere solo per le 
aziende statali. Tra queste 25 aziende ne 
abbiamo trovato una disposti a fare una 
joint venture e già performante. 
Tendenzialmente, infatti, le altre aziende 
statali erano tutte poco efficienti, come 
l’azienda proprietaria del salumificio.  
The Senfter family asked for 
some help to ICE office to find 
out other potential partners. 
Out of 25 only one was good 
enough to make a deal with.  
Henan Shuanghui Group had a 
general manager with a 
military background.  
In 1994 people of age 40/50 
would have had an education 
only if they were military, 
otherwise for them schools 
and university were closed.  
Cultural trends 
HS Motivo dell’efficienza dell’azienda era il 
General Manager con back ground 
militare. Per quegli anni tendenzialmente 
chi aveva 40/50 anni era cresciuto 
durante la rivoluzione culturale, che 
significava tutte le Università chiuse e 
anche le scuole superiori. Perciò c’era 
una generazione di Cinesi, tra i 40/50 anni 
senza istruzione. Gli unici ad aver studiato 
erano i militari, che potevano continuare 
ad andare nelle loro scuole fino anche al 
titolo universitario. Le aziende statali 
quindi nella ripartenza con Deng Xiaoping 
hanno cercato di ripescare dalle leve 
militari cercando di mandarli come 
manager nelle aziende statali. Nel caso 
dell’azienda con cui abbiamo poi stretto 
l’accordo lo stato aveva trovato una 
persona giusta che aveva già fatto 
un’altra JV  e che con noi sarebbe stata la 
seconda. La prima l’aveva stretta con una 
famiglia ricca di Hong Kong che aveva 
investito $, puramente finanziaria. Poi 
siamo arrivati noi che avevamo anche le 
tecnologie di produzione eccetera e 
questi erano super gasati, non volevano 
far partire mio padre e gli hanno 
addirittura messo dei contanti sul letto.  
  
HS Mio padre aveva anche la possibilità di 
fare un back ground check, contattando 
questo fondo d’investimento di HK, da cui 
è arrivato un riscontro positivo. I 
potenziali partner erano persone molto 
serie, l’azienda guadagna e i dividendi 
arrivavano. Allora siamo partiti nel ‘95 
con un primo stabilimento in JV con lo 
In 1995 the Senfter family 
made the first JV with a state-
owned company. The main 
business purpose of their 
partner was not making Italian 
salumi, but to produce huge 
quantity of food to feed the 1,2 









stato. Lo stato però non aveva interesse a 
fare i salumi classici tradizionali (Italiani) 
ma aveva più una vocazione ovviamente 
da azienda statale il cui obiettivo era 
sfamare il popolo (regime comunista) di 
1,2 miliardi di persone. Volevano fare 
quindi prodotti economici, mix di 
proteine vegetali e animali, che erano 
fondamentalmente degli emulsionati 
metà vegetali e animali che costavano 
poco e potevano essere trasportati con i 
treni per tutta la Cina. Nel ’94 non c’era la 
vocazione per prodotti crudi e stagionati 
come salame e prosciutto crudo, era 
CULTURALMENTE IMPROPONIBILE. Il 
prosciutto cotto poteva andare bene, ma 
la linea alla fine non è mai partita e per 
circa 10 anni hanno fatto solo emulsionati 
con lo stato, arrivando ad avere più di 
2000 dipendenti, 4 stabilimenti e a 
produrre più in Cina che in Italia.  
way of doing so was to 
produce half meat and half 
veggie products, kind of 
emulsion, which was then 
shipped by train all across the 
mainland.  
Anyway, the population was 
still not prepared for raw 
products like prosciutto crudo 
or salami.  
After 10 years they had more 
than 2000 employees, 4 plants 
and a higher production in 
China rather than in Italy.  
HS Dopo 10 anni, si sono divisi, in quanto il 
manager militare ha fatto con i suoi 300 
manager un management buyout 
privatizzando l’azienda statale.  
After 10 years the adventure 
was over, and the Senfter Spa 
decided to go on with its own 
feet without a Chinese partner 





HS Noi eravamo abbastanza consolidati in 
Cina e abbiamo deciso di separarci senza 
avere più un partner. Questa è la 
differenza con Beretta, l’altra azienda 
italiana che sta investendo nel mondo dei 
salumi in Cina ma ancora nella prima fase 
di approccio al mercato, che 
tendenzialmente ti porta ad avere un 
partner visto l’approccio completamente 
diverso. 
  
HS Io con questo progetto sono partito nel 
’95 e sono rimasto tutto il tempo. Ho 
vissuto in Cina da bambino, sapevo 
parlare e leggere in cinese, potevo 
permettermi di fare un salumificio 
italiano senza partner.  
HS spent his childhood in 
China, learning how to speak, 
read and write in Chinese.  
Insidership 
EM Il governo cinese ha autorizzato la 
fondazione di un’azienda con capitale 
straniero?  
  
HS Dovevi fare un escamotage, ma che ora 
fanno tutti. Era necessario dichiarare 
tramite uno studio di fattibilità che 
l’azienda andava ad esportare almeno 
metà del fatturato (VERIFICARE). Anche 
To have the possibility of 
building a completely foreign 
owned company in 2001 you 
needed an escamotage, which 




se è abbastanza improbabile esportare 
salumi cinesi, non ci sono protocolli 
sanitari sufficienti ed è difficile ottenere 
autorizzazioni per l’export. Era quindi 
palesemente una società orientata al 
mercato domestico. Ormai è stato 
superato anche questo limite.  
feasibility an analysis that half 
of the turnover would have 
been abroad. They succeeded 
in doing so, although Chinese 
salumi are obviously not 
saleable abroad. 
Nowadays also this limit has 
been overcome.   
EM Avete deciso di produrre salumi italiani 
dopo uno studio di mercato, per 
un’intuizione o per la domanda?  
  
HS C’era già richiesta. Io con la JV ero già in 
Cina, ero a Shangai dal ’98 ed ero 
abbastanza esposto con la comunità 
straniera italiana e c’erano delle 
richieste. Le richieste venivano 
soprattutto da hotel 5 stelle, ristoranti 
occidentali e qualche supermercato di 
nicchia, specializzati per gli espatriati, 
specializzati nel food di importazione. 
Questa richiesta veniva dal fatto che i 
salumi italiani non possono essere 
importati in Cina.   
The choice of opening up a 
salumificio for the production 
of Italian salumi came from the 
market knowledge. Being in 
China as an insider helped the 
Senfter Spa in understanding 
the market needs. 5-star 
hotels, western restaurants 
and specialty markets needed 
these products, mainly 
because their import was 
forbidden.  
Political trends – 
duty 
Market needs 
 Nella politica estera e nella gestione dei 
dazi c’è una specie di mutualità. Se l’Italia 
o l’UE non accettano salumi/prodotti 
cinesi allora la Cina si oppone 
all’importazione di salumi/prodotti 
europei in Cina. Tutt’ora c’è il divieto dei 
salumi Cinesi in Europa.  
In foreign policy and in the 
management of duties there is 
a kind of mutuality. If Italy or 
the EU does not accept 
Chinese cold cuts/products, 
then China opposes the 
importation of European cold 
cuts/products into China. 
Chinese salumi are still banned 
in Europe. 
Political trends and 
regulatory changes 
 C’era il prodotto di contrabbando 
(tramite HK) ma gli alberghi 5 stelle e 
ristoranti di alta qualità non volevano 
rischiare multe salate. Oltretutto è 
diventato ad oggi un reato punibile non 
solo a livello civile ma anche penale. C’è 
dunque ancora più incentivo a non 
acquistare prodotto di contrabbando.  
There was the contraband 
product (via HK), but the 5-star 
hotels and high-quality 
restaurants did not want to 
risk high fines. Moreover, it 
has now become a criminal 
offence punishable not only on 
a civil level but also as a 
criminal offence. There is 
therefore an even greater 
incentive not to buy 
contraband products. 
Political trends and 
regulatory changes 
 Nel 2007 c’è stato il superamento del 
divieto per il Prosciutto di Parma e di San 
Daniele, in quanto il contrabbando di 
Prosciutto Crudo non era controllabile. È 
convenuto quindi fare un accordo 
bilaterale con l’Italia con i DOP. Stessa 
cosa ha fatto l’America. In realtà qualcosa 
hanno ottenuto sui gamberoni, una 
For what concern the DOP 
products, in particular 
Prosciutto di Parma and 
Prosciutto San Daniele, in 2007 
there has been an opening 
because the contraband was 
not manageable anymore. 
There was the new possibility 





contropartita c’è stata. Si è aperta quindi 
la possibilità di importare un DOP ma 
comunque con un dazio del 25%. Il 
protezionismo continua ad essere 
elevato.    
of importing these products 
but with a fee of 25%, wat too 
high.  
 C’era una domanda già esistente che 
poteva essere in un certo senso 
quantificata. È stato quindi deciso di 
costruire una fabbrica molto piccola, con 
fatturato potenziale di 10 mln, in quanto 
la domanda proveniva dai canali di 
nicchia. Il mercato non c’era, bisognava 
partire da zero. Però avevi un aiuto inziale 
perché gli stranieri che vivevano lì e i 
turisti richiedevano i prodotti e questa 
domanda gli ha permesso di partire. Si 
trattava poi di espandersi ed andare oltre 
la domanda degli occidentali espatriati. 
Sul consumatore cinese la domanda è 
cresciuta più lentamente di quanto 
sperato, in quanto era una speranza, non 
c’era nessuna indagine di mercato che 
poteva prevedere la domanda futura di 
salumi. Non avevamo fatto nessuna 
ricerca tramite questionari ai 
consumatori. Tornando indietro non la 
faremmo comunque, in quando più 
piccoli di così non potevamo farlo, al 
massimo avremmo potuto decidere di 
non farlo. Era una dimensione gestibile 
anche in caso di mancanza di domanda, 
anche nel caso fosse andata 
completamente male.  
The size of the newest plant 
(10 mln potential turnover) 
was the minimum possible. 
The demand used to come 
only from western customers 
expatriate in China, while for 
the remaining population 
there was a huge work to be 
made in order to generate the 
needed market demand.  
Plant size 
Market demand 
 Per arrivare ad 8 mln di fatturato ci 
abbiamo messo dal 2005 ad oggi, 15 anni. 
Che tutto sommato è stato un processo 
molto lento, avevamo ipotizzato il 
raggiungimento dell’obiettivo in 3/5 anni, 
mentre è stato 3 volte più lento rispetto 
alle aspettative di un normale greenfield.  
To reach the target turnover 
they needed 15 years despite 5 
years planned. 3 times slower 
than a standard greenfield.  
Process 
 Nel frattempo, lo stabilimento in Italia 
continua a produrre ed era gestito da mio 
padre. In Italia nel 2001 la Senfter Spa si 
è fusa con Unibon cooperative di Modena 
(Casa Modena) creando l’Italia Salumi 
Spa. Siamo riusciti grazie alla Cina di 
oltrepassare la trappola del sandwich che 
ci ha permesso di fonderci 50/50 con 
un’azienda già grande. L’unione di queste 
due società ha fatto che noi con una firma 
siamo diventati da piccoli a grandi 
evitando tutta la sofferenza che sta nel 
mezzo. Mio padre è rimasto presidente 
dell’azienda con le coop fino al 2018. 
Questa società però, senza effettiva 
In the meanwhile the Italian 
plant kept the production and 
in 2001 the Senfter Spa 
merged with Unibon giving life 
to Italia Salumi Spa. This merge 
was made possible thanks to 
our presence in China and 
allowed us to overcome the 
medium size company step, 
becoming a big one with only a 
signature. Senfter senior has 
remained president of the 
company until his retirement, 
in 2018, when he sold his 





maggioranza, poteva essere gestita solo 
dai fondatori in maniera efficiente, in 
quanto il suo voto era considerato più 
pesante degli altri. Arrivato quindi a 75 
anni mio padre ha deciso di vendere le 
sue quote alle coop risolvendo questa 
situazione di stallo.  
 
been difficult for his sons to 
manage a company without 
the majority.  
 Con i ricavi dell’exit in Italia è stato 
possibile avere i mezzi finanziari per 
investire maggiormente in Cina, dove 
stiamo costruendo un nuovo 
stabilimento che sarà pronto l’anno 
prossimo e ci permetterà di portare il 
fatturato a 40 mln. Non sappiamo ancora 
rispondere alla domanda di quanto 
tempo ci metteremo. Potremo metterci 
anche altri 15 anni per arrivare a 40 mln. 
Mi sono confrontato con il mondo della 
finanza e ho parlato con un analista di 
questo progetto di un fondo statale di HK, 
il più grande per il governo cinese di 
Pechino secondo cui il salumificio sarà 
sempre lento nella crescita in quanto il 
consumatore deve essere educato prima 
e questa educazione deve essere fatta 
individualmente. Ad ogni consumatore 
deve essere fatto degustare il prodotto e 
insegnato il prodotto. E questo se devi 
farlo con 1,4 mld di persone ci vuole 
tempo.  
With these shares sales 
revenues the Senfter Spa has 
decided to build a brand-new 
plant in China with a potential 
turnover of 40 mln, planned to 
be reach in 15 years.  
The main hurdle for this 
project is customers’ 
education, which has to be 
done almost individually, 
tasting, and teaching the 
different products. It takes 
time.  
Cultural trends 
EM Nonostante gli obiettivi raggiunti, ad oggi 
il consumatore cinese non è ancora 
pronto per i prodotti italiani?  
  
HS Va educato. Ma secondo il fondo, 
nonostante la crescita non sarà 
esponenziale ma lenta, motivo per cui un 
fondo non investirebbe in quanto il suo 
obiettivo è quello di massimizzare il 
profitto nel breve termine, dall’altra 
parte essendo il primo (Beretta è il 
secondo), hai il vantaggio di imporre il tuo 
gusto, una volta che il mercato sarà 
creato da te, i followers e new entrant 
dovranno adeguarsi.  
Being the first the Senfter are 
able to impose their tastes and 
all the next salumi producers 
will need to adapt to them.  
First mover 
HS Il gusto dei nostri prodotti non è quello di 
speck/affumicato, prodotti tipici dell’Alto 
Adige, ma prodotti classici più 
rappresentativi della categoria: salame 
milano, napoli, prosciutto crudo e cotto. 
Niente prodotti particolari. Già siamo in 
una nicchia, ma andando nella nicchia di 
una nicchia non rimane più niente. 
Abbiamo provato a fare lo speck con la 
They produce classic and 
standard products, because 
with typical salumi no 
customers would be found, it 




fusione con GSI nel 2001, dove c’era già 
tutta la gamma, dove non mancava nulla.   
EM Il prosciutto crudo solitamente ha 
stabilimenti dedicati per la stagionatura. 
In Cina come viene realizzato?  
  
HS  Li è tutto un unico stabilimento, è una 
specie di laboratorio artigianale che fa 
tutti i prodotti.  
  
EM La materia prima ovvero la carne la 
acquistate da macelli cinesi?  
  
HS Si sulla carne, essendo la Cina il primo 
allevatore di suini, è stato meno 
problematico, la carne fresca c’è e come 
genetica funziona abbastanza bene, in 
quanto per la loro cucina per il loro 
consumo hanno bisogno di una genetica 
un po’ grassa. Hanno una cucina abituata. 
Anche il suino autoctono cinese nero, che 
ormai non viene più allevato, era grasso. 
Oggi, anche se non ci sono più suini 
autoctoni, sono suini che rispetto allo 
standard di mercato sono più grassi.  
Raw materials (meat mainly) 
are purchased directly from 
china, where pigs have a good 
genetics for producing salumi.  
Product 
EM Canali di vendita e di distribuzione ad 
oggi.  
  
HS 40% Horeca – 40% GDO -  10% online  40% Horeca – 40% GDO -  10% 
online 
Distribution channel 
EM  Avete l’ecommerce o sfruttate un 
ecommerce di terzi? 
  
HS Abbiamo dato la gestione dell’online in 
outsourcing ma è a nostro nome. C’è 
un’agenzia specializzata che gestisce il 
nostro shop. In Cina c’è il dominio di 
Alibaba, perciò, i negozi vengono aperti 
principalmente attraverso il suo canale. 
In Cina il 90% del traffico online è su 
Alibaba, WeChat e Baidoo e se apri un tuo 
negozio online con il tuo indirizzo IP non 
ci va nessuno. Noi sfruttiamo due 
piattaforme, Alibaba e JD (Tencent – la 
stessa di WeChat) e le facciamo gestire da 
un’agenzia. Da outside è quasi 
impossibile comprendere i meccanismi di 
questi canali. Noi abbiamo provato a 
sviluppare inhouse l’online ma dopo tre 
anni l’abbiamo esternalizzato.  
Online channels are managed 
outside the company. There is 
no company ecommerce, but 
they use platforms as Alibaba 
and Tencent, given that private 
platforms are not used by 
consumers. An external 
agency is more capable of 
managing efficiently these 
platforms.  
Online 
Alibaba – Tencent  
EM Come avete affrontato le 
problematiche/crisi della peste suina e 
del Covid19? 
  
HS La peste suina è stata per noi una crisi Swine fever has been a huge Swine fever 
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esistenziale. Come GSI abbiamo ereditato 
l’utilizzo esclusivo di carne fresca per la 
realizzazione dei salumi, cosa che non 
tutti i salumifici italiani fanno. Con la crisi 
della peste suina ci è venuta a mancare il 
40/50% della produzione di carne in Cina 
e, a parte i prezzi alle stelle che non siamo 
riusciti a trasferire al consumatore, 
abbiamo affrontato un altro problema 
della mancanza dei tagli. Abbiamo 
dovuto iniziare ad utilizzare carne 
congelata di importazione, ma l’abbiamo 
fatto abbastanza tardi. Principalmente da 
Brasile, America, Spagna e Germania. 
Adesso vorremmo trovare un partner 
vicino che collabora con noi. Noi adesso 
compriamo carne di importazione 
direttamente da rivenditori cinesi, ma 
vorremmo trovare un partner in 
Germania direttamente con cui 
potremmo saltare un passaggio.  
crisis given that we used only 
fresh meat for the production. 
We needed to start purchasing 
frozen meat coming from 
Brazil, USA, Spain and 
Germany, but we could start 
doing that immediately.  
We are now looking for a 
partnership with German 
producers for directly 
purchasing meat.  
Meat price growth of 150% but 
we were able to transfer to the 
customer only 20%.  
We needed to recapitalize the 
company with the help of the 
Italian State.  
EM Perché non ricercate un partner di carne 
congelata in Italia? 
  
HS Perché l’Italia ha un suino diverso, l’Italia 
alleva un suino pesante e alleva la 
quantità di suini necessari per fare 
Parma, San Daniele e DOP e i prosciutti 
cotti nostrani. Tutta la filiera si è 
improntata su un suino che pesa 160/170 
kg come da disciplinare dei DOP. Con il 
risultato che alla fine che questa carne 
per i tagli diversi dalla coscia, allevando il 
suino 6/7 mesi al posto che 4, questo ha 
un costo nettamente più elevato. Se non 
puoi usare il nome originale e la DOP/IGP 
il costo elevato non ne vale la pena. 
Abbiamo parlato con un solo macello 
italiano, facente parte del gruppo 
Veronesi, il quale ci ha ammesso che per 
commercializzare con la Cina avranno 
bisogno di almeno un altro anno, in 
quanto i cinesi hanno imposto un 
protocollo troppo complicato, ovvero 
dovevano congelare la carne a fine linea, 
cosa che loro non avevano e che adesso 
devono costruire per poter esportare. 
Sono solo 4/5 mesi che la Cina ha 
approvato l’Italia per la carne congelata.  
We do not buy meat in Italy 
because it costs too much.  
Italian raw materials 
EM Il Covid19 in che modo ha impattato sul 
fatturato e sull’operatività?  
  
HS Il Covid19 rispetto alla peste suina è stato 
meno drammatico e non fatale. Mentre 
sulla peste suina se non avessimo avuto 
l’aiuto dallo stato italiano l’azienda 
Covid19 brought a loss of 10% 
given an increase in GDO sales 
and a complete loss from 




avrebbe chiuso. Abbiamo dovuto 
ricapitalizzare la società, non avendo 
potuto passare l’aumento del prezzo di 
acquisto della materia prima al 
consumatore finale. La materia prima ha 
quasi triplicato il prezzo (150%) ma noi i 
prezzi li abbiamo potuti aumentare 
solamente del 20%, in quanto oltre quel 
limite i prodotti non avrebbero più avuto 
mercato. La Cina va avanti anche senza i 
salumi, l’hanno fatto per 5000 anni. Tutte 
queste differenze le abbiamo dovute 
assorbire noi e abbiamo dovuto 
ripristinare le perdite dall’Italia.  
The Chinese government has 
rebated all payments of 
contributions and taxes on 
salaries recovering huge part 
of losses.  
 Il Covid19 non ha inferto così tante 
perdite, le perdite sono state circa un 
10% mensile da febbraio, marzo, aprile e 
maggio. Lo Stato cinese per 4 mesi ha 
abbuonato tutto il cuneo fiscale sugli 
stipendi (non posticipato proprio 
annullati) e questo ammontare ha 
sopperito a quasi tutte le perdite. Mentre 
sulla peste suina non ci sono state 
politiche statali di sostentamento.  
  
EM Oltre al calo di fatturato il Covid19 ha 
comportato anche un cambio di 
preferenze nelle scelte dei consumatori? 
  
HS Per alcuni mesi c’è stato un forte 
aumento di vendite in GDO, 
compensando in parte la chiusura degli 
alberghi e dei ristoranti, ottenendo un -
10% complessivo.  
  
EM Tre fattori chiave per il successo in Cina 
dell’azienda?  
  
HS Conoscenza della cultura e del mercato: 
avendo imparato non solo a parlare 
cinese ma anche a scriverlo e leggerlo 
sono riuscito a gestire un’azienda cinese 
da insider, non come la multinazionale 
che ha tutta la prima linea di manager 
occidentali, che non riescono nemmeno a 
comprendere le news nei quotidiani 
locali e impongono il loro gusto/stile, ma 
in quanto grandi se lo possono 
permettere. Nelle aziende piccoline 
come la nostra se avessimo avuto 
manager solamente occidentali saremmo 
stati miopi nella gestione. Tutto ciò 
renderebbe ancora più rischioso un 
investimento che già di per sé lo è. 
Inoltre, nella mia azienda tutti i manager 
sono cinesi e sanno dove andare, 
conoscono e vivono il mercato cinese.  
Knowledge of Chinese market 
and culture 
Western managers have a 
blind management of the 
company. If they are MNE they 
can impose their way, but 
smaller companies need to 





EM Quanti dipendenti italiani avete?    
HS Un dipendente fisso che cura il prodotto, 
il nostro Master Chef, responsabile per le 
ricette ed il gusto, per gli aspetti 
tecnologici del prodotto. È una funzione 
di staff orizzontale che non gestisce i 
dipendenti.  
The Master Chef, who is 
responsible for the recipes and 
the taste, for the technological 
aspects of the product, has 
granted all the payments of a 
fixed employee who takes care 
of the product. It is a 
horizontal staff function that 

































Attachment 4 – Beretta interview and coding  
 
COMPANY: Fratelli Beretta Spa 
INTERVIEW 21/08/2020 
LENGTH: 52 min 
With the participation 
SD Simone Donadoni – Production manager 
FB  Francesca Brusa – Marketing member 





Summary Key words 
EM In Cina presso lo stabilimento di Beretta- 
Yurun siete gli unici italiani? 
  
SD Eravamo in cinque, ad oggi che seguiamo 
la Cina siamo in quattro. Io, come 
responsabile produzione, Francesca, 
marketing e comunicazione, a cui 
purtroppo è scaduto il visto e ci seguirà 
per un periodo dall’Italia, giù c’è Nicola 
che segue la manutenzione e un 
responsabile vendite. Prima c’era anche 
mia moglie che lavorava con noi nel 
reparto affettato. Siamo quindi 5 italiani 
su un totale di circa 120 dipendenti. Non 
ci sono colleghi provenienti da terze 
nazionalità. Questo perché siamo in JV 
con 30% quote Beretta e 70% cinese. Noi 
seguiamo produzione, ricerca e sviluppo, 
portiamo giù il know how italiano.  
Beretta in China has a JV with 
Yurun, with a share of 30%. 
Italian employees present in the 
mainland are 5, who manage the 
R&D, production, marketing and 
sales, bringing the Italian know 
how in the country. While 
Chinese people are almost 120, 
production workers included. 
Chinese also manage HR.   
JV 
HRM 
EM Quali sono i vostri main competitors in 
Cina? 
  
SD ISU è il nostro competitor principale, in 
Cina è un brand recentissimo anche se 
loro sono in Cina da tantissimi anni, prima 
come GSI dopo solo come Senfter. Hanno 
creato questo brand nuovo solo per la 
Cina.  
ISU is the main competitor of 
Beretta in China, being in the 
country for years, but with a new 
brand only since 2018.  
Main competitor 
EM Com’è avvenuto il processo di 
internazionalizzazione in Cina? Quali 
sono stati i fattori che hanno portato 
Beretta ad avere successo in Cina?  
  
SD Io non ho seguito direttamente l’ingresso 
nel mercato cinese. È difficile ed è anche 
uno dei motivi per cui quando le aziende 
occidentali vogliono entrare nel mercato 
scelgono di avere una partnership con 
un’impresa locale. C’è anche qualche 
vincolo legislativo, però comunque 
Without having a partnership 
with a local company, entering 
in China would have been 
difficult, both for legal reason 
but also for bureaucratic, logistic 
and commercial reasons.  
JV 
Entering in China 
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altrimenti le difficoltà a livello 
burocratico e logistico sono veramente 
notevoli. Senza avere rapporti con enti 
cinesi è davvero difficile iniziare ed 
entrare nel mercato.  
EM Per quale motivo in Cina avete uno 
stabilimento produttivo mentre nel resto 
del continente asiatico fate solo export?  
  
FB Principalmente per motivi di origine 
legislativi, ovvero in Cina, appunto perché 
ci sono accordi particolari tra i due paesi, 
ad oggi gli unici prodotti che possiamo 
esportare dall’Italia in Cina sono 
Prosciutto di Parma e Prosciutto di San 
Daniele. Abbiamo appena ottenuto 
l’autorizzazione per uno stabilimento 
Wuber, che fa quindi prodotti cotti, per 
un paniere di prodotti abbastanza 
ridotto. Questa autorizzazione per 
questo stabilimento ha richiesto 10 anni, 
quindi molte risorse economiche. 
Ovviamente se al cliente cinese vuoi 
offrire un paniere di prodotti completo 
l’unica soluzione è produrre 
direttamente lì. Bisogna considerare che 
lo stabilimento in Cina produce 
solamente per il mercato cinese. Ciò che 
si trova nel resto dell’Asia sono prodotti 
realizzati in Italia ed esportati.  
Beretta has decided to have a 
production plant in China while 
exporting directly from Italy in 
the rest of Asia mainly for legal 
reasons. Only San Daniele and 
Parma ham have the 
authorisation to be exported in 
China from Italy, the remaining 
products are banned. Only with 
a plant in the mainland you 
would be able to sell in China.  
Now Beretta, after 10 years of 
work, it has obtained the 
permission for a little range of 
Wuber products, cooked 
products. What is made in china 
is sold in China only, while in Asia 





EM Il prodotto realizzato in Cina è differente 
rispetto a quanto prodotto in Italia?  
  
SD  No, non abbiamo volontariamente voluto 
differenziare ovvero adattare il prodotto 
italiano al mercato cinese. Logicamente 
per questione di materia prima che 
riusciamo a reperire in Cina, per la parte 
impiantistica e per l’area in cui vengono 
stagionati i prodotti il salame fatto in 
Brianza non è come quello fatto in Cina, 
logicamente sono simili ma non uguali. In 
ogni caso non per scelta. Su altri prodotti 
invece, come per esempio sui cotti, 
abbiamo scelto di adattare qualcosa ai 
prodotti meno tradizionali, come per 
esempio un prosciutto cotto affumicato. 
Tendenzialmente loro sono abituati a 
sapori forti, quindi nel mercato vanno per 
la maggiore prodotti cotti dal gusto 
intenso.  
Products are the same in Italy 
and in China as a company 
choice. Raw materials are 
slightly different, but it may 
happen that there is the same 
supplier for Italy and China 
sometimes. Machinery and 
place of aging are different, 
consequently the final result 
could change a little. On the 
other hand for cooked products 
they are trying to adapt more to 
local tastes, which are strong 
and intense, selling more a 
smoked cooked ham than a 
traditional cooked ham for 




EM Sentite l’influenza dei prodotti ISU nelle 
scelte di acquisto e  nelle preferenze dei 




FB No. Non è questione di imposizione del 
prodotto e del consumatore. C’è tanto 
insegnamento da fare al Cinese, gli devi 
raccontare la storia del prodotto, come 
viene fatto e la storia che c’è dietro.  
Chinese customers need to be 
educated, Beretta is trying to 
teach them the story of each 
single product and what is 
behind  it.  
Chinese customer 
education 
EM In che modo provvedete 
all’insegnamento del consumatore 
cinese? 
  
FB Attraverso attività di training, soprattutto 
per il personale dei supermercati che va a 
vendere il nostro prodotto, perché 
spesso non sanno nemmeno loro cosa 
vendono. Partecipiamo anche a fiere. Per 
quanto riguarda il canale Horeca non 
vendiamo direttamente al ristoratore ma 
abbiamo il contatto con lui. Beretta in 
Cina c’è da molti anni ma le attività di 
comunicazione sono sempre state 
l’ultima ruota del carro. Non siamo 
arrivati lì in modo aggressivo. Facciamo 
soprattutto promozioni in store, cooking 
class con i clienti fidelizzati di retail, store 
stand in ristorazione. Le necessità e il 
mercato rispetto all’Italia sono diverse 
(spot in tv vs cooking class). In Cina fa 
tutto parte di un progetto educational, 
molto più simile a quello che viene fatto 
nel resto dell’asia.  
Beretta is doing so with training 
activities mainly for 
supermarket employees, who 
should translate their 
knowledge to the customers. 
The company participates to 
international fairs too, to get in 
touch with Horeca sector 
customers.  
In store promotion and cooking 
classes with retail loyal 
customers are other activities 
fostered by the company.  
This educational project is 
similar to the activities 
promoted in the rest of Asia and 
fully different from marketing 
activities made in Italy. 
Beretta has been in China from 
2004 but marketing activities are 
being pursued since few years.   
Marketing and 
promotion 
EM  Horeca per espatriati ed occidentali o 
tipici cinesi?  
  
SD Solo ristoranti di fascia alta, se non 
italiani ma occidentali o internazionali. 
  
EM Quali sono quindi i vostri canali di 
distribuzione? 
  
FB Horeca, Retail (supermercati di fascia alta 
per espatriati o cinesi abbienti) ed online. 
Acquistare online in Cina è molto 
comune. Noi abbiamo due shop online sia 
su JD che su Tmall.  
Beretta distribution channels 
are high-end Horeca,  Italian and 
western, high-end retail and 
online. Online they have a shop 
both in JD and Tmall.  
Distribution 
Channel 
EM Quali sono le differenze tra JD e Tmall per 
voi? 
  
FB In realtà la nostra offerta dei prodotti è 
uguale. Forse Tmall da più prestigio al 
marchio. Se un brand ha uno shop 
certificato su Tmall accresce comunque il 
suo valore.  
The main difference among 
these two online channels is that 
Tmall gives more prestige to the 
brand. Having a certified shop in 
Tmall increases the brand value.  
Online channel 
EM Questi due shop vengono gestiti 
internamente all’azienda oppure avete 




FB Per quanto riguarda la logistica questa 
viene gestita internamente, però la 
gestione della piattaforma viene fatta da 
un’agenzia esterna. È molto complicata la 
parte burocratica e richiede un grande 
dispiego di tempo.   
Online platforms are managed 
both by a web company, since all 
the bureaucratic thing are highly 
complicated and requires too 
much time.  
Online channel 
EM Ignorando per un momento la questione 
autorizzazioni all’export, sarebbe stato 
possibile avere un e-commerce su queste 
due piattaforme direttamente dall’Italia?  
  
FB No, sarebbe stato impossibile. Anche 
perché hanno due piattaforme diverse 
per i marchi nazionali o internazionali e la 
piattaforma più utilizzata è quella dei 
brand cinesi.  
Having an online shop, also 
without thinking about the 
export authorization, without 
being in china, would have been 
almost impossible since there 
are different platforms for 
national and international 
brands and the one for 
international brand is not used 
enough. Moreover it would have 
been really difficult for the 
logistic and bureaucratic point of 
view.  
Online channel 
EM Per quanto riguarda la protezione del 
marchio, avete avuto problematiche di 
salvaguardia e di contraffazione?  
  
SD Il marchio è stato registrato fin da subito. 
Qualche anno fa avevamo fatto la 
registrazione anche dei caratteri cinesi 
perché era capitato che ce lo copiassero.  
Their trademark is registered 
also with chines characters.  
Trademark 
protection 
FB Di casi eclatanti dove ci siamo dovuti 
muovere con mezzi legali non ce ne sono 
mai stati. Certo che bisogna sempre 
mantenere l’attenzione molto alta. In 
poco tempo è facile trovare un prodotto 
con etichetta beretta.  
  
EM I consumatori che acquistano online 
riuscite a caratterizzarli? 
  
FB Sull’online è un po’ complicato. 
Riusciamo a raggiungere molte più città, 
che sono magari città di seconda fascia, 
dove non ci sono shop o le principali 
catene che serviamo acquistano online.  
With the online sales we can 
reach many more cities, also the 
second-class ones, where there 
are not high-end retails.   
Online sales 
SD Sfruttiamo la rete logistica di Yurun, che 
ha diverse agenzie dislocate in  Cina, 
create appunto per seguire l’Horeca, in 
tutte le città cinesi.  
We can do that by using the 
distribution chain of Yurun, with 
different agencies located in the 
whole country.  
Online sales 





FB Sicuramente lì è più facile l’aspetto 
comunicativo ed inoltre il consumatore è 
già abituato al consumo di salumi. Motivo 
per cui in poco tempo siamo arrivati ad 
avere tre stabilimenti.  
  
EM Rispetto a sei anni fa (quando SD è 
andato in Cina per la prima volta), i gusti 
dei consumatori cinesi si sono evoluti?  
  
FB È un processo molto lento, però il 
consumatore cinese si sta evolvendo, è 
più indirizzato verso la qualità.  
Although it is a slow process, 
Chinese customer is evolving 
and is more and more interested 
in quality of products.  
Chinese customer 
EM Gli ultimi trend di mercato dicono che il 
consumatore cinese è più attento ad 
acquistare prodotti sani e di qualità. 
Vedete questa tendenza riflessa anche 
nelle vostre vendite?  
In clear harmony with the last 
market trends.  
Chinese customer 
SD Assolutamente sì.    
EM  Lo stabilimento ad oggi produce al 
massimo o potrebbe esserci un fatturato 
potenziale maggiore?  
  
SD  Lo stabilimento non lavora al massimo 
delle sue potenzialità. Siamo circa 
all’80%. Massima capacità produttiva è di 
250 tonnellate/mese.  
The plant does not work at its 
full potential, but at about 80%. 
The maximum production 
capacity is 250 tons/month. 
Revenues 
EM  La gestione delle risorse umane viene 
effettuata dall’Italia o dal partner cinese?  
  
SD Le risorse umane sono seguite dal partner 
cinese. Noi seguiamo di più la parte 
tecnica, di prodotto e commerciale.  
  
EM WeChat lo utilizzate?   
FB È in progetto.  WeChat is work in progress.  Online sales 
EM Come materia prima la acquistate 
direttamente in Cina? 
  
SD  Inizialmente veniva utilizzata materia 
prima cinese. Nel corso degli anni, la 
svolta è stata 4 anni fa, dove i prezzi della 
materia prima cinese sono andati alle 
stelle, poi c’è stato il picco dell’anno 
scorso con la peste suina. Principalmente 
per il mix qualità e prezzo della carne 
abbiamo deciso di importare da fuori 
carne congelata. Quindi noi ad oggi 
compriamo il 100% della carne che 
usiamo nello stabilimento, da Germania, 
Olanda, Spagna o Sudamerica.  
Initially it was used Chinese raw 
material. There were two pivotal 
moments that changed the 
purchase policy. Four years ago, 
Chinese commodity prices 
skyrocketed, then there was a 
further spike with swine fever. 
As a result, mainly for the quality 
and price mix of meat they 
decided to import from outside 
frozen meat. So today they buy 




factory, from Germany, Holland, 
Spain or South America. 
EM In Italia producete solamente con carne 
italiana?  
  
SD No, dipende dal tipo di salumi.    
FB Per esempio, qui in Italia abbiamo una 
linea completamente antibiotic free 
(puro beretta) e la materia prima di quei 
prodotti è principalmente danese perché 
sono molto attenti a quegli aspetti.  
  
EM Voi avete solamente salumifici?   
SD Non abbiamo macelli, ma solamente due 
tre allevamenti. Comunque, non 
sufficiente per il fabbisogno produttivo. 
La carne di suino presente in Italia penso 
sia solamente il 60% del fabbisogno.  
  
EM  Se in Italia usavate già carne di 
importazione immagino non abbiate 
avuto difficoltà ad utilizzare una materia 
prima importata e congelata.  
  
SD Sì anzi a volte sono addirittura gli stessi 
fornitori che forniscono l’Italia che 
mandano qui la carne.  
In Italy they use 40% of imported 
meat, reason why they did not 
have huge problems in 
importing in China. Moreover it 
may happen that some suppliers 
are the same for both countries.  
Raw materials 
EM  Mi sembra strano come voi in Cina non 
abbiate variato il vostro prodotto 
essendo nel settore food, industria multi-
domestica in cui il prodotto va adattato al 
mercato.  
  
FB È proprio una filosofia aziendale, di 
essere ambassador del mondo del cibo 
italiano in particolare nel mondo dei 
salumi.  
Our company policy is to be an 
ambassador of the Italian 
culture in the food/salumi field.  
Products  
EM  Quindi riassumendo con la peste suina 
non avete avuto problemi dal momento 
che importavate già carne dall’estero.  
  
SD Abbiamo avuto problemi perché anche 
nei mercati esteri si sono impennati i 
prezzi ed era difficile trovare materia 
prima, visto che qualcosa compriamo 
dall’estero e altro, anche se importato, 
direttamente dal mercato cinese. La 
vendita era diventata quasi un’asta 
giorno per giorno. Un paio di referenze 
per due mesi sono andate fuori 
produzione. Siamo stati quindi costretti 
With the swine fever the prices 
had a huge increase also in the 
forex market and it was difficult 
to find enough raw material at 
an acceptable price. The prices 
to market had an increase of 
30% at the end and now is still 




ad aumentare i prezzi del 30% in più step 
e il consumatore ha continuato in parte 
ad acquistare, anche perché è stato un 
aumento da parte di tutti i consumatori. 
Ad oggi i prezzi sono leggermente calati 
ma non ai livelli di prima.  
EM Ha avuto un impatto maggiore la peste 
suina o il coronavirus?  
  
SD Il coronavirus l’abbiamo sentito molto ma 
per due mesi, febbraio è stato il mese 
peggiore di sempre, era tutto chiuso, 
marzo così così. Da fine aprile era quasi 
alla normalità, anche perché in Cina, tolto 
Yuan, il resto era tutto aperto, anche se il 
consumatore era spaventato e rimaneva 
più a casa. L’horeca non ha acquistato per 
due mesi mentre le vendite retail sono 
aumentate, come abbiamo avuto un 
picco nell’online dove e vendite ad oggi 
continuano ad essere maggiori rispetto a 
prima del lockdown. Comunque, il nostro 
consumatore target è dai 30 in su.  
Swine fever has been worse the 
covid19.  The coronavirus we felt 
a lot but for two months, 
February was the worst month 
ever, it was all closed, so March. 
By the end of April it was almost 
normal, also because in China, 
after Yuan, the rest was open, 
even if the consumer was scared 
and stayed more at home. The 
Horeca has not bought for two 
months while retail sales have 
increased, as we had a peak in 
the online where and sales to 
date continue to be higher than 
before the lockdown. 
Covid19 
EM  Formazione del personale italiano in 
Cina.  
  
FB  Ognuno di noi ha fatto un percorso 
differente, anche perché ricopriamo 
posizioni differenti. Simone ha fatto anni 
di esperienza in Beretta, un periodo di 
formazione in accademy al termine di cui 
gli è stata fatta la proposta di lavorare 
all’estero. Dopo una serie di colloqui e un 
periodo di 6 mesi di traning è partito. Io 
ho studiato lingue orientali e mi hanno 
assunta per andare direttamente in Cina, 
avevano bisogno di qualcuno di 
incontaminato.  
Each of the Italian people in 
china has a different 
background, it depends also the 
position they have in the 
company. For sure marketing 
and sales have studied language 
and knew Chinese culture and 
people before. While production 
people were keener on company 




EM  Qual era la vostra conoscenza del 
consumatore cinese prima di trasferirvi? 
  
FB  Bisogna differenziare chi ha mansioni 
produttive rispetto al marketing e 
commerciale per esempio. Entrambi 
abbiamo studiato lingue orientali, 
ovviamente è differente rispetto 
all’essere sul campo ma avevamo 
comunque un minimo di background. Ero 
già stata in Cina per motivi di studi che è 
differente. Nel nostro caso il training qui 
è stato fatto per conoscere la realtà 
aziendale in Italia, ma comunque in Cina 




qualcuno di vergine che riesca ad 
assimilare il più possibile e ad essere 
meno influenzata dallo stile italiano.  
EM Avete avuto difficoltà a comprendere il 
mercato cinese oppure è un processo 
seppur lento ma progressivo? 
  
FB Sono molti anni che siamo lì e dunque 
abbiamo un background e una 
conoscenza del mercato che è notevole. 
Un nuovo potenziale attore dei salumi 
che dovesse entrare in Cina avrebbe 
molte difficoltà in quanto non è semplice.  
Gli anni del passato sono anni preziosi.  
The way to Chinese customers is 
for sure not a speed one. It has 
been years since when beretta 
has come to china and the 
background in the market is 
relevant. Any other competitor 
who could try to approach that 
market would not find an easy 





EM Quali sono stati i fattori del successo in 
Cina di Beretta? 
  
SD Avere personale italiano li. Mantenere 
elevata la qualità del prodotto.  
Success factor for Beretta in 
China have been having Italian 
employees and keeping 
products quality high.  
Success factor 
FB  Avere un partner cinese, per conoscenza 
del mercato cinese e per questioni 
burocratico legislative. Anche se negli 
anni ci sono stati alti e bassi comunque è 
stato fondamentale.  
Having a Chinese partner has 
been important too.  
Success factor 
EM  Per quanto riguarda l’export delle DOP è 
semplice l’export oppure è complicato 
dal punto di vista burocratico e richiede 
una conoscenza particolare del 
consumatore?  
  
FB Noi esportiamo il Prosciutto di Parma dal 
2007. Ancora adesso il processo 
burocratico e di dogana è complicato e 
non sempre avviene con successo, degli 
intoppi ci possono essere. Comunque, 
per noi le persone che fanno tutta questa 
procedura le fanno da anni.  
Beretta export Parma ham since 
2007, some problems may 
happen but within the Consorzio 
there are specialised people for 
that activity.  
DOP export 
EM Esportate più Parma di San Daniele?   
FB Si, perché il Parma ha una fascia di prezzo 
differente, più bassa del San Daniele  e il 
consorzio fa maggiori attività di 
comunicazione, molto probabilmente per 
la mole di prosciutti prodotti (10 mln di 
parma vs 2 mln di San Daniele).  
Parma has invested more than 
San Daniele in marketing 
activities in China mainland . 
moreover San Daniele has a 
higher price and a lower number 
of hams (2 mln vs 10 mln).  
Parma VS San 
Daniele 
EM  L’autorizzazione del prodotto Wuber per 




FB  Perché sappiamo che anche se spesso la 
qualità è comparabile il purchaser è più 
attento al prodotto importato rispetto a 
quello prodotto direttamente in loco.  
They needed the authorisation 
of Wuber products because 
although the quality of thing 
made in china is similar to Italy it 
is still not the same.  
Export 
authorisation  
EM  Collaborate con la camera di commercio 
italiana?  
  
SD No, sono più focalizzate sugli importatori 
che non su produttori di medie 
dimensioni come noi.  
  
EM  Referenze di prodotti in Cina.    
SD  Assortimento di salami: milano, 
ungherese, napoli, spianate, al tartufo, 
finocchiona, sopressa, salametto. 
Bresaola, coppa. Prosciutto crudo, anche 
se vendiamo più le Dop. Speck.  
Assortment of salami: milano, 
hungarian, napoli, spianate, al 
tartufo, finocchiona, sopressa, 
salametto. Bresaola, coppa. Raw 
ham, even if we sell more dop. 
Speck. 
Products 
EM Vi conviene fare diverse e numerose 
referenze di salami piuttosto che i 
due/tre classici? 
  
SD Sì, perché raggiungiamo gran parte della 
Cina e i distributori hanno i nostri 
prodotti e riescono a differenziare, dal 
momento che la maggior parte delle volte 
il consumatore è l’occidentale che vive in 
Cina e sa apprezzare i diversi sapori. 
It is better for them to produce 
more references because their 
customers are mainly 
expatriates and can understand 
the value of these products.  
Products 
EM Vendete maggiormente il prosciutto 
prodotto in Cina o le DOP? 
  
SD Le DOP.    
EM  In quanto a tecnologie di produzione è 
più difficile reperire macchinari/ricambi 
in Cina o in Italia. 
  
SD  In Cina, principalmente per le distanze. 
Noi usiamo gli stessi macchinari che 
abbiamo dall’Italia, cambiando 
eventualmente distributore. L’assistenza 
e i ricambi sono molto più difficili da 
seguire, per assurdo l’elemento viene 
prodotto in Cina ma assemblato e gestito 
in Europa. Inoltre, la preparazione dei 
tecnici cinesi è nettamente inferiore, in 
quanto la casa madre è distante e la 
formazione è più blanda.  
 Spare parts and 
machinery 
EM  Come si differenzia la produzione con 
operai cinesi rispetto agli europei? 
  
SD La difficoltà principale è avere personale 
a cui insegnare nel tempo, stabile, girano 
The main difficulty is to have 





tantissimo, soprattutto uomini fascia 
20/30/35 cambiano molto 
frequentemente, alla ricerca di uno 
stipendio anche solo leggermente più 
alto. A noi assolutamente non conviene 
aumentargli lo stipendio, a meno che non 
sia una persona chiave. Da sei anni a 
questa parte le dinamiche sono sempre 
state uguali. L’unica cosa è che abbiamo 
capito qual è la tipologia di operaio che 
rimane più nel tempo, ovvero la donna 
locale, tra i 25/40 anni, con già ½ figli e 
quindi non ha particolari ambizioni. 
turn a lot, especially men in the 
20/30/35 range change very 
frequently, looking for a salary 
even slightly higher. We 
absolutely do not want to 
increase his salary unless he is a 
key person. For six years, the 
dynamics have always been the 
same. The only thing is that they 
have understood what is the 
type of worker that remains 
more in time, that is the local 
woman, between 25/40 years, 
with children already ½ and 
therefore has no particular 
ambitions. 
EM In quanto ad autocontrollo i protocolli 
sono uguali o differenti all’Italia? 
  
SD Lavorando con clienti internazionali 
siamo obbligati a mantenere dei 





LENGTH: 14 min 
With the participation 
AB Andrea Beretta - Family Member 
EM Eleonora Milesi 
 
EM Com’è iniziata l’esperienza di Beretta in Cina? 
AB È nato tutto nel 2004, quando un nostro fornitore di impianti ci ha messo in contatto con 
un’azienda cinese, che è tutt’oggi nostro partner (Yuber food). Loro avevano iniziato in autonomia 
a produrre salumi occidentali, hanno però capito che mancava un po’ di know how e hanno chiesto 
supporto per trovare un partner al loro fornitore di impianti. Noi abbiamo iniziato 
progressivamente. Abbiamo mandato lì un tecnico industriale/alimentare per implementare una 
piccola produzione e mostrargli come si poteva fare il salume italiano, poi ormai creatosi il 
contatto nel 2006 abbiamo fatto il primo vero accordo, che era un accordo commerciale, sulla 
distribuzione del Prosciutto di Parma in Cina, costituendo una JV solamente per l’export. Subito 
però nei mesi successivi, a cavallo tra il 2006 e il 2007 il socio cinese ci ha chiesto maggior 
supporto, dandoci a disposizione spazi, impianti e altro e c’è stato quindi il primo trasferimento di 
un nostro commerciale/finance in Cina, più un tecnico di produzione e l’anno successivo nel 2008 
è nata questa piccola realtà di Beretta in Cina, una realtà commerciale che si occupava di vendere 
sia i prodotti di importazione che ciò che veniva prodotto direttamente li. Questo fino al 
18/02/2012, quando è stato inaugurato il nuovo stabilimento di 9000 m2 dove tutta la tecnologia 
è arrivata dagli stessi fornitori che abbiamo in Italia, sia per quanto riguarda la lavorazione delle 
carni che per quanto riguarda la stagionatura, l’affettamento e il confezionamento. Fornitori che 
sono italiani o europei come nel caso dell’affettamento. Li abbiamo iniziato con due tecnici, uno 
che si occupava della produzione e uno del confezionamento, un ragazzo italiano che si occupava 
della manutenzione, un altro ragazzo che si occupa del commerciale e finanziario, e l’ultimo 
ingresso è stata la Francesca che hai conosciuto che si occupava del brand in Cina.  
EM La vostra esperienza all’estero, in America o in Europa, vi ha aiutato ad entrare ed avere successo?  
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AB  No. Non è stata utile per tre semplici fattori.  
1. L’identità del mercato, nonostante sia una nazione di 1 mld di persone, la cultura della salumeria 
è poco matura. Mentre in America questa è molto più intrinseca e ci ha permesso di effettuare 
investimenti molto diversi da quelli fatti in Cina. Sia come tipologia di prodotti sia come impianti. 
2. i volumi di ogni referenza erano molto più grossi in America, pertanto la valutazione sugli 
investimenti è stata quella di dire facciamo nuove tecnologie per produrre grosse quantità di 
volumi in poco tempo ecc.  ecc. 
3. In America siamo da soli e non in JV, quindi noi come famiglia possiamo decidere quello che 
vogliamo, il rischio è tutto nostro, non siamo influenzati da niente e da nessuno. Lavori con la tua 
testa e con il tuo cuore e come famiglia decidi di prendere determinate decisioni. Diverso è quando 
hai un socio a 12500 km di distanza con 7 fusi orari, le decisioni le prendi in maniera più diversa, 
ponderata e precauzionale.   
EM Il rapporto con la JV è sempre stato lineare o turbolento? Il rapporto di fiducia come si è 
instaurato? 
AB  Perché mi fai questa domanda? Cosa sai che io so ma che tu non dovresti sapere?  
EM  Non so nulla, ma nel modello Uppsala learning e trust building sono due pilastri fondamentali, a 
maggior ragione nel caso di una JV.  
AB Quando sei tu che vieni cercato per il know-how che devi esportare in una nazione è molto difficile 
che il socio che ti accoglie ti metta i paletti tra le ruote e ti dica come fare le cose. Quando un 
partner ti cerca per fare del puro business come nel caso dei cinesi, loro si affidano completamente 
a te. Siamo partiti con la JV che dovevamo fare solo la produzione, la realtà dei fatti è che, anche 
se non è contrattualizzato, ci occupiamo di produzione, di commerciale, di finanziario e di brand.  
EM  Come mai la partnership con loro è stata necessaria agli inizi e continua ad esserlo? 
AB Se non ci fossero stati loro probabilmente oggi non saremmo in Cina. Allo stesso modo però ad 
oggi se fossimo in Cina da soli sarebbe un po’ più facile.  
EM  La mia curiosità era capire se ci fossero differenze o similitudini con ISU. 
AB Se tu credi che non ci siano differenze tra Beretta e ISU la prendo come un’offesa personale. 
Tecnicamente dovresti dirmi tu che ci sono differenze abissali tra un marchio ISU che faccio un po’ 
fatica a trovare l’italianità e la credibilità di trovarsi ad essere su un mercato difficile come quello 
cinese e trovarsi a vendere un prodotto italiano con un nome anonimo. La gente non è sciocca. 
Tant’è che oggi noi vendevamo i prodotti con il doppio logo, il nostro logo beretta e Yurun. Ci 
siamo trovati un giorno a dire, ragazzi noi vogliamo vendere più prodotti, vogliamo vendere più 
salumi italiani in Cina. Per i cinesi era: volete fare più soldi? Per i cinesi vendere un bullone o un 
salame è lo stesso. Diverso è per noi italiani, in particolare noi che siamo una famiglia. Noi ci 
teniamo alle cose, a dove andiamo e alla reputazione che abbiamo. Questa coesistenza di logo 
cinese/italiano creava dubbi ai consumatori, e invece con il logo singolo il messaggio è stato molto 
più chiaro. Uno dei capisaldi del contratto di JV era 30% logo italiano e 70% logo cinese. Ci siamo 
trovati dopo 4 anni a dire che o cambiavamo le cose o non avremmo più venduto. Siamo quindi 
partiti con linee dedicate con solo logo beretta, di modo che l’italianità del prodotto fosse 
immediata agli occhi del consumatore.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
